Type 45 Destroyer capabilities

It is hard to tell if the 45's are getting phalanx or not, some specs say yes some no, there is room for it if needed.

when the falklands kicked of we sent a fleet that included about 25-30 frigates and surface combatants. At the same time we still had other vessels conducting missions around the world. Today if we wanted to send that many ships down there (why would we need less, troop ships, hospital ships, carriers and rfa would all still need protecting) it would be the entrie uk fleet!!! At any time about a quarter of the navy is in drydock under going repair and upgrades, this leaves only 18 combatants to fight and to honour all our other comitments.

That is not to say we couldnt do it, capabilities have increased somewhat in the last 24 years, including more sophisticated sonars, weapons and vessels. There are however some jobs where you need the numbers such as escort duty and picket duty for the fleet. It doesnt matter how good the ships are they cant be in two places at once. It is these tasks that we would stuggle to cope with.

That is not to say the falklands would or could happen again, there isnt just 1 squad of marine there anymore but a whole garrison, with aircover etc.

but there is always a flash point somewhere.

Paperplane, most of the fleet took part in the Falklands as well. Not too mention the fact that our fleet now is far stronger in terms on firepower and systems.

The Type 45 is the most powerful warship (not including carriers) afloat at this present time


As I said in that recent thread about Chavez goading us Brits to hand over the Falklands to the Argies, we would still be quite capable of kicking their arse. If you read the Sun however, they do portray the Government letting down the armed forces, whereas in reality, defence spending has increased and we are getting some serious top-of-the-line stuff coming through.


Ships of the Falklands

One thing that would concern me is the lack of a decent CWIS on those ships. One of the major headaches for the British fleet in 1982 was low flying targets, such as A-4s or Exocets. They ruled the high altitudes, but sea skimming was an area the British fleet was woefully inadaquate to defend itself.

On the other hand, AEGIS techs in the US Navy typicly refer to Phalanx as the abandon ship alarm.

Originally posted by Travellar
One thing that would concern me is the lack of a decent CWIS on those ships. One of the major headaches for the British fleet in 1982 was low flying targets, such as A-4s or Exocets. They ruled the high altitudes, but sea skimming was an area the British fleet was woefully inadaquate to defend itself.

On the other hand, AEGIS techs in the US Navy typicly refer to Phalanx as the abandon ship alarm.

It was British Phalanx's that save the USS Missouri (may be wrong on the ship name there) in the 1st Gulf War from Iraqi Exocets.

After the lessons learnt from the Falklands, the RN will undoubtably put CIWS on the new Type 45's as well as any other new vessels. Seeing as we lost or had damaged 9 of the 23 Frigates/destroyers we sent to the Falklands, it was a lesson learnt the hard way.

Needless to say, the RN is in better shape now than it has been in a while. We have the 6 (potentially 9) new Type 45's coming on line, the new Astute class subs and the 2 new carriers coming down the pipe. Things look rosy (unless your Iranian.....)

Travellar,

I would hope for a better than Mk.15 capability to be honest. RAM or a single barrel, high caliber, weapon in the 30-35mm (AHEAD beats ROF) range would be my choice.

Given as these ships may also see significant use as pickets or inshore amphib protection assets (i.e not 1-2 'into the herd' but 2-3 'all for me?!') on AShM threats with very short LOS horizoning I would like to see the option for an even /heavier/ inner zone defense.

Whether that be mixed missile/gun systems or a DEWS.

The alternative again being some kind of VTOL drone that can peak over local horizons and do Mountaintop type handoffs-

www.fas.org...

However far downrange your PAAMS missile can reach (and 15/30 as the initial _kilometer_ references used with land-Aster make the system significantly less capable than vintage Sea Dart in a mid/outerzone engagement), it's principal worth lies not in it's seeker but in it's midcourse guidance ability to accept handoffs.

If I pick up the seeker lightoff or actual missile track here-

1.

Launch at here......2..........................................T45.

And perform the functional intercept here-

...........................................3............................T45.

I am playing right into the hands of a supersonic or saturation attack paradigm where a miss or a flood of followon shots brings the defense ever closer aboard.

If my shot is already _in the air_ as the threat AShM clears whatever the effective interceptor kinematic cutoff is-

1..........2.........3................................................T45.

Then the ability of the weapons /system/ to both handle multiple high rate closure threats, and multiple engagements of same can rest solely on the the ability of a DDG-launched surveillance asset-

........................SENSCAP..........................................................
.................................OTH.......1........2........3.4.5.6.7..........T45.

To start stacking VLS launches based on previously modeled (AM.39 vs. Brahmos or Sunburn for instance) 'estimated rowdiness' of the inbound threat.

Obviously, this gets down to shooter vs. arrow vs. ACP (remote) platform kill games and (ultimately) the OTH bandwidth choices on the radars employed.

But short of putting JORN/ROTHR on a barge (and 400km SM-6 in a VLS cell to kill the bus platform in transit), there is no way in hell I would come inshore with a 500 million dollar asset (assuming T45 is equal to DDX) without a realistic ability to see past whatever masking shadow the coastal terrain gives the enemy.

That's what screwed up Sea Wolf 'the last time' if you'll recall.

Add to this the need for decent coastal traffic/inland MTI indications and I would bet that both the S1850M and Sampson are simply out of their elements.

Even if it's just a garbage truck tooling down the road, I wanna see it coming.


KPl.


P.S. Can Aster do the STANDARD S2S 'emergency' mission vs. PCI/FIAC type threats? And if not, what's the status of the Penguin replacement? Another reason not to play with class designs until they are /really/ _paid for as much as technically 'ready' IMO. Armilla Patrol ops are just too tight to use 'force mixes', even if you can afford to. Polyphem maybe? That's EADS/Euromissile to isn't it?

Originally posted by stumason
Paperplane, most of the fleet took part in the Falklands as well.

Not true, at the time the impact of the 1981 defence review was still being carried out, it called for a reduction of the surface combatant fleet from 65. At the time of the falklands war we still had over 50 operational frigates and destroyers. It is however true to say that most of the modern vessels went south while the rest took over other comitments.

Not too mention the fact that our fleet now is far stronger in terms on firepower and systems.

I never said otherwise, read what i wrote again.

The Type 45 is the most powerful warship (not including carriers) afloat at this present time

AT THE PRESENT TIME The Type 45 ia a HALF BUILT SHELL with the same offensive power as a house brick! She is not the most powerful of anything. She may be in a couple of years time when she is completed, trialed, tested and the crew have become skilled in operating her.

As I said in that recent thread about Chavez goading us Brits to hand over the Falklands to the Argies, we would still be quite capable of kicking their arse.

READ WHAT I ACTUALLT WROTE, I NEVER DISPUTED THIS

If you read the Sun however, they do portray the Government letting down the armed forces

I have never read that comic in my life thank you very much!

whereas in reality, defence spending has increased and we are getting some serious top-of-the-line stuff coming through.

your right defence spending has increased, but so has the cost of new equipment and the need for replacement. you are right that we are getting some very nice equipment but does that mean we are getting enough of it. The retiring first sea lord himself says we need more hulls for the navy (in latest warships IFR, feb 2006 )www.warshipsifr.com...




Ships of the Falklands

It was British Phalanx's that save the USS Missouri (may be wrong on the ship name there) in the 1st Gulf War from Iraqi Exocets.

NO it was the Sea dart of HMS Gloucester shot down a silkworm missile heading for the missouri, the first confirmed missile on missile kill in naval combat)

After the lessons learnt from the Falklands, the RN will undoubtably put CIWS on the new Type 45's as well as any other new vessels. Seeing as we lost or had damaged 9 of the 23 Frigates/destroyers we sent to the Falklands, it was a lesson learnt the hard way.

Needless to say, the RN is in better shape now than it has been in a while. We have the 6 (potentially 9) new Type 45's coming on line, the new Astute class subs and the 2 new carriers coming down the pipe. Things look rosy (unless your Iranian.....

)

They retofitted phalanx to the type 42's but had to remove the seaboats to do it (later replaced by lightweight Rib's) as there was no space weight allowance left.

The RN is in a poor state at the moment, it will be in a much better state in about 2020 if all the new vessels that are promised arrive. That is far from likely. It is by no means certain any more than 6 type 45's will be built, the astutes are late and only 3 have been bought, the carriers are late and still have not been offically ordered. (it has been put back till the end of the year). The landing ships are late (at least swan's are),No replacement has been decided on for the type 22's let alone the type 23's. And most of the RFA will not meet IMO safety regs within the next 4 years and so will need replacing and the govenment is stalling on paying for that.

They have big ideas but they are still a long way from seeing them to fruition.

Originally posted by ch1466
Travellar,


However far downrange your PAAMS missile can reach (and 15/30 as the initial _kilometer_ references used with land-Aster make the system significantly less capable than vintage Sea Dart in a mid/outerzone engagement), it's principal worth lies not in it's seeker but in it's midcourse guidance ability to accept handoffs.

current declassified ranges are aster 15: 1.7 -30 km's; aster 30: 3 -120 kms
current declassified speeds are aster 15: mach 3; aster 30: mach 4.5
current declassified ceilings are aster 15: 13km; aster 30: 20km

The 15 and 30 have nothing to do with their performance

The trials, between 1993 and 1994, were very successful. All flight sequences, altitudes and ranges, were validated. This was also the period during which the launch sequence of Aster-30 was validated.

In May 1996, trials of the Aster-15 active electromagnetical final guidance system against live targets began. All six attempts were successful:

8 April 1997: interception of a C22 target simulating a subsonic antiship missile, flying at 10 metres, at a distance of 7 kilometres.
23 May 1997: Direct impact on an Exocet anti-ship missile of the first generation, at 9 kilometres, to protect a distant ship (7 km). This was the first "Hit-to-Kill" interception ever against an antiship missile.
13 November 1997: interception of a C22 target in very low flight in a strong countermeasures environment. In this test, the Aster was not armed with its military warhead so that the distance between the Aster and the target could be recorded. The C22 was recovered bearing two strong cuts due to the fins of the Aster missile.
30 December 1997: Interception of a live C22 target by an Aster-30 at a distance of 30 kilometres, an altitude of 11,000 metres, and a speed of 900 km/h. The Aster climbed up to 15,000 metres before falling on the target at a speed of 2880 km/h. The closest distance between the Aster and the C22 was four metres.
29 June 2001 : Interception of a Arabel missile in low altitude, in less than 5 seconds.
In 2001 : Interception by the Aster-15 of a target simulating an aircraft flying at Mach-1 at an altitude of 100 metres.


[edit on 17-2-2006 by paperplane_uk]

Paperplane, not sure why you had to come across as so aggressive, wasn't trying to pick a fight at all. However...

Not true, at the time the impact of the 1981 defence review was still being carried out, it called for a reduction of the surface combatant fleet from 65. At the time of the falklands war we still had over 50 operational frigates and destroyers. It is however true to say that most of the modern vessels went south while the rest took over other comitments.

Counting obsolescent 60's/70's ships, you have a point. But they would have faired far worse than the modern ships we sent and we still got a bloody nose. Truth be told, we scrimped together a fairly hastily assembled force (RN, RAF and Army)and it still beat the Argies...Can't get better than that, can you?

I never said otherwise, read what i wrote again.

Never said you did

AT THE PRESENT TIME The Type 45 ia a HALF BUILT SHELL with the same offensive power as a house brick! She is not the most powerful of anything. She may be in a couple of years time when she is completed, trialed, tested and the crew have become skilled in operating her.

Argue semantics all you like. If you want to be picky, in 2 years she will be the most powerful warship afloat. She is still afloat and it is going to be a long time before the Yanks get their DDX online.

READ WHAT I ACTUALLT WROTE, I NEVER DISPUTED THIS

Touchy little bugger, aren't you? Why do you assume everything I wrote was directed at you, or anyone for that matter? Was just making a point and was not directing it at anyone in particular. Try reading my posts again yourself.

I have never read that comic in my life thank you very much!

Never said you did. It was "you" as in the third person. My point was the Sun always makes a mission out of slandering the forces.

Anyhoo, why make an argument about it? Seems to me like you got out the wrong side of bed today

NO it was the Sea dart of HMS Gloucester shot down a silkworm missile heading for the missouri, the first confirmed missile on missile kill in naval combat)

Really? Fair enough. Again, no need to so iffy about it, I wasnt even sure I had the right ship. Point being that the Phalanx is not an "abandon ship alarm"....well, maybe to the USN, but then, the less said the better....

current declassified ranges are aster 15: 1.7 -30 km's; aster 30: 3 -120 kms

well, 1.7 km min range on the Aster 15 puts it well inside the engagement envelope of even the Mk15, meaning that if equipped with one signifigant layering of ships defense is accomplished.

As for not wanting to put 500 Million dollar assets in close to shore, that's the concept of the LCS in the US Navy. However, Burkes cost twice that, and DD(X) will be closer to three times that amount. I can't find any info on how much a type 45 should cost.

As for dealing with multi-missile raids, the deciding factors are "How many missiles can this ship put in the air at one time?", and "How well can the crew/ship deal with the time-challenged task of engaging each missile?"

Originally posted by Travellar


As for not wanting to put 500 Million dollar assets in close to shore, that's the concept of the LCS in the US Navy. However, Burkes cost twice that, and DD(X) will be closer to three times that amount. I can't find any info on how much a type 45 should cost.

As of 31 october 05 , the estimated unit production cost per , based on aquiring 6 ships is £561.6 million or around $970 million .

From
here

But there are conflicting numbers this seemed like the most credible source.
I myself find those numbers hard to believe

nope, a billion dollars apiece for a state of the art surface warship is about what they cost. Prior to the USS Ticonderoga, most warships cost about a quarter that much, but had the capabilities to reflect the lower cost. From what I've read, It looks like the British navy is a bit ahead of the US in feilding the concept of multiple dispersed smaller VLS units, but in this case it's at the cost of a few extra missiles. Quite a few. About half actually.

As for my CWIS being an abandon ship alarm comment, I was refering to the pretty standard concept that if an anti-ship missile can slip through a three-quarter billion dollar weapon system, the odds of CWIS doing the job start looking awfully thin.

PaperplaneUK,

>>
current declassified ranges are aster 15: 1.7 -30 km's; aster 30: 3 -120 kms
current declassified speeds are aster 15: mach 3; aster 30: mach 4.5
current declassified ceilings are aster 15: 13km; aster 30: 20km
>>

Thanks.

>>
The 15 and 30 have nothing to do with their performance
>>

They did when they were first reported in the U.S. press. I couldn't understand it at the time.

>>
The trials, between 1993 and 1994, were very successful. All flight sequences, altitudes and ranges, were validated. This was also the period during which the launch sequence of Aster-30 was validated.
>>

IMO, the difference between a successful system test and a 'firepower demo' is that you either accept range constraints necessary to allow for shipborne handoff and missile tracking/fuzing limits.

Or show a deliberate ability to kill from high perch angles onto sea skimmers using parabolic range lofts.

How far out can either the 3DAS or Sampson FC systems acquire an un-enhanced, modern, AShM? Tracking airliners with amplified SIF/M3a signatures and 'unknown' altitude factors says nothing, even if it was all the way out to Berlin.

Are these systems using tropobounce to any degree to get 'two looks' at the target plan and frontals signature? Is that how they plan to pull microsignatures out of the background? If so, how does that compare with what the seeker can achieve at X or Ku?

Once you get that question answered, the next one becomes whether you /want/ H2K because while the best way to kill a skimmer may well be to see it across a flat horizon with effectively (shuntmotor) 'chicken' intercepts, by the time the weapon hit's inner zone, it may have activated evasion routions that make the 2D mechanic more complex than it seems.

In anycase, in-plane intercepts WILL cost you flyout in terms of absolute range and for work in the littorals or some fleet based goal keeper scenarios.

OTOH, if you go for extended range (midcourse) engagements, why 'shine the sea' with seeker mirroring, looking for a kinetic kill when you can snap down into a directionally entrained warhead shower from twice as high?

You get more of the (AShM) missile body that way and while the kinetics are not nearly as great in terms of destroying the weapon outright, it also makes the best use of the combined missile kinematics and autonomous homing modes relative to smart fuzing, and the limitations of the vessel sensors in OTH mode.

>>
In May 1996, trials of the Aster-15 active electromagnetical final guidance system against live targets began. All six attempts were successful:

8 April 1997: interception of a C22 target simulating a subsonic antiship missile, flying at 10 metres, at a distance of 7 kilometres.
23 May 1997: Direct impact on an Exocet anti-ship missile of the first generation, at 9 kilometres, to protect a distant ship (7 km). This was the first "Hit-to-Kill" interception ever against an antiship missile.
13 November 1997: interception of a C22 target in very low flight in a strong countermeasures environment. In this test, the Aster was not armed with its military warhead so that the distance between the Aster and the target could be recorded. The C22 was recovered bearing two strong cuts due to the fins of the Aster missile.
30 December 1997: Interception of a live C22 target by an Aster-30 at a distance of 30 kilometres, an altitude of 11,000 metres, and a speed of 900 km/h. The Aster climbed up to 15,000 metres before falling on the target at a speed of 2880 km/h. The closest distance between the Aster and the C22 was four metres.
29 June 2001 : Interception of a Arabel missile in low altitude, in less than 5 seconds.
In 2001 : Interception by the Aster-15 of a target simulating an aircraft flying at Mach-1 at an altitude of 100 metres.
>>

See, none of these scenarios sounds particularly impressive to me. Standard can do these things.

What I don't see is the ability to handle saturation/multibearing attacks from weaving skimmers with modern stealth treatments (the 'latest' Exocet) and the radar needing to provide at least one pre-handoff and post-kill MCG update to XX numbered intercepts (10 threats = 20 interceptors, think about it). Nor supersonic threats and high divers as a 'wall of missiles' concept whereby a miss means live retasking of followon shots on the fly in more than mile per second closure states and quite possibly /into/ a clouded wardet cell of fragments and gas.

Nor even attacks on mixed profile weapons over the horizon, with intercept mechanics (snap when) adjusted on a before-during-after basis of changed target profiles relative to supersonic staging.

There is evidence, from our own trials, that modern AShM have both chaff and imbedded repeater options as sacrificial as much as self protect gaming on followon shots and that some can react to illumination with specific evasion patterns designed to mess with centroid tracking monopulse algorithms (materials on fins that cause roll scintillance when steered into a given illumination angle). Can Aster handle these?

I don't see /any/ particular relevance to the manned threat, not least because their is no 'background' EW support threat or what I would call real ability to reach into the overland areas where not only direct clutter but standoff masking conditions put the threat into 40-60nm TOF constraints that allow simple notching and retrograde changes to drastically change intercept trajectory mechanics nd seeker cube expectations. Can you run the missile in JAT mode or light the seeker off independently to scan the acquisition cell in a TVM maneuver?

And as I stated earlier, if you don't have a dedicated AShM of your own, you NEED to be able to deal with at least small surface combatants via an SS mode option.

Everybody assumes that AShM are 'missionized' through warhead weight. Yet the fact of the matter is that the burning motor and/or fuel splash is about 80% of the incendiary control problem in a post strike casualty assessment, simply because they burn out electrical routings and generate the most secondary toxic gasses from both the systems and structure (if it's aluminum). Which means a brace of 1,500lb Standard can be a real problem, even on a large ship. On a small craft, it's more often a case of vaporization by kinetic effect alone.

DOES Aster have this option or was it considered 'to expensive' as a weapons system to be expended this way?

If you don't bring at least some (mix of guided) 'multimission' /protective/ measures onboard, you will find that your ship lacks the flexibility to be used as even an AAW asset, in confined waters where a PCI threat /might/ exist.

Travellar,

>>
well, 1.7 km min range on the Aster 15 puts it well inside the engagement envelope of even the Mk15, meaning that if equipped with one signifigant layering of ships defense is accomplished.
>>

Actually, this is deceptive, R2 is a _lot_ less effective than it is commonly given credit for. Both in total onmount engagements, ability of the radar to pull targets out of the clutter and lethality effects vs. /rate/ of engagements before you get into close-aboard conditions. Most Mk.15's only have about 1.5 engagements per mount. And most are really only effective (yes, even with the sabot rounds) out to about 500m from a /start/ range of about 1,500-2,000.

I believe there have been some significant improvements in both the way the main ship sensors cue the gun and in the fitting of a TV tracker to enable faster lockups (though the oft-bragged 'round to round' fire cone tracking is now gone, there are more warhead kills and fewer 'lets see if we can strip the fins off' thanks to tighter vidicon type tracking correction).

In any case, given as I have _zero_ belief or affection for the notion of a 5-6" caliber deck mount doing /anything/ useful for either NGS or Naval Surface engagements (compared to missiles). I would prefer to have a decent 2-2.5km engagement capability that didn't rely on which side of the ship was exposed and where the VLS popout cycle vs. weapon tipover lag was in gettting the interceptor onto bearing and locked up with a close in threat.

If nothing else, it will be a cold day in hell before I willing see 20-30mm manual-pedestal gun duels between major naval assets and PCI with 12.7 or 14.5mm punt gun (or RPG or RCL) on somebody's converted cigarette boat suddenly come a-creeping out from behind his cousin's fishing trawl.

Again, if you REALLY THINK it's a 'great idea' to play in the littorals, you have to acknowledge how much /easier-is-as-cheaper-can-do/ you are making it for every would be Corsair as much as Revolutionary out there to make a fight of it. And arm yourself accordingly. A decent fast-traverse, high-mounted, auto cannon _pair_ with smart fuzed rounds will do for the inner zone MD/AAW role what it /also/ gives you as a mid range (2,000-4,000m) anti boghammer system.

If you really want to be well AAW protected however; you still need a turreted pedestal that can slew to fire weapons directly into bearing, _under guidance_, as soon as they leave the octuple mount. And keep on firing until the threat has 2-3 separate engagements on it /before/ slewing to the next inbound to begin it's kill resolution.

Guns typically can't reach that far. Guns can't guide that well. Guns mean weight under deck for the mount and if they are of any size, for the magazine and loader.

>>
As for not wanting to put 500 Million dollar assets in close to shore, that's the concept of the LCS in the US Navy.
>>
Unfortunately, it's not.
www.murdoconline.net...
Just as with DD-21 and the ArS, when the navy thinks 'inland power projection from a surface asset' they must immediately bow their heads and say two hail mary's while making obeissance in the direction of the nearest carrier in port.
MY belief is that the difference between pro-am is that the pro's think how far out they have to be to stay safe before they start slinging rounds XXnm over the surfzone. And, having added the two distances together, they realize there is no point in playing twin-gun monitor games.
I have my own questions as to the design of a 14,000 ton destroyer without the weapons programs fully matured to let it function as a defacto Arsenal Ship. But I don't believe in 3,000 ton 'corvettes' as having a role to play inshore, either. The problem then becomes:
16 DDX = defacto CG.
80-100 LCS = ???
These are not destroyers, they are not even frigates. They don't have a bluewater hullform and they only have about a week of fuel in them, even at a sedate 18-19 knots. This combination of a lack of endurance and a lack of high seas stability will mean NO escort force for conventional carriers (not that I will cry) and NO standalone force when yipe-yipe our way back out into the deep blue after 'gunboat 21' tactics are proven to be as hazardous and /unnecessary/ as I think.
Yet DDX is supposedly the systems baseline for LCS. Though, given it's 'modularity' (one big shining gap of mission equipment package) I have a feeling the latter is more a case of timid-toes vs. one-big-push of a hollow asset into the whitewater as someone realizes 'quick, we have to have /something/ to protect the inshore dreadnaught!'. Even if it's nought but a manned decoy.
And I blame _all of it_ on the brownshoe navy. For while the LCS, whose airpower motif is undoubtedly modelled on the LPD-17 has 'facilities for ONE blackhawk, woohoo!' and the DDX is little better, nobody has stepped forward to say "Why not an SCS that takes the littoral war inshore at 400knots instead of 30-50?".
The difference between hunters and savages being that the former come out of the bush where the latter must live. To clean up and regenerate but also to preserve asset value by multiplying the sophisticaion of targeting required to be /found/ as much as fired on.
As such, _If I Were Designing For Class_ my leadship would look rather more like the Street Fighter/Jervis Bay concept:
www.globalsecurity.org...
Whereby you use dedicated (non developed = potentially Not Ever developed if not specifically made 'essential' for class functionality) missile systems for most inshore bombardment (netfires at sea) and mount air-ops off the big flat roof with both V-22 and small VTOL UCAVs, to give yourself limited airpower flotilla flex along the lines of Ops Earnest Will/Prime Chance/Praying Mantis etc.
www.specialoperations.com...
For inshore naval ops (no Muktar can't hide his boghammer on the other side of Ali Baba's boat).
While also having the ability to reach FURTHER INSHORE (say 200-400nm), at speeds vastly higher than helicopters can and for /hours/ longer, at heights where trashfire attrition is not a concern. To support SOCOM teams.
With weapons systems like the JCM and GBU-39, it is simply not necessary or realistic (50,000 dollar Excalibur round vs. 64,000 dollar SDB) to make 'volume vs. precision fire' tradeoffs. Not least because fewer men on the ground can have more fires dedicated to their force protection than a vast 'encampment' (USMC OEF).
The real difference (in a zero IADS sophisticated threat environment) then being how you target those fires which more or less comes down to the gods-eye 'clairvoyance' via an overhead sensor package in the drone. Vs. letting the ground force 'call you when they get into trouble' roll over the threat as a function of calling for gun or other (ship launched = long TOF, low persistence) from-the-sea-forward systems.
Airpower on-call is airpower _overhead_ which makes for faster response times and the _right to choose_ whether to accept the engagement before it happens.
My ideal then being something like this-
Inshore Warrior = PB.3/PC Cyclone.........150-200nm...............LCS=Streetfighter.....................250-500nm..........................DDX= TSV
(mothership to small boat ops)..................................................(FCS/Staging Device)..........................................................(Logistics/Sortie Generation)
100-200 tons..............................................................................1,000-1,500 tons..................................................................5-15,000 tons
AS AN INDEPENDENT OPS CLASS.
Separate from both the traditional descriptors of 'what a destroyer does'. And most especially from the notion of _guarding carriers_. In 20 years, main force threats will be able to wipe aircraft from the sky like flies before a hurricane. Thus mega-CVs will cease to have value and Blue Water will exist solely as TBM/ATBM power 'global strike' 30 minute power projection (infrastructure hostaging) and NMD counterforce. As well as perhaps open-water anti-piracy/rescue assets.
What good then all the firepower of a dedicated 'destroyer' class for which there is no threat (3-5,000nm AAW when you can send a missile off a satellite? You gotta be kidding me!). And no mission (huge DEW beam directors and vast VLS loads of both Upper Tier and Conventional CBM does NOT a 7,500 ton vessel fit.).
>>
However, Burkes cost twice that, and DD(X) will be closer to three times that amount. I can't find any info on how much a type 45 should cost.
>>
Towards the bottom. I read from the wrong columns.
www.military.com...

CONCLUSION:
There is a good sized school of thought which says "Don't plan, just do!"-
www.military.com...
Because it seems that the amount of time spent in the 'R&D as Acquisition Proving Cycle' only ensures block obsolences of the weapons platforms when they finally reach service compared to what 'modular today' can achieve as a P3I baseline class inventory. My problem is that the weapons systems baselines in the 'modular' design are so glaringly conservative (ne, anachronistic) that they render vessel classes into little more than bloated reconstructs of their WWII analogues.
IMO, what this REALLY comes down to is _cowardice_. Refusing to unseat the king of airpower _basing mode_ centric systems as a function of /inventing/ the missions by which systems are not simply created but proven as new-doctrine, to be more flexible than what the existing paradigm of 'X must do Y' for class size, fires engagement/targeting modes and overall role flex (support of human ops vs. direct interdiction of same at vastly lower scales of intensity than the big deck navy was planned around).
If you cannot kill carrier air. You cannot broach the notion that airpower is still needed in different (NOT A HELO) ways from much smaller ship classes in backwater environs. And so you are always going to be left with the notion that the smaller assets are always going to be based around costs/ISR limited missile fires and guns which have no reach.
And that is dead wrong.
Good luck Britain, I hope Darling does whas you want her and her sisters to. I just hope we don't follow the same, faulted, class-path.

KPl.

[edit on 18-2-2006 by ch1466]

Originally posted by ch1466Again, if you REALLY THINK it's a 'great idea' to play in the littorals, you have to acknowledge how much /easier-is-as-cheaper-can-do/ you are making it for every would be Corsair as much as Revolutionary out there to make a fight of it. And arm yourself accordingly. A decent fast-traverse, high-mounted, auto cannon _pair_ with smart fuzed rounds will do for the inner zone MD/AAW role what it /also/ gives you as a mid range (2,000-4,000m) anti boghammer system.[edit on 18-2-2006 by ch1466]

Playing in the littorals isn't the best way to preserve one's navy. It turns an otherwise wide open killing feild into a cluttered arena where anyone can hope to get in a cheap shot on any enemy. However, there are missions in the U.S.Navy which require the ability to work there. That said, the requirement becomes one for a fast, agile, and cheap ship. One which can be easily converted to handle rapidly changing threat profiles, and one which has enough organic assets to be able to kill or outrun anything out there.

LCS is meant to be the low cost asset which can get in and do those littoral missions, while leaving those tasks to which it is not capable to the bluewater fleet. Who cares if it can't escort a carrier? That's not it's job. It's job is to go clear mines so we can land some tanks for the Marines. Or to go hunt down that sub which wants to hide in shallow waters. Or provide depth of fire capabilities against 20-30 smallboats with RPGs.

By the way, ships will still be viable weapons platforms for the concievable future, due to thier ability to remain on station for days, weeks, or months at a time. Airplanes have to land much sooner than that, and use more fuel to do it.

Travellar,

>>
Playing in the littorals isn't the best way to preserve one's navy. It turns an otherwise wide open killing feild into a cluttered arena where anyone can hope to get in a cheap shot on any enemy.
>>

Here, here!

>>
However, there are missions in the U.S.Navy which require the ability to work there.
>>

Such as the 'anti piracy' mission they are now engaging in off Somalia. A mission in which they have lost a /pair/ of helos to 'unknown but weather related' (collision) causes.

Because they can't fly p out of the crap to see. And they can't /launch/ from far enough out to have it not be a problem.

>>
That said, the requirement becomes one for a fast, agile, and cheap ship.
>>

Sure, and it's called the PC Cyclone-

www.globalsecurity.org...

Or PB's III/IV/V-

www.navyseals.com...

As effectively the followon to a history of swift boats going back to the PT.

_Their Role_ is precisely that of inshore blockade, policing, naval interdiction and SpecOps.

Cheap, brutal, warfare whereby you stop a sampan and board it to make sure they are playing by the rules. And when a massive firefight develops because they /were not/, your sister ship razes the hull to the waterline from a hundred yards the other side of theirs.

>>
One which can be easily converted to handle rapidly changing threat profiles, and one which has enough organic assets to be able to kill or outrun anything out there.
>>

Blah-blah-blah. The only difference between 'so sophisticated' on-hull vaporware wet dreams and 'modularity by design' equivalents is that when the latter fails nobody has to step up and explain why the X-weapon or capability was not developed because "Hey, I only built the hull to match what they said it needed if it ever exited development".

Blameless naval engineering is not a replacement for foresight sir.

To me a 'universal mount' is exactly that, a hardened-plate deck area with good horizon coverage and minimal effects on ship balance. Prehardening to X loads understructure and an existing supply of databus, hydraulics and power circuit.

ONTO that mount you should be able to drop any /land/ system (Netfires, Polyphem, Mistral, etc,) missile system whose 'pod' has been sufficiently engineered to secure the WOODEN ROUND seals in a marine environment.

Such being how you convert from a low tech system based on gunboat diplomacy (12.7 to 40mm LOS weapons) to one which is capable of reaching sufficiently /inland/ (or OTH) to deny the direct engagement which you can no longer win.

There is no real genius award deserved for such design, it should be standard to begin with.

>>
LCS is meant to be the low cost asset which can get in and do those littoral missions, while leaving those tasks to which it is not capable to the bluewater fleet.
>>

Then it needs to be either a lot lighter and cheaper. Or a lot more capable of independent ops 'no matter the weight'.

Again, -my- LCS never really /needs/ to go inshore because it acts as a flotilla tender and C4ISR asset for the various PB/PC assets deployed much closer in.

>>
Who cares if it can't escort a carrier?
>>

When this nation is so close to moral and physical bankruptcy than we sell off the very ports which we most-fear are vulnerable to /Arabs/, via secret cabal.

When we are further building one hundred boats-vice-ships for a mission set that is NOT well enough defined as to /how you do it/ as much as 'why you are there'.

Then I care.

Because they are effectively stealing money from future blue water ops for the purpose of building another brownwater navy 'just a little further off shore'.

2-3,000 tons is too much for a corvette. It restricts a lot of the bays and what not that you can actually enter and maneuver in. Even as the 40-50 knot capability makes for a hullform that SHOULD NOT be taken into class 5 seastates.

>>
That's not it's job. It's job is to go clear mines so we can land some tanks for the Marines.
>>

Boyd got one thing right: The bloody Marines are /fixated/ on that white strip of sand on their horizon. Forget the beach! Only IDIOTS give their enemies such a predictably linearized killing-as-surf zone!

OTOH, if I want to do inshore mine hunting, I'm going to do it with a throwaway UUV. And it's going to go find those mines the same way I 'rediscover' sprinklerheads every damn spring when some fellah comes around with his yard aerator. Namely turn on the water and 'get wet' with multiple Lidar/Acoustic systems suitable for the mud-water mission.

NO WAY IN HELL I am going to commit a 2,000 ton vessel to that mission. Not even if it is entirely plug'n'play. Because I don't need the weight and I I most assuredly don't need the Tier-1 selfdefense/sensor/EW capability that are _baseline_ to a combatant.

You look at WWI and II minesweepers. If they were open ocean they were built on a deep sea tug for sheer horse. If they were inshore, they were a fishing trawl. /Sometimes/ (if you were rich or the threat really bad) they could be built on a converted DE/Corvette/Sloop class. But only rarely. You don't need the knots. You don't need the signature. You've _got_ to be able to replace losses.

A 500-1,000 ton ship can either 'handle' or be GOES warned off in advance of, most storms. And that's all I care about because I'm not even drogueing a paravane anymore.

>>
Or to go hunt down that sub which wants to hide in shallow waters. Or provide depth of fire capabilities against 20-30 smallboats with RPGs.
>>

Again, if I want to kill inshore subs, I will do it with a combination of remote emplaced and long line and (IMO) _extant_ April Showers capable satellite platforms. I'm not going to play here fishy-fishy with Jaws and a bucketful of my own blood.

That said, the best way to 'contain' the ASW threat is exactly as we are doing now. Buying off or otherwise financially bludgeoning whatever CMIC has the brilliant idea to sell cheap anarchy to small has-no-gravitass nations.

>>
By the way, ships will still be viable weapons platforms for the concievable future, due to thier ability to remain on station for days, weeks, or months at a time. Airplanes have to land much sooner than that, and use more fuel to do it.
>>

Yes and no. The best weapons systems are those which provide their own ISR. i.e. take a MALD like bus. Fit it with a Hellfire sized warhead. And a LIDAR or high resolution I2R/TV vidicon as the Israeli SPIKEs now supposedly use.

Then, when the call comes, as your PB or PC class system is running hard out into deep blue with a damaged engine barely staying ahead of a fleet of boghammer type threats, angry because of something a SWO team did inshore.

Or as you are /about/ to snap shut a trap for equivalent threats in a deliberate draw play designed to stop local piracy or drug running, you launch this 230 mile system, along with a cheap RQ-8 type (relay) drone and engage targets as you come across them with the MISSILE as your eyes on discriminator in crowded waters.

OTOH, the problem then becomes what you do when either the SWO daddies are 500nm inland. Or you have no real clue as to how the situation is, going in. Maybe they are there _waiting for you_. Maybe you need to thread the needle between. Several random patrols.

Heck, maybe you are just running for-real 'rescue ops' and need wide area sea search more than some notion through-the-looking-glass microview.

NOW your RQ-8 is /worthless/. Because it cannot move fast enough, to push back the horizon. And it's operating altitude is heart-of-the-envelope for a lot of threats. Even as it's payload is abysmal.

Similarly, if you need to -go get those guys- (beyond the whitewater) a helo with all of perhaps 150nm worth of operational radius is going to be SOL on pulling junior and his sprained ankle out of the bush. Let alone a real bleeding-out-NOW emergency.

What then?

None of your swift boats or midrange corvettes can handle a V-22. And even a 'real' ship like LCS is going to be crippled for want of viable flight deck space.

UNLESS, you reach down, grab hold with BOTH hands and say-

"Forget you 10-days-away airdales! I need real airpower. Right Now."

Which means that a _vital_ element in designing your ship is now creating a vessel which can land and launch LARGE assets from a 'when we say putting the jet on the roof, we mean /on the roof/' shaped sea asset.

Why do this? Because there is an overriding need to SEE WITHOUT SHOOTING over the whitewater intersection. Because things you can get away with at sea you could /never/ do on land (oops, is this the backend of one of you 'lethal recce drone sir, one of my farmers just blew himself up stepping on the front'.

Because even at sea your defacto frigate fleet is often going to be the SOLE USN asset for a 1,000 miles in any direction. And the only way it can _effectively contribute_ as a 'patrol class' is by seeing a good sized chunk of that 1,000 miles without having to literally motor there.

UCAVs are the way to get there.

Because a 2/3rds scale UCAV shaped on the notion of the X-47-

www.air-attack.com...

Can mount a shaft driven lift fan like an X-35 (feeding it from the _main_ inlet) while using the X-32's nozzle cutoff and control valve secondary post fed from 'auxilliary' inlets further aft on the inlet trunk.

All to launch and recover a drone that has a combat radius of at least 450nm and 5hrs on station. In a package about 20ft long and 10ft wide.

i.e. _Easily Operable_ from a wide, flat, roof deck. Even if the concept of robotic jet lift and interactions with the pad and adverse flow off a conventional deckhouse superstructure make the whiners in the USN too scared to 'see it' as a function of their mental image of a conventional helodeck equipped ship.

At which point my costs to maintain that wide horizon are actually pretty low (1/10th the amount for an equivalent coverage by helos? 1/100th?).

While my costs to /kill something/ there (with say 4 instead of 8 SDB as with a full size UCAV) are 256,000 dollars (64,000 dollars per shot). Vs. the 730,000 dollars that the ship is _simply too small_ to mount in an equal-range Tomahawk CM.

_Nothing else_ having the range to create a useful sphere of influence in independent ops around a nominal 'smal surface combatant'.

CONCLUSION:
The Navy wants to pay big bucks for LCS to do mean and largely meaningless missions. I want to build a BIG MISSION into a small, mean, hull. To conquer the world of naval power projection.

Something like these-

ness.external.lmco.com...
www.globalsecurity.org...

The difference between us is that I know that carrier and indeed /manned/ airpower has had it's last best day. And I want to enable the alternative before the idiots in charge of the Air Navy crush the budget with the weight of their wallet. Or impale themselves on a spear of light.

Whichever comes first.

That can only happen with fixed-wing radius of action and speeds of tranist. To get that capability, I am willing to design a ship that has the blue water capabilities to SUSTAIN these options. Irrespective of what happens to the CVSF escorts.

But I won't trade air-for-nothing. And that is what a (2,000 ton, 100 hull class-count) 'Corvette Navy @ Frigate Prices' is setting us up to do.

Moronic Bastards.


KPl.

It seems you may have been misinformed of a couple of the capabilities of the LCS. (trust me, I have my own gripes about it, but the class is a neccesity)

You've repeatedly mentioned that using UAVs and other remote vehicles is the way to go. Here, you couldn't be more right, and a large part of the LCS's design is based around being a mothership for unmanned vehicles. Not just air vehicles, but also surface boats and long range unmanned submersibles. In fact, if the LCS is directly involved in any combat itself, it's doing something wrong.

As for the degree of modularity, How do you feel about the concept of a sea-going pickup truck? Except that bed is large enough to hold a half dozen conex boxes full of the equipment needed for THAT mission. Oh, change mission? Pull into port, drop those modules off, load on two other modules, three extra RQ-8s, and a pair of spartan rhibs, then get back underway, all in less than 24 hours. Now THAT'S modularity!

By the way, the U.S.Navy doesn't operate "A thousand miles away from the nearest freindly vessel". That's just asking someone to come get a suckerpunch in on you. Tha USN operates in groups.

Frankly, I don't know how we got so far off topic, we probrably should've opened up an "LCS" thread for this.

1. The British government is notorious for saving money by removing weapons from weapons platforms, the Type 45 will likely go to sea armed with the gun (because otherwise there would be a big hole in the deck), the VLS system (otherwise the French would be snippy because of Aster) and a helicopter that is referred to as the "Flying Frigate" in the Navy - because of its cost, not its firepower (because otherwise Westland workers would be unemployed).

2. Can the Type 45 fire anything out of those VLS cells apart from anti-aircraft missiles, I'm guessing not, which is poor.

3. I'm also not (yet) seeing either a CIWS or an SSM battery - only "provision for". What does that mean apart from some deck space and an empty wiring loom. My bank account has provision for several million dollars.

4. It may be the World's most comfortable warship, but calling it HMS Daring is appropriate if you claim it to be the World's most powerful warship, it should be HMS Who Are You Kidding because the World's most powerful warship is not generally defined as having 42 anti aircraft missiles, some guns, a helicopter, and several iPod sockets.

5. All of us who remember Nimrod AEW - which was of course announced as the world's most advanced AEW aircraft, and one that would embarass the E-3A in all aspects, spent it's days designating Ice Cream vans on the Devon coast as inbound helicopter threats - or how about the disaster that became the Foxhunter radar in the Tornado F.2/F.2A/F.3. My point being that the UK defence industry has a habit of talking big and delivering small (and very, very late) when it comes to most things (like ASRAAM) but with radar systems in particular.

I would put this thing slightly ahead of the Kidd class destroyers, but it's certainly no Arleigh Burke, it's at least half a generation behind current ships, and let's not forget it's still only a shell (but with iPod sockets).

The government is more about shipyard workers than ships, expensive things like weapon systems cost a lot, but employ fewer people in making them - guess which one gets the chop.

hi, well firstly i'll say i don't really know much about all these specs what everyone is talking about (sounds another language to me)

but with (respect) i sence a little 'biasedism' in the replys in this thread!!

ive typed in on google 'type 45 destroyer' and it comes up with the 'worlds most advanced warship'.

now i noticed a lot of americans have replyed and said 'its not!' - if it's not then fair do's, ive got no problem with that

but really my main part in replying to this thread is.. 'countrys are getting more advanced!!'

yes! america is infront of other (respectable) military powers in the world, but nations are SLOWLY catching up!!

for instance 20 years ago, america was like a 'FURTHER' 20 years infront of everyone else (military wise) - these days i don't think they are!!

for instance (this thread) would the UK (or any other country) have been saying this 10 years ago (apart from maybe russia)??

UCAV's was these all talk 10 years ago? - (now NUMEROUS nations have these in development) - and some look better than the ones the US are producing!!

+ other things like (F-35, eurofighter, tornadoGR4) yes maybe the F-22 is a better fighter than the f-35, but come-on its not exactly LIGHT YEARS behind it

my point is, reading from the net - the UK has the 2nd highest defence budget/are 2nd highest contributers in military research and development.

so all this stuff takes time (maybe in 10/15 years) you'll see why we are the 2nd highest and then you'll see results

but as said, the US are infront - but the gap is closing ALL THE TIME (technology wise), nations are having to invest more in defence because of 'terrorism!!'

but to the person who posted above me, i'm not sure if that was an insult or what comparing the 'type45' to a 'Kidd class destroyer' - ive just typed it in on google and the kidd class destroyer looks like a rusty old machine from the 30 years ago

so maybe i am right and there is a little biased-ism in peoples replys

ps:- can someone tell me about another british project 'sea wraith' ive been reading about when ive typed in 'type45 destroyer'

foxxaero.homestead.com...

it says its a stealth ship that will be capable of artificially generating a mist to disquise itself as a bank of fog - sounds amazing


[edit on 24-2-2006 by st3ve_o]

Steve_o, this isn't about nationality or being biased, its about being real, I take it you look up a picture of a ship and decide from how it looks how capable it is? Well just some advice, looks amount to nothing, you have to know the weapons of that ship and the capabilities of those weapons to determine how powerful a ship is. The Type-45 dose have advanced technologies and it is a very capable warship but its not at the top of the food chain, and that's just being honest.

The Kidd class which you referred to as “a rusty old machine from the 30 years ago” is a very capable warship and certainly no laughing matter. Again, looks wont win you a battle.

Travellar,

>>
It seems you may have been misinformed of a couple of the capabilities of the LCS. (trust me, I have my own gripes about it, but the class is a neccesity).
>>

Not as an underarmed, overweight, inshore expediter of gunboat diplomacy.

>>
You've repeatedly mentioned that using UAVs and other remote vehicles is the way to go. Here, you couldn't be more right, and a large part of the LCS's design is based around being a mothership for unmanned vehicles. Not just air vehicles, but also surface boats and long range unmanned submersibles. In fact, if the LCS is directly involved in any combat itself, it's doing something wrong.
>>

The problem is that, at 220 million, the type is overpriced for the threat it's designed to deal with and remote controlling craft in the immediate sphere around it will not change the fact that /by accepting the range constraints/ of their control and performance, you are putting the 'mothership' at risk to their lack of capabilities. Even as you deny yourself the _overland_ power projection and 'monitoring' mission set altogether.

It's like protecting a 4 mile long battlestar with let's-play-red-baron machine-gun vipers. It can't be done and you shouldn't try to sell the concept simply because it has a fad-word like unmanned attached.

>>
As for the degree of modularity, How do you feel about the concept of a sea-going pickup truck? Except that bed is large enough to hold a half dozen conex boxes full of the equipment needed for THAT mission.
>>

A pickup truck is designed to transfer generic, unprocessed, goods like lumber and gravel and so on. In this it is closer to being a bulk cargo carrier than a 'modular mission system' surface combattant.

Do not the Edmund Fitzgerald confuse the two because, without adequate MISSION SYSTEMS onboard, the modularity of the hull is never going to be more than the situational ethic of the moment demands. Guns and helodrones for FIAC. ASTER and IPOD for an absent AAW threat.

THAT squire being 'reactive rather than dominant' engineering at work. Which is something we have never previously lowered ourselves to doing.

>>Oh, change mission? Pull into port, drop those modules off, load on two other modules, three extra RQ-8s, and a pair of spartan rhibs, then get back underway, all in less than 24 hours. Now THAT'S modularity!
>>

No. If you don't have the goods to seal the deal on hand, by the time you 'pull in for a quick sex change' (I blame a generation of Japanese Mech anime watchers just getting their engineering degrees myself...;-) the mission is won, done or lost. Because, the RQ-8 is nothing more than a DASH with a custom body job. And rigid inflatables are dumb as FIAC harbor patrol. Don't BS me about their use as open water assets or 'thieves hunting thieves' systems.

Indeed, when it comes time to smack the 'Iranian Fleet' back into humility, I don't want a fair fight. I want overwhelming fires AND targeting dominance. Which means _I see them, they don't get to see me_. I kill them, they don't get to /shoot/ at me.

You can't do that with RQ-8. You can't do that with manned or otherwise suicide-sled FIACs. Hell, the Ababil has superior up and away performance to BOTH those systems.

You _have to specifically design_ for an overmatch. And we simply have no effing clue as to how to do that.

1. Because we refuse to acknowledge the cost of a missile+UCAV based weapons platform on a fill-the-VLS 'pickup' level.
2. Because we reuse to make DEWS the principle means by which we _have no choice_ but to replace the even more outrageously wasteful carrier air system of elitist
nonpresence.

As a correlary of such deliberate ignorance of the obvious we also fail to accept that it is /harder/ to make a naval system that is competitive with a landbased one. Because the environment nibbles on it's mission systems where they sit. And swallows them whole if you miss the recover/launch point modeal by which 'there is no time' to wait for carrier air. Or net/para recover a UAV in the middle of combat ops. Or get the hell out of Dodge in a 370ft long ship doing turns for 40 'someday' while being chased by 70 knot powerboats that are hell bent on driving it into a minefield they laid last night.

>>
By the way, the U.S.Navy doesn't operate "A thousand miles away from the nearest freindly vessel". That's just asking someone to come get a suckerpunch in on you. Tha USN operates in groups.
>>
Actually, we do it all the time, it's just not commonly known how many backwaters are only worth a port of call option from a surface combattant. When the EP-3 chose to defect, the nearest asset we had was a DDG.
It's only when someone mines your behind, slams an Exocet into your side or plays motorboat IED that you realize _every_ ship, even those nominally flotilla'd out into larger operating groups, is _TOTALLY ALONE_ when hit.
Given how poorly equipped modern carriers are in terms of sphere of influence and mission diversity. Given how far under billeted and overdeployed we are 'gonna gap' forced to run our presence missions around the world, the only fool is the one who DOESN'T ANTICIPATE THE NEED for small ships with big (Theater Wide) teeth and eyes. You don't replace the SIGINT mission with another MMA that is merely 150 knots faster. You replace it with a drone off a small combatant.
Because the pair of them are together small and fast and sacrificial enough to _get the job done_. No matter who 'rubs, rams or overflies' after in protest. No matter how insane the notion of not maintaining 'In God We Trust, Everyone Else We Monitor' priveleges. Or even /wanting back/ a navy aircrew so treacherous as to hand over a National Asset into a hostile foreign powers hands.
I think we've forgotten the key to naval power is to assert presence where there is no law. Even as we clearly have /never learned/ that hunting microthreats means hours and miles of sanitizing void to get the one fleeting trace _200+nm inland_ that leads to a weapons kill.
Combine those two missions: WE WILL BE HERE. And WE WILL SEE YOU MISBEHAVING. And you have the means to make LCS work.
Not as a 'combat' but a /control/ ship. For the Litorals extend 200nm either side of the surfzone. Yet there is simply no need to be anywhere's near that close-in generating dominance.

CONCLUSION:
Given I think the USN has wussed out completely into a politically driven, subservient, warfighter appendix, WRT still hit it on the head when he said that designing a one-trick-seahorse cost-limits your class to the number of other hulls that have to be made to cover the missions it's too cheap to do out of the slip. Whether you see the pickup as half empty or half full, if it doesn't specifically have the capability to do more than a single mission set at a (unpaid for mission system) time, it is just as limited in the long run because procurement is about production, not followon missionization.
And everything LCS does now, it does inferiorly using existing technology which others can easily overmatch.
This latter is what he doesn't get and which indeed /no one/ is paying attention to in that it's when you try to deploy those mixed group SAGs into a litoral mission environment that you end up having nobody suited to the job sufficiently well to lynchpin the others **without all being exposed equally**. To landbased systems that are easier to put overmatching performance into because they don't have to pay special care to basing mode 'navalization' constraints. Or to seabased ones which are simply so cheap that they can be thrown away.
And such is why I hope we _seriously_ think about what we're doing. And specifically Follow The Money. To the gorging pigs-at-trough of NavAir. So that once we get our heads from arears as to the nature of the 'driving threat capability' (carrier aviation, right under the water). We can afford to pay to make the 1-in-1,000 ship NOT a victim. But a BMC2 den to hull-dedicated packhunters.
As a starting point to that process: Realize that water is a void sufficient only to point to value inland. Accept the cost of designing mission systems that are relevant to getting inland with speed and persistence to find the landward threat in it's den. Design and Proof those mission systems with other services (Netfires) if need be to bypass the Congressional scepticism for single-service capabilities. And then build a hull around developmental systems which you KNOW are available, only to you.
Once you get through this process, everything you do in the mudplain of the sea:land interface will come simple and second nature.
Because you will have the basic range to dictate the engagement conditions and the specific platform:mission performance (the bullet not the gun) to overmatch the best of what any corsair navy can bring out to bother you. Another 200nm into the true blue.
Designing large groups of generic hull classes around too-small a concentration of mission systems (Corvettes and Sloops) was typical of pre-WWII systems design to bulk out both the RN and USN(CG). It resulted in a lot of targets and complete second-line relegation of lightforces until the midwar designs could put real fires into real hulls. And then it was too late because navair had sucked the life out of independent ops based on targeting alone.
If there is no true, imminent, threat, we don't need to do the numbers-over-sense game. If there is, then we don't need to expose ships to landward-superior fires by pretending a frigate sized corvette with next to no real armament or multimission capabilities needs to be inshore.

KPl.