posted on Sep, 29 2003 @ 05:40 PM
Separate to the scandal over Diebold voting machines and their corruptibility, and Diebold principals coming out in support of Bush for 2004 (!?)
there is another track for citizens seeking electoral reform through two Bills (second one below).
1. Does anyone know where HAVA and Voter Confidence are at with Congress?
2. Why is there such a headlong rush into touch screen systems anyway? Why not replace the defunct punchcards with machine readable pencil-on-paper,
like the rest of civilization uses?
3. Is there going to be any confidence in voting machines from Diebold at all? Why? Simple snowjobs and fancy looking new-fangled machines?
A$$holes.
THE VOTER CONFIDENCE AND INCREASED ACCESSIBLITY ACT OF 2003
On May 22, Rep. Rush Holt responded to the growing chorus of concern from election reform specialists and computer security experts about the
integrity of future elections by introducing reform legislation, The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 (H.R. 2239). The measure
would require all voting machines to produce an actual paper record by 2004 that voters can view to check the accuracy of their votes and that
election officials can use to verify votes in the event of a computer malfunction, hacking, or other irregularity. Experts often refer to this paper
record as a �voter-verified paper trail.�
�We cannot afford nor can we permit another major assault on the integrity of the American electoral process,� said Rep. Rush Holt. �Imagine it�s
Election Day 2004. You enter your local polling place and go to cast your vote on a brand new �touch screen� voting machine. The screen says your vote
has been counted. As you exit the voting booth, however, you begin to wonder. How do I know if the machine actually recorded my vote? The fact is,
you don�t.�
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was an important piece of legislation that took many important steps towards electoral reform. However, in helping
states replace notoriously problematic and antiquated machines, HAVA appears to be creating a headlong rush to purchase computer voting systems that
suffer different flaws.
Unfortunately, because computer voting machines are not currently required to produce a voter-verified paper trial, any errors and irregularities they
cause are difficult or even impossible to discover. A growing host of nationally and internationally-renowned computer scientists consider a
voter-verified paper trial to be a critical safeguard for the accuracy, integrity and security of computer-assisted elections.
The Voter Verification Bill seeks to incorporate the voter-verified paper trail by amending HAVA immediately. If passed, funds expended under HAVA
will be utilized in a manner that ensures that this minimum standard of protection will be built into computer voting systems now, without the
necessity of replacing or upgrading such voting systems later. Key provisions of the bill include:
Requires all voting systems to produce a voter-verified paper record for use in manual audits. For those using the increasingly popular ATM-like
�DRE� machines, this requirement means the DRE would print a receipt that each voter would verify as accurate and deposit into a lockbox for later use
in a recount. States would have until November 2003 to request additional funds to meet this requirement.
Bans the use of undisclosed software and wireless communications devices in voting systems, and limits electronic communication to outgoing reports of
vote totals only.
Requires all voting systems to meet these requirements in time for the general election in November 2004. Jurisdictions that feel their new computer
systems may not be able to do meet this deadline may use a paper system as an interim measure (at federal expense) in the November 2004 election.
Requires that electronic voting system be provided for persons with disabilities by January 1, 2006 -- one year earlier than currently required by
HAVA. Like the voting machines for non-disabled voters, those used by disabled voters must also provide a mechanism for voter-verification, though
not necessarily a paper trail. Jurisdictions unable to meet this requirement by the deadline must give disabled voters the option to use the interim
paper system with the assistance of an aide of their choosing.
Requires mandatory surprise recounts in .5% of domestic jurisdictions and .5% of overseas jurisdictions.