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Originally posted by Stratrf_Rus
There is a post with the presupposition that the US is superior in Nuclear technology than Russia and that no one wins a Nuclear war.
I have a feeling this individual neither has been a soldier in the US AF Strategic Forces nor in the Russian Strategic Forces, nor does he deal with Policy matters concerning Nuclear War.
Thus, because of that thread being 11 pages long, I feel a new thread must be developed with the presupposition that Nuclear war can be won, and it would be won by Russia.
The stereotype that no one can win a Nuclear war is false. The stereotype that the US arsenal is more survivable or better is also false.
At the present the US has deployed approximately 932 warheads in 500 Minuteman III (Single payload) and 432 SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles). (Dye, 295)
That means 500 Warheads to strike hardend targets (because of guidance systems needing accurate initial coordinates, an SLBM cannot be used against hardend facilities but can be used against airports, cities and etc.).
In total the US has about 11,766 warheads as of 1990 but by 2003 if accurately declared, has reduced their warheads to 3,500.
Russia has an undisclosed number of warheads but it is around 12,000. Russia has 549 Missiles deployed in various ICBM missile systems totalling a number of 1,959 declared warheads (in MIRVS: Multiple Re-entry Vehicles). And a total of 192 SLB Missiles with 672 warheads.
A total of 2631 deployed warheads. Russian Strategic Rocket Forces
There is already a numbers advantage to the Russians but their MIRVs does cause parity some-what.
There are 93 hardened Nuclear Facilities in Russia. Some ICMB locations
These facilities are far and spread-out; USA facilities are close together, mostly in Whyoming and Montana. USA facilities
Russian forces are also mostly mobile, the mobile rocket launchers can be anywhere in Siberia and have accurate enough Global Positioning Data from Russian Satelites to hit American ICBMs.
Thus Russia has more survivability and better first-strike capabilities than the US.
Nuclear Winter is a fake scenario invented in 1980s by medical doctors who were laughed off the stage by Nuclear Scientists; but Hollywood loved the idea and thus the American public has become believers of this superstition.
Russia believes in Nuclear war they would lose 20 million people, which is no more than they lost in WW2 thus it is acceptable.
Russia also has various Missile Defenses and has a significant civilian shelter that is an on-going program in Moscow even today.
Moscow can protect nearly its entire citizenry from Nuclear attack (about 5 million people) and feed them for a year (which is more than enough time to begin decontamination).
Thus in short, Nuclear war is winnable by Russia...not explained is the reason that the USA has fallen short of its Nuclear Weapons Program but we can talk about that policy later.
Source
Dye, Thomas R., 2002; Understanding Public Policy Tenth Edition: Prentice Hall
[edit on 24-1-2006 by Stratrf_Rus]
Originally posted by ShadowXIX
The KT impact blocked out the son for years or decades after the event. Nobody ever suggested that a nuclear winter created through nulcear war would last that long. The KT impact is a extreme example but proves that nuclear winters can and do happen if enough material in injected into the air.
The nuclear winter theory had more to do with flammable targets such as cities buring, where large amounts of smoke,dust and soot would be injected into the Earth's stratosphere then total combined power of the nuclear explosives.
In 1991, the Mount Pinatubo volcano alone was able to lower the entire global surface temperature by about 1 degree
Plus the dinosaurs didnt have to worry about radiation from nuclear fallout,which could severely damage plant and animal life.
Russia even had designs for a nuclear dirty bomb that could in theory kill most global surface life with radiation alone.
Your also not factoring in the massive amounts of Chemical and Bio weapons both sides would use in any such all out war. Both sides wouldnt hold back these weapons in the event of a nuclear war. The BIO weapons alone can be worst then all the nuclear bombs in the world.
Originally posted by StellarX
Nuclear weapon effects puts out flames in cities..... All a nuclear explosion leaves is smoldering ruins and ground bursts is not the way to cause wide spread destruction even if you choose to try to cause a dusty mess.
Russia even had designs for a nuclear dirty bomb that could in theory kill most global surface life with radiation alone.
And i believe they have space based lasers. Lets see who's theory has more backing?
Originally posted by Stratrf_Rus
No Bio Weapon has ever sat at the top of a Rocket.
Care to shed a tear? It is a very lame statement to be complaining about research (and I wouldn't trust an ex-Soviet Officer, Putin happens to be one) when it is a dog barring its teeth and little more.
Saddam proved that the US intelligence could be fooled, there's no telling that Russia really did do as Alibekov claims. What is certain is that Russia doesn't bother with a delivery system, which is reserved for Nuclear weapons and conventional weapons.
Russia could prepare to use them, but they are not on stand-by.
Originally posted by rogue1
Not true, nuclear weapons cause firestorms in built up areas. The intiail radiant pulse from teh wepaon causes all teh flamable amerails to reach their flashpoint instantly thus catching fire. The slower shockwave, then puts out the flames. However once the winds start rushing in to the vacuum,
"Firestorms" could occur only when the concentration of combustible structures is very high, as in the very dense centers of a few old American cities. At rural and suburban building densities, most people in earth- covered fallout shelters would not have their lives endangered by fires.
www.oism.org...
Heat radiation will set fire to easily ignitable materials (dry newspapers, thin dark fabrics, dry leaves and dry grass) in about the same extensive areas over which blast causes moderate damage to frame houses. The blast wave and high-speed blast winds will blow out many flames. However, tests have shown that fire will continue to smolder within some materials such as upholstery and dry rotted wood, and after a while it often will burst into flame and will spread. The burning automobile pictured in Fig. 7.2 is an example of such ignition beyond the range of severe blast damage.
www.oism.org...
A standard Soviet civil defense textbook states:
“Fires do not occur in zones of complete destruction
[overpressure greater than 7 psi]; flames due
to thermal radiation are prevented, because rubble
is scattered and covers the burning structures.
As a result the rubble only smolders.”
www.oism.org...
the fires are reignited, due to trhe oxygen feeding them again, This then results in a firestorm.
The original 1983 report on “nuclear winter”
assumes that 5% of urban fires resulting from a
nuclear exchange would be fire storm^'^ (and thus
that 95% would not be firestorms). That report
has been the impetus for recent attempts to model
the mass fires that might result from nuclear
weapons effects. 1 1 , 1
www.oism.org...
Originally posted by StellarX
Nuclear weapon blast wave effects puts out fires as i have stated before and if major fires do break out afterwards it's mostly as result of bad city design and firefighting efforst all of which can be countered to a great extent with beter preparation
The 300kT detonation would create a mass fire with a radius of 3.5 miles in all but the most extreme weather conditions. Under a majority of weather conditions, there would be a mass fire ignited to a distance of just over 4.5 miles from the detonation.
This gigantic fire would quickly increase in intensity and in minutes generate ground winds of hurricane force with average air temperatures well above the boiling point of water (212 degrees F). The fire would then burn everywhere at this intensity for three to six hours, producing a lethal environment over a total area of approximately 40 to 65 square miles - an area about 10 to 15 times larger than that incinerated by the 15 kT atomic bomb which destroyed Hiroshima.
Originally posted by ShadowXIX
We know Atomic bombs create mass fires because its happened at Hiroshima.
It created a stationary firestorm which burnt out 4.4 square miles in a matter of hours not days. We are talking about weapons that produce temps of 200 million degrees Fahrenheit, about four to five times the temperature found at the center of the sun!
Its absurb to think any cities firefighting effort will stop the firestorm a modern nuclear weapon will create over a city.
Heres the effects of a 300KT blast
Within 1.3 miles of the blast would experience more than 15 times the thermal energy found at the edge of the mass fire which destroyed hiroshima
The
Office of Technology Assessment stated that the
conditions needed to support a firestorm (such as
sufficient fuel loading-at least 8 pounds of combustibles
per square foot of fire area) are not met
in most modern American cities, although mass
fires might occur. (Hamburg had 32 lb/sq ft, and
the typical American suburb has about 2 Ib/sq
ft . 22(p22)) This conclusion has been challenged.
Postol states that “attacks on lightly built-up,
sprawling American cities, where the amount of
combustible material per unit area is relatively
low, could well result in extreme conditions
somewhat comparable to those of the firestorms
experienced in Japan and Germany during World
War II. ”11(p17) However, this assertion is based
on a large number of assumptions that Postol
describes as “highly uncertain”11(p29) and ‘‘only
of the most qualitative nature. ”11(p37) Others who
have recently tried to develop criteria for the
development of a firestorm state that the requisite
fuel loading appears to be about four times the
value of 8 lb/sq ft cited earlier.15(p63)
Among the uncertainties is the effect of the blast
wave from a nuclear explosion, which would level
all buildings within a certain radius. If much of
the combustible material were buried under
masonry rubble, some believe it would be more
likely to smolder than to support a firestorm. 24(P4)
A standard Soviet civil defense textbook states:
“Fires do not occur in zones of complete destruction
[overpressure greater than 7 psi]; flames due
to thermal radiation are prevented, because rubble
is scattered and covers the burning structures.
As a result the rubble only smolders.”2
www.oism.org...
We now know the simultaneous combustion of many fires over a large area, causes a great volume of air to heat, rise, and suck in large amounts of fresh air at hurricane speeds
Other cities were also subjected to fire bombing,
and approximate casualty figures are listed in the
Table. 17,18,31,32 Firestorms "frequently killed
more than 5% of the pop~lation'"~(p~~) (so that
about 95% survived). The death rate was influenced
greatly by the adequacy of defensive
measures.
www.oism.org...
The 300kT detonation would create a mass fire with a radius of 3.5 miles in all but the most extreme weather conditions. Under a majority of weather conditions, there would be a mass fire ignited to a distance of just over 4.5 miles from the detonation.
This gigantic fire would quickly increase in intensity and in minutes generate ground winds of hurricane force with average air temperatures well above the boiling point of water (212 degrees F). The fire would then burn everywhere at this intensity for three to six hours, producing a lethal environment over a total area of approximately 40 to 65 square miles - an area about 10 to 15 times larger than that incinerated by the 15 kT atomic bomb which destroyed Hiroshima.
Originally posted by Sandman11
Yes I was posting on the former string, and I believe we were referencing the late 1970s to early 1980s to the end of the cold war in which many, but not all claimed a 'window of vulnerability'.
Today, you are mistaken about operational warhead levels; The US is not behind in raw numbers, but in fact leads Russia in Strategic warheads by a thousand or so...
Russia has about 3800 operational warheads that could hit the US.
www.thebulletin.org...
The US has about 5,521
www.thebulletin.org...
Of course these are both estimates as both sides do not release such information to the public.
Russia today is in no shape to fight anyone, nuclear or otherwise.
It's Navy is in total decay, the Russian airforce is barely able to buy any aircraft at all, much less the latest 5th generation stealth in any numbers at all.
It now has fewer combat aircraft than the US Airforce, NOT including US Navy and Marine combat forces to add to that. Training is a fraction of what US combat aircraft crews get.
The Army can't even subdue Chechen rebels on home territory,
and ballistic missile defense radars were lost with the disolution of the USSR to the extent that there are large gaps in which SLBMs can attack with no warning.
If Moscow has an ABM system, the 400 reported warheads headed there would overwhelm the 100 interceptors, and if Yamantau Mountain can withstand the reported 6 direct nuclear hits in the same spot digging it out, then I would suspect that more than 7 are targeted there, if not a couple dozen.
And it is amusing that you conclude, if you were refering to me, that I did not have any formal military or political connection as if I would reveal such classified information if I did...
Anyone of that level, and I suspect the Russians as well, would be sworn to secrecy, and if such information were declared to US intelligence it would never see the light of day.
We are all amatures here, unless you want to admit your "top secret" credentials, however that might get you shot...
Until directed energy weapons are perfected, the offense will dominate any nuclear defense, passive or active.
Like I say, space based directed energy weapons will change everything though...
One potential method might be a powerfull ground-based laser (why was the infrared sensor on one of our satellites suddenly blinded as it passed over the USSR?) A laser on the Mir space station recently "illuminated" an ICBM during the cruise phase of its flight in space, demonstrating Soviet ability to detect and track a missile, according t o Pentagon sources (Washington Inquirer , July 24, 1987).
The purpose of Mir may indeed include bringing about "peace" -- Soviet style,
implies absence of opposition.
www.oism.org...
The Soviets are also developing an airborne laser. Assuming a successful development effort, limited initial deployment could begin in the early l990s. Such a laser platform could have missions including antisatellite operations, protection of high-value airborne assets, and cruise missile defense.
The Soviets are working on technologies or have specific weapons-related programs underway for more advanced antisatellite systems. These include space-based kinetic energy, ground- and space-based laser, particle beam, and radio frequency weapons. The Soviets apparently believe that these techniques offer greater promise for future antisatellite application than continued development of ground-based orbital interceptors equipped with conventional warheads. The Soviets also believe that military applications of directed energy technologies hold promise of overcoming weaknesses in their conventional air and missile defenses.
The USSR's high-energy laser program, which dates from the mid-1960s, is much larger than the US effort. They have built over a half dozen major R&D facilities and test ranges, and they have over 10,000 scientists and engineers associated with laser development. They are developing chemical lasers and have continued to work on other high-energy lasers having potential weapons applications - the gas dynamic laser and the electric discharge laser. They are also pursuing related laser weapon technologies, such as efficient electrical power sources, and are pursuing capabilities to produce high-quality optical components. They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) generator which produces 15 megawatts of short-term electric power - a device that has no counterpart in the West. The scope of the USSR's military capabilities would depend on its success in developing advanced weapons, including laser weapons for ballistic missile defense.
And:
The Soviets have now progressed beyond technology research, in some cases to the development of prototype laser weapons. They already have ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with US satellites. In the late 1980s, they could have prototype space based laser weapons for use against satellites. In addition, ongoing Soviet programs have progressed to the point where they could include construction of ground-based laser antisatellite(ASAT) facilities at operational sites. These could be available by the end of the 1980s and would greatly increase the Soviets' laser ASAT capability beyond that currently at their test site at Sary Shagan. They may deploy operational systems of space-based lasers for antisatellite purposes in the l990s, if their technology developments prove successful, and they can be expected to pursue development of space-based laser systems for ballistic missile defense for possible deployment after the year 2000.
www.fas.org...
ASATs The Soviets may have a new "direct-ascent" antisatellite
capability, according to the Pentagon's annual report
to the Congress. This would be more effective than the "coorbital"
ASAT, which has been operational since 1971. It is
speculated that the new ASAT could carry a nuclear warhead.
Lasers: According to Paul Nitze, the Soviets have over a
half dozen major development facilities, including an ABM test
center at Sary Shagan. US intelligence sources suspect that
Soviet lasers have already damaged some American spy
satellites. In 1984, Richard DeLauer testified that it would
take the US about ten years to reach parity in laser weapons.
Active Measures (Wet)?: Since July 1986, there have
been seven terrorist bombings, three assassinations, five highly
suspicious "suicides," and one disappearance among European
scientists and officials working on SDI-related projects.
(Washington Inquirer, 12/18/87).
www.oism.org...
At the annual meeting of The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA) in Los Angeles, October, 1985, Dr. Teller stated that the U.S.
has made encouraging progress in research on x-ray lasers. But he believes the Soviets are a decade ahead of us in strategic defenses.
www.oism.org...
On Sept. 29 and 30, the Soviets practiced bombing Hawaii.
They also zapped three American airplanes with lasers. The
pilots were not seriously injured, but most of the electronic
surveillance equipment on one plane was knocked out
instantly. For several hours, Mikhail Gorbachev and a number
of other top Soviet officials occupied the deep underground
bunkers near MOSCOW, according to US intelligence sources
(Washington ZTmes, Oct. 13, 1987 Al). But they did not need
such a huge protection factor. The US government responded
with a protest, and with optimism about the upcoming summit.
A few Hawaiian citizens called their Director of Civil Defense
to ask where the shelters were, and had to be informed that
actually there aren't any (personal communication, War Crisis
Workshop, Ark. Department of Emergency Services, Nov. 4).
www.oism.org...
Only two advanced
photoreconnaissance satellites (called KH-11) are now in orbit,
possibly about half the bare minimum needed. One is long
past its design life. A replacement was reportedly destroyed in
the Challenger explosion (Washington Inquirer Aug 12,1988).
In an 18-month period, there were five satellite launch failures.
In satellites for surveillance and defense, the USSR is
said to have a tenfold advantage. When trouble flares, the
Soviets frequently launch one or more surveillance satellites
within days, while it takes the US at least six weeks to plan a
new space flight. Development of Soviet antisatellite weapons
continue. Space-based lasers may be deployed in the 199Os,
and ground-based lasers may be capable of blinding US
satellites in low earth orbit even now (Wall St July 12,1988).
www.oism.org...
On August 16, 1983, Yu. Andropov, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, announced that the USSR unilaterally stopped trial of the SDS, and the testing was stopped. However, due to ascension of M. Gorbachev to power, and launching of the "Star Wars" (Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI) program in the US development of the space defense continued. The Skif-D dynamic model was designed for testing of a laser combat station. A scale model of the Skif-DM station (Polus) was made later for test launch of the Energiya delivery vehicle. The model had a length of 37 meters, diameter of 4.1 meters, and weight of 80 tons. The Skif-DM had four sustainer engines, 20 orientation engines, and 16 stabilization engines. At the station it was planned to conduct 15 applied military and a few geophysical experiments, including launching of targets. Before the launch Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, declared an impossibility of moving of the armament race to the outer space, after which it was decided not to perform military experiments at the Skif-DM satellite. A test launch of the Energiya delivery vehicle with the Skif-DM satellite was conducted on May 15, 1987. The satellite separated from the rocket 460 seconds after the launch, and fell in the Pacific Ocean some time later because of the control system's failure. There was no laser system on board. Instead the satellite carried its scale model. Some elements of the "Soviet SDI" were to be mounted on the Spektr space module, but it was delivered to orbit only five years later than it had been planned, and was included into the Mir orbital station.
Since late 1960s, the Soviet Union was working on development of ground laser systems for anti-satellite defense and pumping from nuclear explosions. Unlike the Roentgen laser of Teller, such lasers were reusable. One of such lasers was probably built near Dushanbe. In different periods Yu. Babaev and Yu. Ablekov supervised the work on such laser, but due to the unilateral moratorium announced by the USSR, and the followed mysterious deaths of both engineers the work on such lasers was suspended in the mid-1980s.
In 1994-1995, The High Temperatures Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences sold the Pamir-3U mobile electric generator to the United States. The Pamir-3U had an output of 15 megawatt, dimensions of 2.5 x 2.65 x 10 meters, and weighed about 20 tons. The generator could be used in Russia (USSR) on the ground or in outer space for power supply to long-range laser and super high frequency weapon systems.
The Soviet Union also worked on designing of an "orbital fortress" based on a space station of the Mir type. Modules of the aiming system served as the side blocks of the station. The side blocks were attached to the basic module. The blocks were to be delivered to the station in cargo compartments of the Buran shuttle orbiter. The station was intended for killing of warheads of ballistic missiles from outer space when the crew was on board.
It was also planned to use a group of three missiles to stretch a kevlar net to cut warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
www.fas.org...
U.S. Fears Satellites Damaged
Peter G. Neumann
Sun 24 Jan 88 14:10:34-PST
Subtitle -- Soviets used lasers to cripple equipment, sources contend.
Washington, by Richard Sale (UPI, 24 January 1988).
U.S. intelligence agencies are convinced Soviet laser attacks have damaged
supersophisticated U.S. spy satellites deployed to monitor missile and
spacecraft launches, administration sources said. These sources said they
believe the Soviets fired ground-based lasers to cripple optical equipment
attempting to scan launches at Tyuratam, the major Soviet space center, to
obtain a variety of sensitive military information. Administration
intelligence sources said they fear that other vital U.S. reconnaissance
satellites will soon be endangered because six new Soviet laser battle stations
are under construction... "There is no way you can protect the optical sensors
on satellites" from laser attacks, an Air Force official said. ...
Intelligence sources acknowledged that the Pentagon also has trained
ground-based lasers on Soviet spacecraft, sometimes in attempts to disrupt
their sensors. ...
[From the San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle, front page, 24 Jan 88. The
article goes on to consider reports that some spacecraft malfunctions may
have been due to laser "hosing", e.g., a KH-11 or Code 1010 satellite, which
was permanently damaged in 1978. Seems unlikely -- the technology was not
very well advanced then? PGN]
[However, the risks of laser interference or accidental triggering are worth
noting. Adding to the risks of computing in SDI, might such a concerted
attack of simultaneous laser bursts on many satellite sensors be mistakenly
detected as the launch of a nuclear attack!? PGN]
catless.ncl.ac.uk...
One effect of the panic was the strengthening of U.S. satellites against
radiation that in the end would help shield them from ground-based laser
attacks. According to U.S. intelligence sources, who asked not to be named,
such attacks damaged super-sophisticated American spy satellites deployed to
monitor missile and spacecraft launches at the major Russian space center.
These sources said that the Soviets fired ground-based lasers to cripple
sensitive optical equipment attempting to scan launches at Tyuratam to
obtain a variety of sensitive military information including payloads and
throw weights. The Soviet laser "hosings" of costly satellites, details of
which remain classified, occurred throughout the 1980s and into the early
1990s, and sent U.S. scientists scrambling to shield the space surveillance
system.
"According to a former Senate Intelligence Committee chief of staff, Angelo
Codevilla, the Soviets regularly "pulsed" or targeted lasers on U.S.
satellites. A senior Air Force official said that the U.S. had decided to
keep evidence of the laser attacks hushed up for a variety of reasons."
"The official said that first, it makes our equipment "look bad" but more
important, the United States has used the collective evidence as a
bargaining chip in strategic arms limitation talks."
In 1976, a KH-11 or Code 1010 satellite was "painted" by a Soviet laser
and sustained "permanent damage," according to a senior Air Force official.
This source said that such paintings continued into the late 1980s.
Air Force officials told UPI that for years the Soviets had a
"battle-ready" ground-based laser at Saryshagan that they said they believed had been involved in past blindings of U.S. spacecraft.
When the Soviet Union dissolved, it was in the process of building a new
battle-ready laser at Nurek in Tadzhikstan and a second 500 miles away at
Khazakstan in the Caucasus Mountains. Four more ground laser battle stations
were planned, one begun on mountains near Dushanbe and another between Nruek
and Dushambe and two more at unidentified areas.
But the result of the "hosings" of U.S. equipment was positive. The United
States moved quickly to install laser warning receivers on its newest
generation of low-orbit spacecraft, U.S. intelligence sources said.
One State Dept. analyst said that the whole Star Wars system of the Reagan
presidency was the result of Soviets "messing around with our satellites."
www.strategypage.com...
Originally posted by StellarX
Russian silo's are also reloadable with some estimating that it could in fact happen in time to get off a second salvo before the American strike arrives. I am comfortable assuming it would take hours if not days to reload the silo's.
Russia today is in no shape to fight anyone, nuclear or otherwise.
This is another one of those complete lies that the facts disproves no matter how you twist them. Please stop telling them Sandman.
They still have large numbers of planes in storage ( and hundreds on active duty) and as you said earlier all these claims are based on what the Russians admit to having. Their navy can still deploy in large numbers on occasion and has NEVER been a patrol navy like their US counterpart.
The Army can't even subdue Chechen rebels on home territory,
Why do we assume their stupid when we could be assuming that both countries want instability in these various regions?
and ballistic missile defense radars were lost with the disolution of the USSR to the extent that there are large gaps in which SLBMs can attack with no warning.
SLBM's can never attack with 'no warning' and SA-10's where designed to shoot them down with very little warning anyways.
Moscow ABM defenses uses 1 megaton warheads on those interceptors so i imagine they need 400 warheads for a reason. They can probably get the missile before the Mirv's even get a chance to seperate. Even if that isn't so each 1 megaton blast is going to kill a few warheads.
Pffftttt. You know that there is plenty of evidence to show that not everyone agrees with that. Why did Reagan want SDI? Why do they all want it but never get as far when they could manage in back in the 60's? Who is preventing the US from deploying defenses that would save tens of millions of lives when it is now well known that the Russians have deployed at least 8000 missiles with at least SOME capacity against SLBM's/ICBM's?
Originally posted by rogue1
Bollocks, so you are saying that the Russians could reload their silos in less than 30 minutes. Complete fantasy.
Who cares about silo reload capability, their won't be any silos left after a US counter strike.
Also you make these claims that silos can be loaded in a very short time which means that any spare missiles would be close by and their storage areas will also be hit
They may be able to launch nuclear warheads, however their conventioanl forces are in disrepare - just look at the Chechen Wars.
Having planes in storage hardly constitutes a viable air force, lol. Also what exactly does ' large ' mean ? Deploying in large numbers hardly makes them battle worthy.
And what would be the reason for the Russians wanting instability in Chechnya ? They claim it as part of Russia, so it's not as though they are causing the instability so they can stay in occupation - it's their own country.
Hmm, you accuse sandman of lying where you outright lie here.
The SA-10 ( S-300P) cannot shoot down SLBM's , they have never been tested against ballisticv targets even aproching the speeds of SLBM RV's. So please keep your BS to yourself.
Only the Gorgon missile carries 1 MT warheads and they can't intercept MIRV's before they seperate from the bus vehicle.
There only 32 Gorgon missiles deployed. Also a 1 MT blast will no kill a few warheads, unless they are travelling very close together which would be unlikely.
LOL, so what weapons in the 60's could be classes as relevant to the SDI in the 80's ? There is no conspiracy to leave the american people undefended. If you nuclear war were to break out everyone would lose - simple as that.
Seems your estimates has gone from supposedly 10-12 000 ABM's to 8000 now By your thinkiong we should class the American patriot as being able to tkae out ICBM/SLBM's as well - right.
Immediately prior to the signing of the ABM treaty, the Soviets had developed a surface-to-air missile, the SA-5, which was observed to have a peculiar trajectory. The SA-5 was fired high above the atmosphere and then would descend to intercept and destroy enemy bombers. While technically such a trajectory could not be ruled out, logically, however, it could not be accepted as this type of trajectory represents the least efficient way to shoot down enemy aircraft. On the other hand, the SA-5?s trajectory would be just the ticket for shooting down incoming ballistic missiles which themselves travel above the atmosphere. Taking this into account, the SA-5 had to be an ABM weapon. But with the ABM treaty almost in hand, this fact was ignored and the treaty went into effect. The treaty remains in effect, limiting development of a U.S. ABM system. Meanwhile, Russian dual-purpose (anti-aircraft/anti-missile) missile systems like the SA-5 continue to exist.
www.thenewamerican.com...
However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.
Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.
In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).
www.jinsa.org...
history/3,2360,652,170,440
Washington, D.C.): Today's Wall Street Journal features an extraordinarily timely column by the newspaper's highly respected Assistant Editorial Page Editor, Melanie Kirkpatrick. Thanks to Ms. Kirkpatrick, a dirty little secret is now in the public domain: Even as Russian President Vladimir Putin goes to great lengths to denounce President Bush's commitment to defend the American people against ballistic missile attack, railing about the threat thus posed to the sacrosanct 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and seeking to divide United States from its allies, Russia is maintaining a national missile defense of its own that is clearly inconsistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty.
This revelation demands several responses: 1) President Bush should task his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board or some other independent blue-ribbon group to perform an immediate and rigorous assessment of former Defense Intelligence Officer William Lee's work on the Soviet/Russian NMD system and the classified official analyses that have, to date, minimized its strategic capabilities and significance. 2) Present the findings of such a study to the American people and U.S. allies. And 3) end the official U.S. practice inherited by Mr. Bush of allowing the United States to be the only nation whose missile defense programs are encumbered by the outdated and increasingly dangerous ABM Treaty, thereby clearing the way for deployment as soon as possible of effective anti-missile protection for this country, as well as Russia.
www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org...
Mr. Lee's analysis is complex. To vastly simplify, he says he has evidence that Russia's surface-to-air interceptor missiles carry nuclear warheads and therefore are capable of bringing down long-range ballistic missiles, not just aircraft and shorter-range missiles, which is their stated purpose. Russia has 8,000 of these missiles scattered around the country, and Mr. Lee says he has found numerous Russian sources that describe how successive generations of SAMs were in fact designed with the express intention of shooting down ballistic missiles, which is illegal under the treaty.
www.opinionjournal.com...
In 1997, the Russians unveiled yet another variant of the system, this time called S-300PMU-2 (SA-10E Favorit). Its larger missiles (9M96E and 9M96E2), longer range (200 kilometers), and better guidance system make the S-300PMU-2 a thorough modification of its predecessor. The system can engage targets between 10 meters and 27 kilometers above the ground.(7) The Russians claim that, during a series of tests in the mid-1990s, the S-300PMU-2 shot down a target ballistic missile traveling at 1,600 meters per second, and that the system can destroy targets traveling at 4,800 meters per second.(8) The Russians add that the system has a kill ratio between 0.8 and 0.98 against Tomahawk-class cruise missiles and from 0.8 to 0.93 against aircraft.(9)
www.missilethreat.com...
By the time the Empire collapsed, more than 10,000 dual purpose SAM/ABM interceptor missiles were deployed at SA-5/10 complexes. Yet the U.S. officially counts only the l00 interceptors of the "ABM X-3" system at Moscow, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. ABM X-3 is a scaled up model of the NIKE-X system, vintage late
www.fas.org...
"Full antimissile defence the length of the perimeter of the borders
of Europe and Russia is not planned," Ivashov said. "It is intended to
concentrate all that we already have, coordinating ABM systems, obtaining
opportunities to destroy ballistic missiles and opportunities in the
command structure, and directing those opportunities in directions
presenting a missile danger."
He said that the systems should cover peacekeeping contingents, and
the civilian population and civilian facilities as well as military
facilities, damage to which could cause significant harm to civilians.
The Russian side has no doubt that "NATO members will not start
purchasing Russian ABM systems on a large scale, like the modernized
S-300PMU or the new S-400, which can effectively combat ballistic
missiles, although NATO's European members do not have systems like
these", Ivashov said. Moscow does not in any case intend to extend its
missile technology to NATO countries, and Sergeyev said this frankly in
Brussels a few days ago.
www.fas.org...
Correspondent] The upgraded S-300 can hit a warhead even in space. This is exactly what the Americans are dreaming of when they speak about the ABM system. As soon as it is known about the launch of a combat missile, its trajectory is calculated immediately and air defence experts begin acting. There are just 7-10 seconds to locate a target, acquire it and launch an interception missile. They have done it.
www.missilethreat.com...
Throughout the Kosovo War air campaign the major Russian missile manufacturer Almaz Central Design Burueau was quietly putting the finishing touches to a new family of highly effective S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems. Destined to become widespread both inside and outside Russia, the presence of these missiles will "create major problems for [air strike] planners for years to come", and their significance has been greatly underestimated by Defence Ministers worldwide. This warning is made by Editors Chris Foss and Tony Cullen in the foreword of the forthcoming authoritative publication Jane's Land-Based Air Defence 2000-1 Edition.
www.janes.com...
First, the SA-5 system was tested and developed at the officially declared ABM test range, Sary-Shagan.28 Second, medium- and intermediate-range missiles were fired to impact areas located at Sary-Shagan. Senators John "Jake" Garn and Gordon J. Humphrey have charged that many of these missiles could have served as the targets for ABM intercept programs.29 If so, the target most closely approximated in terms of range, radar cross section, and trajectory would be SLBMs. Third, if such a system as the SA-5 were to act as a terminal atmospheric defense weapon, it would require all-azimuth radar data for warning, acquisition, and pointing inputs to the SA-5 intercept radar. The Hen House long-range radar deployment was coincident in time with initiation of the SA-5 deployment.30 Hen House radars are deployed (in accordance with the ABM treaty) on the periphery of the U.S.S.R., scanninig outward over U.S. SLBM launch areas.31 As a linear array radar, Hen House can handle multiple targets limited only by internal computer configurations that can never be physically seen or assessed directly by U.S. intelligence.32 Acknowledged ABM radars such as the Dog House and Cat House also possess the capability to be used by the SA-5 in an ABM role as does a new class of large ABM capable phased-array radars publicly announced by Senator Garn.33 Fourth, and most important, the assessed technical characteristics of the SA-5 system itself indicated a clear capability to perform as a terminal ABM system to destroy ballistic missile targets of the SLBM variety given adequate radar acquisition data.34
Because of this relative wealth of uncertainty, the final ABM treaty included an explicit obligation in Article VI not to test SAMs "in an ABM mode." Since the ABM testing of the SA-5 could have been completed for some years prior to 1972, the treaty’s impact on an SA-5 ABM capability would be slight. Even at that, the reported repeated violations of the treaty after 1972 by the use of the SA-5 radar in tracking ballistic missiles resulted in Soviet tests against missiles similar in range to a normal SLBM trajectory.35 The Soviets claimed (and the administration) accepted) that the SA-5 radar was not being tested in an ABM mode, but rather was being used in a "legitimate range instrumentation role."36 Whether it is designated as a "range instrumentation radar" does not alter the fact that it has been used in a missile-tracking role. Its ability to track missile warheads on the range is therefore prima facie evidence of its ABM capability. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.
The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...
Until recently the Anti-Missile and Space Defense Forces in Russia were called the Missile Space Defense Forces. Colonel General V. Smirnov was their commander. The forces included: the early warning system, the ABM system, the outer space control system, and the space defense system. The outer space control system observes low and high orbits with altitudes of 120 to 40,000 kilometers and higher. The information components of the system can observe, analyze, and list in the catalog objects with diameter of about 10 centimeters staying in low orbits and with diameter of 0.5 meters staying in quasi-stationary orbits. In July 1997, the President issued a decree on re-subordination of the Missile Space Defense Forces to the Strategic Missile Forces. In November 1997, new commander of the united forces Colonel General V. Yakovlev announced that organization of a new branch of Armed Forces increased their combat readiness. At any rate, the service life of 68% of satellites in the early warning cluster and 48% of ground facilities has expired. Nonetheless, the system should fulfill its tasks until 2003, and later it will be renovated.
In September 1997, a package of disarmament documents was signed in Waldorf-Astoria hotel in New York. These documents confirmed the main provisions of the ABM treaty of 1972. It is prohibited to create strategic ABM systems, to test and deploy space ABM systems, but some flexibility is introduced with regard to the tactical ABM defense. The agreement laid some restrictions on the maximum flight speed and quantity of tests for the missiles of a tactical ABM defense system.
www.fas.org...
Originally posted by StellarX
Well you can disagree with the sources and call them liars if you like. Fact is you have no real argument against the reality that the SU have deployed SA-5 and SA-10 in the duel use mode since the very start.
The SA-10 ( S-300P) cannot shoot down SLBM's , they have never been tested against ballisticv targets even aproching the speeds of SLBM RV's. So please keep your BS to yourself.
The SA-5 could manage hitting SLBM's in the early 60's so why doubt the SA-10 can not do it today? Should i post all those dozens of links again untill you one day decided to do the manly thing and address them? You have no idea what your talking about and you have done NO research that disputes what the sources i so often note say. All you have offered is basic denial with no good evidence to dispute it.
Only the Gorgon missile carries 1 MT warheads and they can't intercept MIRV's before they seperate from the bus vehicle.
Why can't they do this Rogue? What evidence is there to suggest that they can not hit the SLBM while the MIRV's are not still within a few miles from each other which they still will be. A 1 megaton blast in the path of mirvs is going to play havoc with the accuracy if they do not destroy them outright.
Well if your targeting the same city why would they not be travelling close together? I just do not understand why you insist on making up 'evidence' just to try dispute mine. Why can't you at least offer some credible arguments against as i am sure they will be SOME that is more logical than what you suggested so far.
And you just keep repeating the same old stuff no matter WHAT i say never really disproving my sources as much as generally avoiding what they state.
Why can't you just at least offer some LOGIC reason why it can not be so and SOME sources to back your claim? Even your beloved 'accurate' CIA admitted that the SA-5 in it's FIRST incarnation had some marginal ABM ( And they do not state whether it's ICBM or SLBM or IRBM) capability back in the mid 60's.
You really want to tell me that the Russians have not improved on that design in 40 years? You really need to check your bias at the door when dealing with facts and figures as bias just makes you look stupid in the long run.
Originally posted by rogue1
And....I'm sure the US could use the PAtriot in a duel use mode. Hardly makes it effective though.
Erm no. The SA-5 never intercepted targets even close to those of SLBM's. Sure post some links, not one will say they intercepted a ALBM
Immediately prior to the signing of the ABM treaty, the Soviets had developed a surface-to-air missile, the SA-5, which was observed to have a peculiar trajectory. The SA-5 was fired high above the atmosphere and then would descend to intercept and destroy enemy bombers. While technically such a trajectory could not be ruled out, logically, however, it could not be accepted as this type of trajectory represents the least efficient way to shoot down enemy aircraft. On the other hand, the SA-5?s trajectory would be just the ticket for shooting down incoming ballistic missiles which themselves travel above the atmosphere. Taking this into account, the SA-5 had to be an ABM weapon. But with the ABM treaty almost in hand, this fact was ignored and the treaty went into effect. The treaty remains in effect, limiting development of a U.S. ABM system. Meanwhile, Russian dual-purpose (anti-aircraft/anti-missile) missile systems like the SA-5 continue to exist.
www.thenewamerican.com...
First, the SA-5 system was tested and developed at the officially declared ABM test range, Sary-Shagan.28 Second, medium- and intermediate-range missiles were fired to impact areas located at Sary-Shagan. Senators John "Jake" Garn and Gordon J. Humphrey have charged that many of these missiles could have served as the targets for ABM intercept programs.29 If so, the target most closely approximated in terms of range, radar cross section, and trajectory would be SLBMs. Third, if such a system as the SA-5 were to act as a terminal atmospheric defense weapon, it would require all-azimuth radar data for warning, acquisition, and pointing inputs to the SA-5 intercept radar. The Hen House long-range radar deployment was coincident in time with initiation of the SA-5 deployment.30 Hen House radars are deployed (in accordance with the ABM treaty) on the periphery of the U.S.S.R., scanninig outward over U.S. SLBM launch areas.31 As a linear array radar, Hen House can handle multiple targets limited only by internal computer configurations that can never be physically seen or assessed directly by U.S. intelligence.32 Acknowledged ABM radars such as the Dog House and Cat House also possess the capability to be used by the SA-5 in an ABM role as does a new class of large ABM capable phased-array radars publicly announced by Senator Garn.33 Fourth, and most important, the assessed technical characteristics of the SA-5 system itself indicated a clear capability to perform as a terminal ABM system to destroy ballistic missile targets of the SLBM variety given adequate radar acquisition data.34
Because of this relative wealth of uncertainty, the final ABM treaty included an explicit obligation in Article VI not to test SAMs "in an ABM mode." Since the ABM testing of the SA-5 could have been completed for some years prior to 1972, the treaty’s impact on an SA-5 ABM capability would be slight. Even at that, the reported repeated violations of the treaty after 1972 by the use of the SA-5 radar in tracking ballistic missiles resulted in Soviet tests against missiles similar in range to a normal SLBM trajectory.35 The Soviets claimed (and the administration) accepted) that the SA-5 radar was not being tested in an ABM mode, but rather was being used in a "legitimate range instrumentation role."36 Whether it is designated as a "range instrumentation radar" does not alter the fact that it has been used in a missile-tracking role. Its ability to track missile warheads on the range is therefore prima facie evidence of its ABM capability. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.
The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...
They only have a range of about 300km. US warheads would be spaced far enough apart so that they wouldn't be fratricided by preceding nuclear detonations. This same safety measure also reduces the Gorgon;s effectiveness, which is why tgey would be able to destroy multiple warheads in one blast.
Hmm I don't hvae to disprove your sources they don't prove anything, all they are is conjecture. Several of your sources are dubious at best especially your DIA reports and othe US intelligence reports in the 70's and 80's. Mnay of their statements have been shown not to be true and were only guesses at best.
And ? A rifle could be said to have a marginal ABM capability.
However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.
Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.
In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).
www.jinsa.org...
It might be a billion-1 shot but that's marginal isn't it.
That's of course if the test wasn't rigged. Kinda strange that they only perfomed one test, which was successful Then they didn't een deploy the missile or test subsequent missiles on any targets as hard as the V-1000 test. Very very strange, something is amiss there. You shouldn't take one report as gospel.
On 29 November 1960 the first attempted intercept of an R-5 IRBM by the V-1000 was fully successful. The anti-ballistic missile passed
within the kill radius of the high-explosive fragmentation warhead of the V-1000. But the warhead itself had not completed development and
was not installed. The five following intercept attempts were unsuccessful - five R-5's and two V-1000's were expended (three times the
system failed to launch the anti-ballistic missile in time):
* On 8 December 1960 the system didn't function due to the failure of the 6N55 tube of the central computer
* On 10 December there was a failure of the software to recognise the anti-ballistic missile in flight
* On 17 December there was a failure of the receiving unit of the radar at the command point
* On 23 December there was an error of the operator of the long-range radar
* On 25? December the second stage of the V-1000 failed to ignite.
* On 30 December a sixth attempt was planned, but the launches of both the R-5 and V-1000 were scrubbed when the long-range radar
couldn't come on line.
1961 began with another string of failures (5 further launches were planned in the first test series). A variety of warheads were wasted in
attempting to destroy the incoming missiles. Once, manually, and twice, automatically, the missile made a more-or-less successful intercept.
But this was followed by three failures, indicating a great amount of time and effort were needed to develop the intercept method.
On 4 March 1961 the V-1000 achieved a world first - the destruction of the re-entry vehicle of an R-12 IRBM. This was followed by the
destruction of an R-5 re-entry vehicle. In all, there were 11 launches with military warheads, plus launches of developmental warheads. The
S2TA variant used an infrared-homing self-guiding high-explosive warhead and was designed by Storozhenko at the GOI State Optical Institute
in Lengingrad. It was capable not only of determining the moment for warhead detonation, but also was capable of guiding the anti-ballistic
missile independently using an on-board computer. The R2TA version used a radio-guided explosive warhead, with two types of proximity fuses
used to determine the correct moment for warhead detonation. These were the G2TA, a radio ranging system, developed by Bondarenko and an
optical system, developed by Emdin at GOI. Flight tests of the V-1000 with a nuclear warhead designed at Chelyabinsk-70 were also carried out.
www.astronautix.com...
The thing is you make the assumption that all Soviet SAM's after that were ABM systems capable of shooting down ICBM/SLBM's, when in fact none were ever tested against such targets So who is making things up ?
Originally posted by OneGodJesus
But but but...it would kill the leopard frogs and spotted owls and the cute bunnies!! This is an outrage!!! Nuclear schmuclear. How in the world can anyone "win" a nuclear conflict when the scale is global?