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Originally posted by Aelita
I can't help thinking that one of the factors that was helping to contain the growing Iran's dominance in the region was Saddam Hussein's Iraq. I know it was not of great strategic importance after the first Gulf War, and still -- there was some kind of check and balance to Iran.
Was it not a better idea to build a relationship with Saddam such that he would counter Iran's strategic dominance? We could have armed and trained his army to do the fighting.
I know it's a moot point.
Originally posted by Aelita
I can't help thinking that one of the factors that was helping to contain the growing Iran's dominance in the region was Saddam Hussein's Iraq. I know it was not of great strategic importance after the first Gulf War, and still -- there was some kind of check and balance to Iran.
Was it not a better idea to build a relationship with Saddam such that he would counter Iran's strategic dominance? We could have armed and trained his army to do the fighting.
I know it's a moot point.
It forecast that in a deeply divided Iraqi society, with Sunnis resentful over the loss of their dominant position and Shiites seeking power commensurate with their majority status, there was a significant chance that the groups would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying power prevented it. And it anticipated that a foreign occupying force would itself be the target of resentment and attacks -- including by guerrilla warfare -- unless it established security and put Iraq on the road to prosperity in the first few weeks or months after the fall of Saddam.
In addition, the intelligence community offered its assessment of the likely regional repercussions of ousting Saddam. It argued that any value Iraq might have as a democratic exemplar would be minimal and would depend on the stability of a new Iraqi government and the extent to which democracy in Iraq was seen as developing from within rather than being imposed by an outside power. More likely, war and occupation would boost political Islam and increase sympathy for terrorists' objectives -- and Iraq would become a magnet for extremists from elsewhere in the Middle East.
Rapid democratization, meanwhile, could be positively harmful in Iraq. In a Maoist people's war, empowering the population via the ballot box undermines the insurgents' case that the regime is illegitimate and facilitates nonviolent resolution of the inequalities that fuel the conflict. In a communal civil war [like Iraq], however, rapid democratization can further polarize already antagonistic sectarian groups. In an immature polity with little history of compromise, demonizing traditional enemies is an easy -- and dangerous -- way to mobilize support from frightened voters. And as the political scientists Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have shown, although mature democracies rarely go to war with other democracies, emerging democracies are unusually bellicose. Political reform is critical to resolving communal wars, but only if it comes at the right time, after some sort of stable communal compromise has begun to take root.
posted by Aelita: “I think one of the factors helping to contain Iran's dominance in the region was Saddam's Iraq . . it was not of great strategic importance after the first Gulf War, still - there was some check and balance to Iran. Was a better idea to build a relationship with Saddam to counter Iran's strategic dominance? We could have armed and trained his army to do the fighting. I know it's a moot point. [Edited by Don W]