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For example, the range of the Backfire medium bomber was considerably overestimated, and the number of Backfires the Soviet Union would acquire by 1984 was overestimated by more than 100 percent (estimating 500 when the real figure was 235). Team B overestimated the accuracy of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, feeding the unwarranted fears of a "window of vulnerability" for the US ICBM deterrent. Team B estimated that the Soviet Union would field a mobile ABM system, which it did not. It regarded as ominous, rather than reassuring, that no intelligence information had been acquired on Soviet development of a nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare capability, again raising concerns over a looming threat that did not arise.
Team B saw as a "serious concern" the possible upgrading of Soviet mobile intermediate range missiles (SS-20s) to ICBMs and criticized the draft NIE for estimating that the SS-16 mobile ICBM program would remain small. In the event, no SS-16s were deployed, and no SS-20s were upgraded to ICBMs. With respect to exotic technologies for ABM defense, Team B castigated the NIE for failing to draw more attention to the threat of Soviet development of charged particle-beam directed energy interceptors, stating that it would be "difficult to overestimate" the magnitude of the Soviet effort, yet by those very alarmist words it did so. The large-scale but ineffective Soviet civil defense efforts were also depicted as an important part of a Soviet design to be able to fight, and win, a nuclear war. Team B even suggested incredibly that the ABM Treaty helped the Soviet leaders "to pursue a goal of achieving assured survival of the USSR and assured destruction for its major adversary."
Team B also reported "an intense military buildup in nuclear as well as conventional forces" and criticized the NIEs for failing to describe adequately the scale of the Soviet military effort. While Team B was estimating a relentless, continuing buildup at a growing pace, it was later learned that, in fact, Soviet leaders had just cut back the rate of spending on their military effort and would not increase it for the next nine years. To be sure, the Soviet Union continued to spend a great deal on its large military programs, but it was not the limitless buildup in pursuit of a war-winning capability that Team B ascribed. Team B went even further. Its report argued at length that there was no constraining effect resulting from the requirements of the civilian economy. The NIEs were attacked for even suggesting that economic considerations might limit Soviet military growth, and Team B itself asserted that "Soviet strategic forces have yet to reflect any constraining effect of civil economy competition, and are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future."
www.cia.gov...
Originally posted by ShadowXIX
Your better believe GDP and money matters. If it didnt Russia wouldnt try so hard to sell its military equipment or anything around the world.
That would only be Russian resources leaving the country and they are only getting fake money in return. They wanted so bad to sell the AN-94 to other countries and found no takers.
Only elite forces of the Russian Army and Ministry of the Internal Affairs are armed with this Assault Rifle. One interesting detail is that the "Abakan" unlike virtually every other Russian infantry weapon is not for sale to foreign buyers.
www.enemyforces.com...
The ASN can be viewed essentially as the Russian version of the American Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW), as it is truly different from any rifle ever fielded or developed by the Soviet/ Russian firearms industry and represents a significant improvement in performance over the Kalashnikov designs that it will replace. The ASN has appeared on an irregular basis at arms show inside Russia, but unlike virtually every other Russian infantry weapon, the ASN is emphatically not for sale to foreign buyers.
warfare.ru...
can I explain why Russia has had drastic years of decline in its nuclear stockpile from the Soviet era one it had? Thats the real question
If they are planning for some secret nuclear strike you would think they would want more nuclear weapons.
The main reason Russia puts so much effort into its shrunken nuclear forces is because its the only thing that underscore its status as a powerful nation. Their convential army power projection is in the crapper.
Where is the evidence for this ABM defense system? Is this the same system you claimed can shot done 90% of ALCM, Where is the real evidence for any such system
Meanwhile, Russia's de facto national missile-defense network, with at least 8,000 modern interceptors and 12 long-range radars, will gain in strategic importance as the United States and Russia decrease the number of offensive nuclear weapons to lower and lower levels.
And:
The Moscow-system missiles, the SA-5 and SA-10/12, were tipped with small nuclear warheads so they didn't require the incredible bullet-hitting-bullet complexity of the U.S. systems developed during the Clinton years. U.S. spy satellites repeatedly identified tactical nuclear-warhead storage sites at the interceptor bases spread across the Soviet empire.
And:
* G.V. Kisun'ko, the chief designer of the ABM systems developed or deployed around Moscow for more than three decades, confirms in a 1996 memoir that large Hen House and Dog House radars at Sary Shagan were designed as battle-management radars for the early Soviet ABM system for the defense of Moscow. Kisun'ko also stated that the SA-5 was designed as a dual-purpose SAM/ABM in conjunction with the Hen House radars.
And:
* B.V. Bunkin, the designer of the follow-on SA-10 and SA-12 (S-300 PMU and S-300V in Russian nomenclature) missile systems, and several other Russian sources, confirmed that these also were dual-purpose SAM/ABMs. SA-10s largely have replaced the thousands of SA-5 interceptors deployed across the Soviet empire during the Cold War. Bunkin's latest SAM/ABM design, the SA-20, is scheduled to begin deployment this year.
www.findarticles.com...
When the Soviet Empire went out with a whimper in 1991, about 10,000 SA-5/10 interceptor missiles were operational at more than 250
complexes, and 15 of 18 planned battle-management radars--nine Hen House and six LPARs--were operational.
Russia inherited most of the Soviet empire's illegal national ABM defenses. Although the Hen Houses and LPARs located in the successor states
created significant gaps in coverage, Russia still controls 12 or 13 of those radars. Consequently, SAM/ABMs still defend most of the Russian
Federation from U.S. ICBMs, much of the SLBM threat, and Chinese missiles. Scheduled completion of the LPAR in Belorus will restore complete
threat coverage, except for the gap left by the dismantled Krasnoyarsk LPAR. Granted, the Hen Houses are old, but the United States has been
operating similar radars for 40 years.
Despite its economic difficulties, Russia continued development and production of the SA-10, adding (in 1992-1993 and 1997) two models with
new missiles and electronics and replacing more than 1000 SA-5 missiles with late model SA-10s having greatly improved performance against
ballistic missiles of all ranges. Russia is protected by as at least as many (about 8500) SAM/ABMs as in 1991, and they are more effective.
No wonder Russia shows little concern for its proliferation of missile and nuclear technology.
Even more impressively, Russia has begun flight-testing the fourth generation "S-400" ("Triumph") SAM/ABM designed not only to end the
"absolute superiority" of air assault demonstrated by the United States in the 1992 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo operation, but also to
improve Russia's illegal ABM defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. The S-400 is scheduled to begin deployment in 2000, more
testimony to Russia's commitment to maintaining its national ABM defenses in violation of the ABM Treaty.
www.security-policy.org...
Over the past decade, Russia has deployed thousands of S-300V and Antey-2500 missiles around its key military and industrial complexes. In
addition, it has exported these systems throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East as a means of financing its ailing economy in the wake
of the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse. According to Aviation Week & Space Technology, “in the worldwide competition to sell ballistic missile
defense systems, the Russian Antey Corp.’s S-300V is a main contender.”(8) The advantage for buyers of Russian surface-to-air missiles is
that, unlike buying from the U.S., there are no political strings attached and, more often than not, the weapons are significantly cheaper
than their U.S. counterparts
www.missilethreat.com...
"Full antimissile defence the length of the perimeter of the borders
of Europe and Russia is not planned," Ivashov said. "It is intended to
concentrate all that we already have, coordinating ABM systems, obtaining
opportunities to destroy ballistic missiles and opportunities in the
command structure, and directing those opportunities in directions
presenting a missile danger."
He said that the systems should cover peacekeeping contingents, and
the civilian population and civilian facilities as well as military
facilities, damage to which could cause significant harm to civilians.
The Russian side has no doubt that "NATO members will not start
purchasing Russian ABM systems on a large scale, like the modernized
S-300PMU or the new S-400, which can effectively combat ballistic
missiles, although NATO's European members do not have systems like
these", Ivashov said. Moscow does not in any case intend to extend its
missile technology to NATO countries, and Sergeyev said this frankly in
Brussels a few days ago.
www.fas.org...
The missile had to have minimal reaction time, improved military utility, minimum time to target, ease of manufacture, and operate under a wider range of climatic conditions. The production missile had to be a 'certified round' - have a guaranteed reliability throughout its lifetime. The result was the TPK combined launch and transport container. This container was never opened between the time it left the factory and the launch of the missile inside. The vertical launch technique adopted used a catapult accelerator within the container to pop the missile to an altitude 20 m above the launcher, where the main motor ignited. The 4M330 featured the world's first gas-dynamic steering system, allowing quick manoeuvrability when homing in on the target.
And:
In 1995 MKB Fakel developed a new 48N6E2 missile for the S-300PMU system, the Favorit. This had a capability against medium range ballistic missiles, incorporating lessons learened from Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War. In that war the surface-to- air missiles would successfully intercept the incoming rockets but the incoming warheads would still get through. Favorit was tested against a series of Scud launches at Kapustin Yar and succeeded in destroying every warhead. As with other modern Russian surface-to-air missiles, the Favorit is launched verticallly, and only in the air after clearing the launcher does it pitch over in the direction of the target. This technique proved of great interest to other surface-to-air missile developers, notably France.
And:
In 1999 MKB Fakel announced development of new rocket versions 9M96E and 9M96E2. Development of these new missiles had begun in the 1980's. The missiles had, respectively, masses of 330 and 420 kg, ranges of from 1 to 40 and 1 to 120 km, and altitude capabilities of from 5 to 20 and 5 to 30 km. Both were ejected by a cold gas cartridge from vertical container-launchers, the motor igniting 30 m in the air above the container. They were equipped with self-contained inertial guidance with updates from the ground, and used gas dynamic steering. Near the target they were capable of what the Russians called 'hyper-manoeuvring', being able to turn 20 degrees in 0.025 seconds. Trials showed the missiles had a 70% kill rate in intercepts of tactical missile re-entry vehicle's, with miss distances of a few metres. This extreme accuracy allowed a light (24 kg) warhead to be carried. The mobile launcher carried four rocket containers. In the S-300PMU-1 variant, launchers for the 5V55R, 48n6Ye, or 48N6Ye2 rockets could be mounted interchangeably on a single vehicle. By the time the latest version went into production, MKB Fakel had produced over 16 basic types of surface-to-air missile, 30 modernisations of these basic versions, and exported missiles to over 50 countries.
www.astronautix.com...
Now this is bordering on pure speculation too raw fantasy.
The Red Mafia is about one thing making money for the people in it and they aint giving it to a goverment that keep them down for decades.
Only with the fall of the USSR have they become super powerful. The Soviets would not tolerate a power stronger then them and they kept the mafia in check.
They used the chaos of the fall to there advantage.
If Russia has any plans after this Nuclear war that include anything more then hiding in their bunkers they better have a large well equiped army.
According to US intelligence sources, Iraqi forces invading Kuwait carried chemical weapons, mostly in the form of artillery shells. Satellite photographs showed special troops unloading the weapons from stockpiles during the buildup of forces preceding the invasion. Decontamination equipment was moved into Kuwait (CWCB, Sept 1990).
Producers are scrambling to meet the demand for protective gear. But what type of equipment are they making?
After spending over $100 million to develop respirators (cf. the $6 to $8 million required to develop the British S-10 respirator), the US Army continues to rely heavily on the 40-year old M-17 model, which fails to meet basic NATO standards. The improved newer models are still said to be a ``disastrous combination of poorly conceived and executed technology.'' For example, the MCU-2P requires an attached rubber-coated hood to offer even minimum protection, and the hood contributes greatly to heat stress. US allies, such as Israel, find US respirators and hoods unacceptable.
For eight years, scientists at a defense research establishment in the Netherlands have been demonstrating the effect of dropping chemical agents on standard US Army protective clothing: they splash right through. According to Evan Koslow, former editor of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense and Technology, there is no deployed NBC protective uniform in the free world that fails this test, except in the US (Armed Forces Journal International, May, 1990).
US protective garments are made of permeable fabric with a lining of activated charcoal. Other nations manufacture garments of impermeable material as well. The rationale for the US choice of gear is to minimize heat stress. However, a soldier still cannot work in the suits for longer than half an hour in desert sunlit conditions. External evaporative cooling like that used with Soviet equipment can, under some conditions, extend endurance to two hours, but would inactivate the charcoal in American suits.
All currently available protective equipment could be defeated by the use of new agents, for example perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB). PFIB penetrates conventional activated carbon, the universal NBC air-filtering agent. Such agents would seep through treaties also, since these cover only substances currently believed to be useful for chemical warfare (ibid.)
www.oism.org...
Because both Russia and the US would both be in ruin and other up and comming super powers with way more people will be intact and in perfect position to expand on a weakened Russia or the US.
In 1968, Radio Moscow reported that the most reliable protection available against nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons was "evacuation from large cities and industrial areas". Soviet leaders assumed that American attacks would be centered around cities and industrial centers, so with proper warning time, Soviet citizens could escape to rural and suburban areas without harm.
In the event of an American nuclear attack, there were nine (9) different warning signals that could be broadcast throughout the city. One of these signals (which corresponded to different levels of urgency) would be played all over the city using sirens, loudspeakers, whistles, and radios.
When citizens heard the signal, they were instructed to move to a pre-assigned location, or "collection point", from which they would be evacuated to rural or suburban areas, out of harm's way. Every available mode of transportation (including trucks, cars, trains and buses) would be used to get as many people as possible away from the city center in the shortest amount of time.
www.piedmontcommunities.us...=
page&GID=01303001151018293682662999&PG=01304001151018318529636575
This dispersal plan had a huge impact on city planning in the Soviet Union. When new cities were built, they were planned as dispersed
cities with suburban populations instead of centralized towns (see above).
Changes to existing cities included constructing wide streets, artificial reservoirs, and a network of highways around the city, as well as
reducing building density to reduce the possibility of blast and fire damage.
The Soviets, therefore, assumed that they would have enough advance warning of an American attack to implement the aforementioned evacuation
and dispersal exercises. Through the use of these removals, pre-attack warning systems, and improved city planning, Soviet military leaders
hoped to reduce the number of civilian and economic (industrial) losses.
www.piedmontcommunities.us...=page&GID=
01303001151018293682662999&PG=01304001151018318529636575
Industrial dispersal. The Soviets have been involved in an industrial dispersal program for more than 15 years. Their approach to the program has been and continues to be the siting of new industrial complexes in towns and settlements with populations of 100,000 people or less. The program has several advantages for the Soviets. First, it is of great economic importance from the standpoint of accelerating and expanding their economic development; this is especially true regarding growth of such sparsely developed areas as Siberia. Second, it prevents high concentrations of industry in a small number of large industrial centers and helps the Soviets make better use of their abundant natural resources. Third, dispersal creates a proliferation of aimpoints for U.S. strategic planners and greatly complicates targeting tasks.
And:
Industrial hardening. The Soviets have an ongoing program designed to harden their industrial base. Included in this program are underground facilities, new plant construction techniques, construction of duplicate plants, retrofit hardening of existing facilities, and expedient techniques. The first three hardening methods can be productively utilized only for new facilities and require a long lead time for fruition. The fourth method, retrofit hardening of existing facilities, has near-term implications but is expensive. The fifth means, expedient techniques, is relatively inexpensive and has short-term implications; it will be the focus of this discussion.
If current Soviet expedient hardening preparations for protection of their industrial base are implemented on a large scale, the effectiveness of a U.S. retaliatory capability could be significantly degraded. By utilizing relatively inexpensive and simple expedient techniques such as packing machinery in sandbags, the Soviets could make their industry relatively invulnerable to overpressures of a few pounds per square inch (psi). Depending on the specific precautions taken in mounting and protecting machines, they can be made to survive overpressures in the range of 40 to 300 psi. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate specific hardening techniques.7
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...
The vast Soviet network of shelters and command facilities, under construction for four decades, was recently described in detail by
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci.The shelters are designed to house the entire Politburo, the Central Committee, and the key leadership of
the Ministryof Defense and the KGB. Some are located hundreds of yards beneath the surface, and are connected by secret subway lines,tunnels,
and sophisticated communications systems. "These facilities contradict in steel and concrete Soviet protestations that they share President
Reagan's view that nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought,"Carlucci said (Ariwna Republic, April 3, 1988). These
facilities reveal that they are preparing themselves for just the opposite." The shelters are also protected against chemical warfare agents,
and stocked with sufficient supplies to allow the leadership to survive and wage war for months.In contrast, the limited US shelter system
begun in the 1950s has mostly been abandoned."To have something comparable, we'd have to have facilities where we could put every governor,
mayor, every Cabinet official, and our whole command structure underground with subways running here and there," Carlucci said. "There's just
no comparison between the two."
www.oism.org...
I can say the same thing about the US military but theirs only so much you can hide.
Undergorund cities with thousands of nuclear warheads or tanks/planes are pure fantasy until you can prove otherwise.
In 1998, in a rare public comment, then-Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Gen. Eugene Habinger, called Yamantau
"a very large complex -- we estimate that it has millions of square feet available for underground facilities. We don't have a clue as to what they're doing there."
It is believed to be large enough to house 60,000 persons, with a special air filtration system designed to withstand a nuclear, chemical or biological attack. Enough food and water is believed to be stored at the site to sustain the entire underground population for months on end.
"The only potential use for this site is post-nuclear war..." --- Rep. Roscoe Bartlett
Bartlett is one of the handful of members of Congress who have closely followed the Yamantau project.
www.viewzone.com...
When it comes to military secrets the US is just as secret as Russia if not more.
I have no need because Russia should still be feared with just its stated nuclear arsenal. Without any secret weapons or bases thousands of nuclear missiles should be feared. These are ICBMs in number the US has no known means to stop.
Russia dose not need any secrets weapons or defense because what they have known is enough to lay waste to any country.
But answer me this Stellar why would Russia want to do this. Lets say they wipe out 90% of the US in a nuclear first strike and in turn take 50% losses in Russia.
Some people might consider that a win in a strange way. Russia had to attack dozens of other of coutries that contain US military bases. Japan, Germany, the UK so on and so on. Most of the world would be pissed at Russia.
Most of Russia major cities lie in ruin millions are dead and India and China that stayed out of it now have convential armies that can roll over any remaining Russian forces.
What was the point to kill capitalist pigs? Russia itself are now capitalist pigs.
If Russia and the US ever went at it their destruction would leave a huge power vacuum that other up and comming countries would love.
Economic might and military power therefore go hand in hand, and a tilting of the balance will, sooner or later, lead to a shift in the relative influence of nations. Seen in that light, you will be interested in a new study by a team of economists and planners at Goldman Sachs, called "Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050." The BRICs \emdash a new acronym in world affairs jargon \emdash refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China. They are large in territory and resources, they are populous, and, says the Goldman Sachs team, they are on their way up economically.
[url=http://theseoultimes.com/ST/?url=/ST/db/read.php?idx=794]Will Brazil, Russia, India, China Be Superpower?" target="_blank" class="postlink" rel="nofollow">
Said:
He spoke of the astonishing civil defense measures which have been developed, and continue to be developed, in the Soviet Union. He stated
that 25% of all Russian factory workers are in training programs preparing them for civil defense leadership roles. Major defense
manufacturing facilities in Russia have been dispersed well clear of all existing major industrial areas so as to afford a large measure of
protection for those industries in the event of nuclear war. Keegan alleged that he was in possession of ample evidence to show that the
Russians are in the process of building up huge stocks of foods and grains, in preparation for war. He said that all the evidence points to
the fact that the Russians are not merely aiming for superiority but are "preparing for war. . . ." Evidence available quite openly in
Russia, contained in Soviet literature, shows that already the Soviets have constructed enough mass-shelters in key strategic industrial
areas to protect More than sixty million from nuclear attack. Bunkers have been provided for the civilian population in all main cities,
including several which are the size of football fields. "My collection team." said the Major-General. "have identified grain-storage bunkers
the size of several football fields on the perimeter of all main cities, guarded by the military -- the most elaborate of their kind in the
world. We are observing the most extensive peace-time war preparations in recorded history. . ."
In 1968, Radio Moscow reported that the most reliable protection available against nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons was "evacuation from large cities and industrial areas". Soviet leaders assumed that American attacks would be centered around cities and industrial centers, so with proper warning time, Soviet citizens could escape to rural and suburban areas without harm.
In the event of an American nuclear attack, there were nine (9) different warning signals that could be broadcast throughout the city. One of these signals (which corresponded to different levels of urgency) would be played all over the city using sirens, loudspeakers, whistles, and radios.
When citizens heard the signal, they were instructed to move to a pre-assigned location, or "collection point", from which they would be evacuated to rural or suburban areas, out of harm's way. Every available mode of transportation (including trucks, cars, trains and buses) would be used to get as many people as possible away from the city center in the shortest amount of time.
www.piedmontcommunities.us...=
page&GID=01303001151018293682662999&PG=01304001151018318529636575
This dispersal plan had a huge impact on city planning in the Soviet Union. When new cities were built, they were planned as dispersed
cities with suburban populations instead of centralized towns (see above).
Changes to existing cities included constructing wide streets, artificial reservoirs, and a network of highways around the city, as well as
reducing building density to reduce the possibility of blast and fire damage.
The Soviets, therefore, assumed that they would have enough advance warning of an American attack to implement the aforementioned evacuation
and dispersal exercises. Through the use of these removals, pre-attack warning systems, and improved city planning, Soviet military leaders
hoped to reduce the number of civilian and economic (industrial) losses.
www.piedmontcommunities.us...=page&GID=
01303001151018293682662999&PG=01304001151018318529636575
Industrial dispersal. The Soviets have been involved in an industrial dispersal program for more than 15 years. Their approach to the program has been and continues to be the siting of new industrial complexes in towns and settlements with populations of 100,000 people or less. The program has several advantages for the Soviets. First, it is of great economic importance from the standpoint of accelerating and expanding their economic development; this is especially true regarding growth of such sparsely developed areas as Siberia. Second, it prevents high concentrations of industry in a small number of large industrial centers and helps the Soviets make better use of their abundant natural resources. Third, dispersal creates a proliferation of aimpoints for U.S. strategic planners and greatly complicates targeting tasks.
And:
Industrial hardening. The Soviets have an ongoing program designed to harden their industrial base. Included in this program are underground facilities, new plant construction techniques, construction of duplicate plants, retrofit hardening of existing facilities, and expedient techniques. The first three hardening methods can be productively utilized only for new facilities and require a long lead time for fruition. The fourth method, retrofit hardening of existing facilities, has near-term implications but is expensive. The fifth means, expedient techniques, is relatively inexpensive and has short-term implications; it will be the focus of this discussion.
If current Soviet expedient hardening preparations for protection of their industrial base are implemented on a large scale, the effectiveness of a U.S. retaliatory capability could be significantly degraded. By utilizing relatively inexpensive and simple expedient techniques such as packing machinery in sandbags, the Soviets could make their industry relatively invulnerable to overpressures of a few pounds per square inch (psi). Depending on the specific precautions taken in mounting and protecting machines, they can be made to survive overpressures in the range of 40 to 300 psi. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate specific hardening techniques.7
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...
The vast Soviet network of shelters and command facilities, under construction for four decades, was recently described in detail by
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci.The shelters are designed to house the entire Politburo, the Central Committee, and the key leadership of
the Ministryof Defense and the KGB. Some are located hundreds of yards beneath the surface, and are connected by secret subway lines,tunnels,
and sophisticated communications systems. "These facilities contradict in steel and concrete Soviet protestations that they share President
Reagan's view that nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought,"Carlucci said (Ariwna Republic, April 3, 1988). These
facilities reveal that they are preparing themselves for just the opposite." The shelters are also protected against chemical warfare agents,
and stocked with sufficient supplies to allow the leadership to survive and wage war for months.In contrast, the limited US shelter system
begun in the 1950s has mostly been abandoned."To have something comparable, we'd have to have facilities where we could put every governor,
mayor, every Cabinet official, and our whole command structure underground with subways running here and there," Carlucci said. "There's just
no comparison between the two."
www.oism.org...
And i could go on for some time but lets see what that does to your ignorance.
I can say the same thing about the US military but theirs only so much you can hide.
Yes you can and i will agree with you that the US military could only hide so much. I just do not think that is true for the old USSR or it's latest incarnation.
Undergorund cities with thousands of nuclear warheads or tanks/planes are pure fantasy until you can prove otherwise.
Well we just don't know and since he did not exclude anything why should you?
In 1998, in a rare public comment, then-Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Gen. Eugene Habinger, called Yamantau
"a very large complex -- we estimate that it has millions of square feet available for underground facilities. We don't have a clue as to what they're doing there."
It is believed to be large enough to house 60,000 persons, with a special air filtration system designed to withstand a nuclear, chemical or biological attack. Enough food and water is believed to be stored at the site to sustain the entire underground population for months on end.
"The only potential use for this site is post-nuclear war..." --- Rep. Roscoe Bartlett
Bartlett is one of the handful of members of Congress who have closely followed the Yamantau project.
www.viewzone.com...
When it comes to military secrets the US is just as secret as Russia if not more.
The US simply do not have the means to keep the kind of secrets the USSR can or for that matter the space and resources to do so. That being said it really is largely impossible to tell what either these countries could hide from their various citizens so i am not really disagreeing.
I have no need because Russia should still be feared with just its stated nuclear arsenal. Without any secret weapons or bases thousands of nuclear missiles should be feared. These are ICBMs in number the US has no known means to stop.
The US has no means to stop it ( declared at least which i do not believe to be true) but Russia has very close to declared their capability to stop a US attack to a large extent.
Russia dose not need any secrets weapons or defense because what they have known is enough to lay waste to any country.
Well they would need defenses if they would want to come out of the battle largely undamaged so that's exactly what they did at great cost over 4 decades.
But answer me this Stellar why would Russia want to do this. Lets say they wipe out 90% of the US in a nuclear first strike and in turn take 50% losses in Russia.
They would not start a war as they allready control geopolitics in their own favour. A war would only break out when the US becomes so desperate that it makes a last ditch effort to regain it's former power. That is why Russia still goes ahead with large scale active and passive defensive works to this very day.
Some people might consider that a win in a strange way. Russia had to attack dozens of other of coutries that contain US military bases. Japan, Germany, the UK so on and so on. Most of the world would be pissed at Russia.
Well most of the world realises that they compromised themselves by hosting American bases so they would only suffer the damage they deserve for playing lackey's to American imperial greed.
Most of Russia major cities lie in ruin millions are dead and India and China that stayed out of it now have convential armies that can roll over any remaining Russian forces.
It really is probably impossible to tell how much damage would really be suffered by both sides with all the variables but i can tell you that Russia need not fear anything from Chinese or Indian agression. Those countries long suffered at the hands of the west and are both now fiercly anti west and part of the Russian coalition. Russia's mobile ICBM forces would be impossible for China and India to counter and large scale troop movements by them could easily be held hostage by strikes against Chinese and Indian cities if they chose probably national suicide over cooporation with Russia.
What was the point to kill capitalist pigs? Russia itself are now capitalist pigs.
The point would be to kill capitalist pigs if they tried grasping for power which is not very much out of reach.Russia is about as capitalist as is China today which means that the state still controls what it needs to control.
If Russia and the US ever went at it their destruction would leave a huge power vacuum that other up and comming countries would love.
There would be no vacuum as Russia would retain it's strategic forces and industrial power where the USA would not ( since it's mostly in South west Asia anyways) after a nuclear strike. Russia also have friends it seems where the USA seems to be running out of them ever faster.
Economic might and military power therefore go hand in hand, and a tilting of the balance will, sooner or later, lead to a shift in the relative influence of nations. Seen in that light, you will be interested in a new study by a team of economists and planners at Goldman Sachs, called "Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050." The BRICs \emdash a new acronym in world affairs jargon \emdash refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China. They are large in territory and resources, they are populous, and, says the Goldman Sachs team, they are on their way up economically.
[url=http://theseoultimes.com/ST/?url=/ST/db/read.php?idx=794]Will Brazil, Russia, India, China Be Superpower?
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), an alliance grouping Russia, China and central Asian countries on Tuesday called for the US-led anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan to set a time frame for withdrawing its forces from member states.
Both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan host US bases whose troops are involved in the Afghanistan operation.
The SCO also added Pakistan, Iran and India as observer nations.
[url=http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_6-7-2005_pg1_1]SCO wants date for US withdrawal from Central Asia
Singh said, "India observed the growth of the organization with great interest". In this connection, he expressed his satisfaction that "the members of this organization have quickly reacted to India's statement (on giving it observer's status)".
"We are also interested in helping develop closer cooperation within the organization," he said.
India plans to fight terror along with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan \endash the Shanghai body's terror fight.
Islam Karimov, the President of Uzbekistan, pointed out the destructive role of the USA in the Asian region. According to Karimov, the events, which have recently occurred in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, unveiled only certain vestiges of the large-scale strategic plan, which the USA was gradually executing in the region. "The final goal of the plan is to change the political and economic correlation of forces in the USA's favor and to take the dominating position in the Central Asian region," the Uzbek president said.
Members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization agreed to introduce strict regulation of terms for foreign army bases to stay on the member-countries' territories. It particularly goes about US military bases in Kyrgyzstan and \par
Tajikistan.
Russia and Asian states welcome USA's sworn enemy, Iran
"The Ministers expressed shared confidence that their meeting in Vladivostok would provide a new impetus to the trilateral dialogue in all spheres of mutual interest," it said. Even though the trilateral dialogue is considered informal, the Vladivostok meeting effectively institutionalised it as an integral part of their foreign policy and a key element of global politics.
The Ministers "confirmed that strengthening of partnership in the trilateral format met the long-term national interests of India, Russia and China," the communiqu\'e9 said. "They were convinced that development of mutually beneficial cooperation between the three countries in practical terms would make a considerable contribution to the strengthening of peace and stability not only in Asia but also globally."
China, Russia back India for Security Council seat
In this era of globalization, the elephant and the dragon are finally running fast, together. There is a sense of urgency for the two ancient peoples to catch up with the developed world. True, there is a high degree of rivalry between them, but all that this competition will produce in the end is a creative and productive partnership
Mutual benefits are plenty. India has built up a world-class information technology (IT) army while China has created a fast-expanding manufacturing force. Their strengths are complementary in numerous ways, all they have to do is team up in a more productive fashion.
China & India: Can They Do Better Together?
MOSCOW \emdash Russia and China warned other nations Friday against attempts to dominate global affairs and interfere in the domestic issues of sovereign nations in what appeared to be a veiled expression of their irritation with U.S. policy.
China's president, Hu Jintao joins Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin to announce their agreement.
Presidents Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao signed a joint declaration after two days of talks calling for a stronger United Nations role in global affairs and opposing attempts "to impose models of social and political development from outside."
The two leaders also urged other states to renounce "striving for monopoly and domination in international affairs and attempts to divide nations into leaders and those being led."\par
While the declaration did not identify any specific country, it echoed similar veiled hints by Moscow and Beijing about U.S. policy in global affairs.
China, Russia warn of world domination
Mr. Karagonov also pointed out considerable cultural differences between the three countries, as well as intense relations between China and India, RIA Novosti reports.
It was reported on Monday, however, that India and China concluded a strategic partnership agreement. Details of the new document were not exposed, although it is known that the parties came to agreement on the issues of the long-standing border dispute, bilateral trade relations and the economic cooperation. Indian and Chinese prime ministers stated that the document would boost diplomatic and economic links between China and India and help the two states resist "global threats."
For the time being it is not known if Russia is going to have at least something to do with the "strategic partnership" of India and China. It is not ruled out, though, that Beijing and Delhi decided to do without Moscow's participation.
India, China and Russia to create new alliance to challenge USA's supremacy.
The signing of the 2001 Treaty for Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Co-operation set in legal stone the sincere hopes of the two peoples for "eternal friendship and never enmity," marking a new phase in the maturity and stability of Sino-Russian relations.
In addition, demarcation of the 4,300-kilometre border was recognized in law, making it a link for "peace, friendship, co-operation and development." This also removed uncertainties that had surrounded political ties and provided security guarantees for future generations and a foundation for deeper growth of bilateral ties.
This year's joint communique signals that relations have entered their best-ever phase. These joint military exercises are the result of the two countries reaching an important stage in relations and a manifestation of the pragmatism demonstrated by both sides.
Sino-Russian relations blossom
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Moscow-led security grouping in the former Soviet Union, has prepared a draft protocol calling for the group to provide military equipment to member-states in emergency situations, the organization's press service said Aug. 2. The situations covered by the protocol include the plotting and execution of international terrorist attacks and external threats to the security, sovereignty or territorial integrity of any CSTO members. Aid will be provided at the request of member-states, which are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. The governments of these countries now must approve the protocol.
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan gather resources together to fight terrorism
Originally posted by StellarX
Meanwhile, Russia's de facto national missile-defense network, with at least 8,000 modern interceptors and 12 long-range radars, will gain in strategic importance as the United States and Russia decrease the number of offensive nuclear weapons to lower and lower levels.
And:
The Moscow-system missiles, the SA-5 and SA-10/12, were tipped with small nuclear warheads so they didn't require the incredible bullet-hitting-bullet complexity of the U.S. systems developed during the Clinton years. U.S. spy satellites repeatedly identified tactical nuclear-warhead storage sites at the interceptor bases spread across the Soviet empire.
And:
* G.V. Kisun'ko, the chief designer of the ABM systems developed or deployed around Moscow for more than three decades, confirms in a 1996 memoir that large Hen House and Dog House radars at Sary Shagan were designed as battle-management radars for the early Soviet ABM system for the defense of Moscow. Kisun'ko also stated that the SA-5 was designed as a dual-purpose SAM/ABM in conjunction with the Hen House radars.
And:
* B.V. Bunkin, the designer of the follow-on SA-10 and SA-12 (S-300 PMU and S-300V in Russian nomenclature) missile systems, and several other Russian sources, confirmed that these also were dual-purpose SAM/ABMs. SA-10s largely have replaced the thousands of SA-5 interceptors deployed across the Soviet empire during the Cold War. Bunkin's latest SAM/ABM design, the SA-20, is scheduled to begin deployment this year.
www.findarticles.com...
Well most of the world realises that they compromised themselves by hosting American bases so they would only suffer the damage they deserve for playing lackey's to American imperial greed.
but i can tell you that Russia need not fear anything from Chinese or Indian agression. Those countries long suffered at the hands of the west and are both now fiercly anti west and part of the Russian coalition. Russia's mobile ICBM forces would be impossible for China and India to counter and large scale troop movements by them could easily be held hostage by strikes against Chinese and Indian cities if they chose probably national suicide over cooporation with Russia.
Ok, just to clarify to everyone else, that the DIA Svoviet Military Power reports are wrong. Stellar has a hard time coming to terms with this as his entire foundations for his posts will fall apart.The following exerpt, refers to Team B, which I have shown in previous posts were the people behind the DIA's - Soviet Military Power reports.
For example, the range of the Backfire medium bomber was considerably overestimated, and the number of Backfires the Soviet Union would acquire by 1984 was overestimated by more than 100 percent (estimating 500 when the real figure was 235).
The Tu-22M designation was used by the Soviets during SALT-2 arms control negotiations, creating the impression that the Backfire-A aircraft was a modification of the Tu-22 Blinder. This designation was adopted by the US State and Defense Departments, although some contended that the designation was deliberately deceptive, and intended to hide the performace of the Backfire. Other sources suggest the "deception" was internal, because this made it easier to get budgets approved. According to some sources, the Backfire-B/C production variants were believed to be designated Tu-26 by Russia, although this is disputed by many sources. At Tupolev the aircraft was designated the AM.
Many of the development steps in manufacturing the AM were unique in their time. Special attention was given to the construction of the variable sweep wing - the basis of the whole project. The mid-mounted wings are variable, swept-back, and tapered with curved tips and a wide wing root. Two turbofan engines are mounted in the body, with large rectangular air intakes and dual exhausts. The fuselage is long and slender with a solid, pointed nose and stepped cockpit. The body is rectangular from the air intakes to the exhausts. The tail fin is swept-back and tapered with a square tip. The flats are mid-mounted on the body, swept-back, and tapered with blunt tips. The wing consists of a center section and two outer panels that have five fixed positions with respect to the leading edge sweep. The two-spar centre section has a rear web and bearing skin panel. The outer wings are secured to the centre section with the aid of hinged joints. The high-lift devices include three-section slats and double-slotted flaps on the outer wings (extension angle: 23~ for takeoff and 40~ for landing) and a tilting flap on the centre section.
During the SALT II process, the United States negotiating team obtained a statement from then-Soviet Premier Brezhnev that the Backfire's refueling capabilities would not be upgraded to allow them to function as intercontinental strategic bombers, and that the Soviets would only build 30 of these bombers per year. When the SALT-2 treaty was signed in 1979, the Soviets informed the USA that it would not equip the TU-22M bombers with air refueling devices. SALT II was not ratified, though subsequently the air refueling system was removed from all TU-22M.
According to press reports in the late 1980s, a defector stated that the Backfire was regularly exercised at intercontinental range, that this intercontinental range was greater than the Bison's, that the Backfire had a screw-in type refueling probe, that this screw-in refueling probe was stockpiled for every Backfire at all bomber bases, and that the Soviets had an active program of camouflage, concealment, and deception to mislead the West about the intercontinental range capability of the Backfire.
"DIA stated in its unclassified February 1990 Soviet Force Structure Summary publication on page 6 that: `The Backfire has an intercontinental strike capability when equipped with a refueling probe.'
The US proposed to the Soviets that they sign a politically binding declaration outside of START, which would commit them to: (1) not give the Backfire an intercontinental capability by air-to-air refueling or by any other means; (2) deploy no more than 400 Backfire; and (3) include all Backfire -- including naval Backfire--in the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] aircraft limits.
www.fas.org...
Team B overestimated the accuracy of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, feeding the unwarranted fears of a "window of vulnerability" for the US ICBM deterrent.
Perhaps most critical for the key issue of Minuteman vulnerability were the estimates of missile accuracy. In the early 1970s, Soviet missile accuracies tended to be underestimated. Perhaps in part in overcompensation, the estimates from 1977 through 1980 in turn overestimated Soviet missile accuracies, although this did not become clear until 1983. Although these overestimates of the late 1970s were closer to Team B's alarmist projections, they were not influenced by the unproven assertions of Team B but by the fact that tests of the SS-18 Mod 4 and SS-19 Mod 3 in late 1977 and early 1978 yielded better results than expected.
www.cia.gov...
Team B estimated that the Soviet Union would field a mobile ABM system, which it did not.
While Gorbachev offers some reassurances on the
Krasnoyarsk radar (which do not involve dismantling this
facility that violates the ABM Treaty), little-publicized
advances in Soviet missile defense continue.
The Air Force Intelligence Service has discovered secret
underground silos believed to be for antiballistic missile radars
and interceptors that are banned under the ABM Treaty.
These are located throughout the Soviet Union, near command
bunkers, nuclear weapons storage facilities, and other strategic
sites. The Soviet ABM plant near Tyumen has recently
doubled in size. It is believed that as many as 3,000 SH-08
and SH-04 interceptors will be produced there -- far more than
the 100 that are allowed by treaty. In addition, electronic
monitoring of the Soviet nation-wide network of phased-array
radars revealed testing related to battle-management
capabilities (Washington Ernes Mar 10,1988).
www.oism.org...
It regarded as ominous, rather than reassuring, that no intelligence information had been acquired on Soviet development of a nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare capability, again raising concerns over a looming threat that did not arise.
Team B saw as a "serious concern" the possible upgrading of Soviet mobile intermediate range missiles (SS-20s) to ICBMs and criticized the draft NIE for estimating that the SS-16 mobile ICBM program would remain small. In the event, no SS-16s were deployed, and no SS-20s were upgraded to ICBMs.
The SS-16 is a three-stage, solid-propellant, single-RV ICBM that the Soviets claim has not been deployed. The system was first tested in 1972; the last known test took place in 1976. The SS-20 LRINF missile is closely related to the SS-16. The SS-16 probably was intended originally for both silo and mobile deployment, using equipment and a basing arrangement comparable to that used with the SS-20. The Soviet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, in particular, not to produce the SS-16 third stage, the RV, or the appropriate device for targeting the RV of that missile. While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, it indicates that the SS-16 activities at Plesetsk are a probable violation of SALT II, which banned SS-16 deployment.
www.fas.org...
When the INF Treaty entered into force in June 1988, Votkinsk was a closed city of 100,000 people located in the Ural Mountains, approximately 1,000 kilometers northeast of Moscow. Three INF missiles had been assembled there: SS-12s, SS-20s, and SS-23s. The Votkinsk plant still assembled some of the Soviet Union's most modern ballistic missiles, specifically the SS-25 missile.3
Encased in large missile canisters, SS-25 missiles were shipped from the plant in special railroad cars to operational military units. The SS-25 was not banned under the INF Treaty. However, the missile's first stage was physically similar to the SS-20 first stage; its missile canister was similar in size and weight; and its railcar exiting the assembly plant was similar to those used to transport SS-20s. The major difference in the two missiles was that the SS-20 was a two-stage missile in which the second stage was 2.87 meters long, while the SS-25 was a three-stage missile, with a second stage 3.07-meter-long.4 Given these similarities and differences, treaty negotiators had to agree upon an inspection process that would allow U.S. inspectors to be sure that no SS-20 missiles or missile stages were leaving the plant.
www.fas.org...
3. SS-20 data taken from the IISS Military Balance 1981-1982, page 105. Mod 2 is the version so often discussed in the European theater, with 3-150 KT RVs. The range of Mod 2 is given at 5600 kilometers. By shifting to a single 50 KT RV, a range of 7400 kilometers is obtained. Both Mods clearly meet the SALT II criterion of being an ICBM, yet the SS-20 is not listed anywhere in the agreed statements or understandings as being a SALT II accountable ICBM. Despite the fact that the Mod I only has a 5000 kilometer range, any missile that has been tested in an ICBM mode is supposed to count.
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...
With respect to exotic technologies for ABM defense, Team B castigated the NIE for failing to draw more attention to the threat of Soviet development of charged particle-beam directed energy interceptors, stating that it would be "difficult to overestimate" the magnitude of the Soviet effort, yet by those very alarmist words it did so.
The Soviets are also developing an airborne laser. Assuming a successful development effort, limited initial deployment could begin in the early l990s. Such a laser platform could have missions including antisatellite operations, protection of high-value airborne assets, and cruise missile defense.
The Soviets are working on technologies or have specific weapons-related programs underway for more advanced antisatellite systems. These include space-based kinetic energy, ground- and space-based laser, particle beam, and radio frequency weapons. The Soviets apparently believe that these techniques offer greater promise for future antisatellite application than continued development of ground-based orbital interceptors equipped with conventional warheads. The Soviets also believe that military applications of directed energy technologies hold promise of overcoming weaknesses in their conventional air and missile defenses.
The USSR's high-energy laser program, which dates from the mid-1960s, is much larger than the US effort. They have built over a half dozen major R&D facilities and test ranges, and they have over 10,000 scientists and engineers associated with laser development. They are developing chemical lasers and have continued to work on other high-energy lasers having potential weapons applications - the gas dynamic laser and the electric discharge laser. They are also pursuing related laser weapon technologies, such as efficient electrical power sources, and are pursuing capabilities to produce high-quality optical components. They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) generator which produces 15 megawatts of short-term electric power - a device that has no counterpart in the West. The scope of the USSR's military capabilities would depend on its success in developing advanced weapons, including laser weapons for ballistic missile defense.
And:
The Soviets have now progressed beyond technology research, in some cases to the development of prototype laser weapons. They already have ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with US satellites. In the late 1980s, they could have prototype space based laser weapons for use against satellites. In addition, ongoing Soviet programs have progressed to the point where they could include construction of ground-based laser antisatellite(ASAT) facilities at operational sites. These could be available by the end of the 1980s and would greatly increase the Soviets' laser ASAT capability beyond that currently at their test site at Sary Shagan. They may deploy operational systems of space-based lasers for antisatellite purposes in the l990s, if their technology developments prove successful, and they can be expected to pursue development of space-based laser systems for ballistic missile defense for possible deployment after the year 2000.
www.fas.org...
ASATs The Soviets may have a new "direct-ascent" antisatellite
capability, according to the Pentagon's annual report
to the Congress. This would be more effective than the "coorbital"
ASAT, which has been operational since 1971. It is
speculated that the new ASAT could carry a nuclear warhead.
Lasers: According to Paul Nitze, the Soviets have over a
half dozen major development facilities, including an ABM test
center at Sary Shagan. US intelligence sources suspect that
Soviet lasers have already damaged some American spy
satellites. In 1984, Richard DeLauer testified that it would
take the US about ten years to reach parity in laser weapons.
Active Measures (Wet)?: Since July 1986, there have
been seven terrorist bombings, three assassinations, five highly
suspicious "suicides," and one disappearance among European
scientists and officials working on SDI-related projects.
(Washington Inquirer, 12/18/87).
www.oism.org...
At the annual meeting of The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA) in Los Angeles, October, 1985, Dr. Teller stated that the U.S.
has made encouraging progress in research on x-ray lasers. But he believes the Soviets are a decade ahead of us in strategic defenses.
www.oism.org...
In 1976, a KH-11 or Code 1010 satellite was "painted" by a Soviet laser
and sustained "permanent damage," according to a senior Air Force official.
This source said that such paintings continued into the late 1980s.
www.strategypage.com...
One potential method might be a powerfull ground-based laser (why was the infrared sensor on one of our satellites suddenly blinded as it passed over the USSR?) A laser on the Mir space station recently "illuminated" an ICBM during the cruise phase of its flight in space, demonstrating Soviet ability to detect and track a missile, according t o Pentagon sources (Washington Inquirer , July 24, 1987).
The purpose of Mir may indeed include bringing about "peace" -- Soviet style,
implies absence of opposition.
www.oism.org...
The large-scale but ineffective Soviet civil defense efforts were also depicted as an important part of a Soviet design to be able to fight, and win, a nuclear war.
Team B even suggested incredibly that the ABM Treaty helped the Soviet leaders "to pursue a goal of achieving assured survival of the USSR and assured destruction for its major adversary."
Team B also reported "an intense military buildup in nuclear as well as conventional forces" and criticized the NIEs for failing to describe adequately the scale of the Soviet military effort. While Team B was estimating a relentless, continuing buildup at a growing pace, it was later learned that, in fact, Soviet leaders had just cut back the rate of spending on their military effort and would not increase it for the next nine years.
To be sure, the Soviet Union continued to spend a great deal on its large military programs, but it was not the limitless buildup in pursuit of a war-winning capability that Team B ascribed.
Team B went even further. Its report argued at length that there was no constraining effect resulting from the requirements of the civilian economy. The NIEs were attacked for even suggesting that economic considerations might limit Soviet military growth, and Team B itself asserted that "Soviet strategic forces have yet to reflect any constraining effect of civil economy competition, and are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future."
As you can see the DIA reports were wrong in critical areas, hence so is stellars argument. No matter how mnay times I point it out theough he ignores it
Originally posted by StellarX
Rogue:
Ok, just to clarify to everyone else, that the DIA Svoviet Military Power reports are wrong. Stellar has a hard time coming to terms with this as his entire foundations for his posts will fall apart.The following exerpt, refers to Team B, which I have shown in previous posts were the people behind the DIA's - Soviet Military Power reports.
The DIA reports are far more accurate in the main than anything the CIA ever contributed ( it hid whatever it's Wall street masters wanted from view)due to the fact that they were not set up to inform Americans but to serve a small group of powerfull men.
In 1981, and then from 1983 through 1990, the Department of Defense issued annually a lavishly illustrated publication titled Soviet Military Power. It presented an ominous picture of a massive Soviet military buildup, without adequate indication of countervailing American and NATO military forces or programs. Although based on national intelligence (plus uncoordinated Defense Department analysis), the data were selected and embellished to magnify the impression of a threat and to rally support for the US military buildup. DIA prepared Soviet Military Power, with informal consultation with CIA (and other) analysts, but the series was not coordinated nor was it an intelligence product; it was a Department of Defense public information publication.
By 1982, the strategic research analysts at CIA had discovered a disturbing trend in the annual NIEs estimating Soviet strategic capabilities: the aforementioned consistent overestimation of strategic forces modernization and enhancement of capabilities since the mid-1970s
www.cia.gov...
The quoted material are the claims made by the CIA which pointlessly attacks the TEAM B data and questions hoping that the ignorant public would not do their own research. Here is information i put together using few hours worth of searching and a rather extensive archive of my own.
Originally posted by ShadowXIX
Stellarx man Russia should just start this ball rolling
They hold all the chips and world domination is ripe for the picking
Originally posted by StellarX
They allready get their way in geopolitics so there is no need for them to got out of their way to start a war that they might still somehow lose. War's are kinda unpredictable that way and the real benefit in superior arms and defenses is having a enemy that understands his place and what he must do to keep you from trying to crush you.
Stellar
Originally posted by ShadowXIX
What even you say there is a chance they might still somehow lose.
If its really all about geopolitics then I would have to say Russia isnt keeping the USA in check that much compared to what the Soviets did.
I highly doubt during the USSR glory days they would have allowed the US to occupy Afghanistan.
Originally posted by StellarX
Well this is where i can help you get a better understanding of cold war history if you have any questions. The USSR sure did it's part in trying to outflank the US but it was normally with direct weapon threats
Originally posted by ShadowXIX
Normally direct weapon threats? I seem to remember the favorite tactic of Soviets or the US to be by far 'proxy wars' with concern to out flanking the the other side.
Infact the USSR and US went to great lengths to hide its part in these proxy wars very often.
The only inccident that springs to mind off hand of direct weapon threat was the Cuban Missile crisis with ended with US direct weapon threats and both sides backing down.
You could argue the Soviets got the worst of that deal strategically.
At most the Soviets got was getting rid of some outdated junk missiles in Turkey they were planning to crap anyway because the soviets would have taken them out, and having them be replaced with by Polaris submarines off the coast of Turkey.
Direct weapon threats wasnt a very effective tactic by either side in the Coldwar. The sheer number of Proxy wars during that time is proof both sides feared direct conflict.
But please share your knowledge on cold war history
Originally posted by Stratrf_Rus
Rogue; am I the only one intelligent enough here to notice that your quotes about the inaccuracies of "Team B's assessments" has no bearing on actual Soviet//Russian Nuclear Capabilities? They only discuss that the Team B reports were wrong...it does not discuss comparisons between Russian and US Nuclear Forces.
Originally posted by rogue1
Originally posted by Stratrf_Rus
Rogue; am I the only one intelligent enough here to notice that your quotes about the inaccuracies of "Team B's assessments" has no bearing on actual Soviet//Russian Nuclear Capabilities? They only discuss that the Team B reports were wrong...it does not discuss comparisons between Russian and US Nuclear Forces.
You're intelligent ? It has a bearing when people state their information and the subsequent DIA reports as hard fact. They weer over inflated.
It is only with hindsight that we know of the SOvietrs real capabilities at that time. They weren't nearly as frightening as the US DIA made out. Simple fact.
I suggest you reread the posts until you understand what was being said.
Kinda rich coming from you, considering how wrong your information is about deployed warheads today You still haven't porivded any proof of you assertions about US capability.
Originally posted by Stratrf_Rus
US has not been developing new missiles or Nuclear weapons since the late 60s and early 70s but Russia has had a continuing program.
A new nuclear age appears to be on the horizon. President Bush recently asked Congress for $27 million to help jumpstart the country's first new nuclear weapons program in two decades. As we broadcast from New Mexico - the center of the country's nuclear weapons program - we speak with Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group. [includes rush transcript]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"We are on the verge of an exciting time."
Those were the recent words of the nation's top nuclear weapons executive, Linton Brooks. Here in New Mexico - the center of the country's nuclear weapons program - a new nuclear age appears to be on the horizon. Bush recently asked Congress for $27 million to help jumpstart the country's first new nuclear weapons program in two decades. The money will be used to fund a competition between the Los Alamos and the Lawrence Livermore laboratories to find and design a new generation of nuclear bombs to replace the country's entire nuclear arsenal.
www.democracynow.org.../03/02/148233
Originally posted by 27jd
Originally posted by Stratrf_Rus
US has not been developing new missiles or Nuclear weapons since the late 60s and early 70s but Russia has had a continuing program.
What are you smoking? Can you share please? If you believe the US has not been developing not only new nuclear weapons, but other new weapons as well, you gotta be a little high. Regardless of what they may have declared the past couple decades, they have been developing new weapons. Now they're actually coming out and admitting it....
A new nuclear age appears to be on the horizon. President Bush recently asked Congress for $27 million to help jumpstart the country's first new nuclear weapons program in two decades. As we broadcast from New Mexico - the center of the country's nuclear weapons program - we speak with Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group. [includes rush transcript]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"We are on the verge of an exciting time."
Those were the recent words of the nation's top nuclear weapons executive, Linton Brooks. Here in New Mexico - the center of the country's nuclear weapons program - a new nuclear age appears to be on the horizon. Bush recently asked Congress for $27 million to help jumpstart the country's first new nuclear weapons program in two decades. The money will be used to fund a competition between the Los Alamos and the Lawrence Livermore laboratories to find and design a new generation of nuclear bombs to replace the country's entire nuclear arsenal.
www.democracynow.org.../03/02/148233