Shroud of secrecy over urban war game

"When Operation "Last Dance" began in Kingsville, Texas, soldiers arrived in unmarked helicopters. Explosions were set off. A gunbattle ensued. One building burned and another was badly damaged. "

www.worldnetdaily.com...


---

How far will these guys go?
They say the reason is that the highly trained soldiers are bored at training in military bases, but jesus, in real neighbourhoods, with civilians at risk. thats horrible.

-----

"Bush says maneuvers not his business"

www.worldnetdaily.com...

-----

Nice going georgie.

Live rifle fire in the middle of 25k people town..

That is maddness..

This is seriously #ed up..

just wanted to let ya know in case you werent aware...

Thursday February 11 1999
&
Tuesday February 16 1999

...are the dates of the two articles in your links



[Edited on 25-9-2003 by Creepy]

The following information I have been holding onto until the "right" time presented it's self. That time is now, I fear...

This information come not from one source, so I cannot post links.

Also I would like to acknowledge those who put the information below together, for with out them this would not be. ALL credit is do to they.

TOUS POUR UN UN POUR TOUS

(the following is in responce to the posts above)

This kind of exercise is knows as MOUT.


Military Operation Urban Terrain.

"Martial law has been declared through presidential powers and war powers act, and some citizens have refused to give up their weapons. They have taken over two of the buildings in Kingsville. The police cannot handle it. So you call these guys in. They show up and they zap everybody, take all the weapons, and let the local P.D. clean it up," described Sanchez of the scenario the Knight Stalkers were likely given.

Sanchez says the military exercise in his town was illegal under the Posse Comitatus Act, but he says that Presidential Decision Directive 25 has given an exception to Special Operations. He believes the men involved have total immunity from any legal action against them. Although PDD 25 is top secret, Sanchez has seen it because of his position with FEMA, and he has a security clearance. He would not provide a copy to WorldNetDaily.
At least one other Texas Mayor turned the military away for a similar request and accused them of offering a bribe.


"In urban warfare, the militarization of the police, this thing got out of order. The citizens did not comply with executive order so and so. They refused to give up their weapons," he re-emphasized.

Presidential Decision Directive 25 as the document being used to authorize the military to participate in domestic police action. PDD 25 is classified as Top Secret, and even Sen. Orrin Hatch was unable to obtain a copy as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Only a brief summary is available to the public.

1878 Posse Comitatus Act has been eliminated by PDD 25.
The posse comitatus act forbids the use of the military as a domestic police force.


Marines and Navy are exempt.






Project North Star and JTF-Six:
The Hazards of Soldiers Training Police

This information is dated approx 1995

Little known to the general public is a program known as Project
North Star. This program, headquartered in Buffalo, NY, is a
combined United States and Canadian law enforcement and military
task force. Its operational area is the entire U.S.- Canadian
border region. Its mission, primarily counterdrug and
anti-smuggling, is similar to the much better known JTF-Six

(They can be used as civilian control and as domestic anti-terrorist)

One glaring example of the abuse of the letter and intent of Posse
Comitatus occurred in the summer of 1993. A training mission was
conducted at Padre Island, TX, by an ODA from Company B, 2nd Bn,
10th SFG(A). The Operations Sergeant of that Detachment was one
Robert Allard. The Detachment's nickname was "The Dark Brothers"
(for some unknown reason). The reason given for this Detachment
being selected for the mission was that they were a SOT Detachment.



SOT is the shorthand version of SOTC, which is the acronym for
Special Operations Training Course. This four week course is
conducted by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School at Fort Bragg, NC.



SOTC is described by U.S. Army Special Forces Command Regulation
350-1 (hereafter referred to as USASFC(A) Reg 350-1), as: "[A
course] taught to Special Forces "A" Detachments and select
personnel assigned to Ranger Battalions.

To provide specialized techniques used by SOF (Special Operations
Forces) to conduct DA (Direct Action) missions and unilateral
special operations of a limited scope and duration in a MOUT
(Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain) environment, to include
personnel/equipment recovery and snatch operations.

It does not (repeat; does not) include hostage rescue or linear
targets. This type training does include a degree of discriminating
fire, and can be conducted with weapons and equipment organic to
Special Forces Groups."


The significance of the Padre Island mission is that members of
"The Dark Brothers" accompanied a law enforcement entry team on a
drug bust. This was a clear violation of Posse Comitatus. When the
details of this violation were relayed to Fort Devens everybody
involved was ordered to, "Keep your mouth shut."

This training mission is significant because it demonstrates how
the system becomes stretched under the banner of the "counterdrug"
mission. (This behavior was also noticed in BATF's lying about a
drug angle in order to pull the counterdrug lever to receive
support from 3rd SFG(A) at Waco.)



In the Ohio case, six out of twenty-three sniper students were in
fact correction officers assigned to various prisons throughout
Ohio. (One can't help but marvel at the brilliance of contraband
and drug smugglers using Ohio prisons as staging areas for their
illegal activities along the U.S. - Canadian border.)

This illustrates a persistent ruse used by law enforcement
agencies, which is acknowledged by the Department of Defense with
a wink and a nod. Local and state law enforcement officials
routinely lie about their participation or involvement in
counterdrug operations in order to receive "free" training from the
Army.



But, as in all things, you get what you pay for. During the
Advanced Sniper Course for North Star, Officer in Charge, 10th
SFG(A) Sniper School, CW2 Brent Delorier, insisted the students be
trained in the technique of transitioning from their sniper rifle
to a handgun!

This concept is entirely appropriate for entry teams using M4
carbines or submachineguns during Close Quarter Combat (CQC). When
an instructor can not distinguish between the appropriate tactical
use of a submachinegun and a bolt action rifle this is
incompetence. Based on further reports about the sniper training at
Camp Perry, any one of those law enforcement 'snipers' who attempt
to use what they were taught by the military should be sued.



This raises a crucial issue for the legal profession concerning
the military training of police in CQC by so-called SOT
Detachments. USASFC(A) Reg 350-1 is very specific on the matter of
SF Detachments training U.S. law enforcement agencies.

While Special Forces is permitted to conduct CQC instruction with
BORTAC (the U.S. Border Patrol's private army), Annex E, paragraph
2c(2) admits: "USASFC [units] may be requested to conduct MOUT
training that falls within the training outlined in Field Manual
7-8 and Field Manual 90-10. If any of the following scenarios,
targets or training are included in the [Program of Instruction] it
will not be taught.



(a) Training that includes discrimination fire. No situations that
require friend/foe target acquisition.



(b) No linear targets may be utilized. This includes aircraft,
buses, etc.



(c) No hostage rescue scenarios."



The above regulation is important because it shows how
inappropriate military training is for law enforcement officers,
because the military does not have to contend with Vicarious
Liability.



Direct liability, for instance, is when someone approved of the
misconduct. Vicarious liability is indirect, and has its roots in
English common law regarding the master to servant relationship. It
can be the result of negligence in appointment, retention,
entrustment (such as making a rookie cop a range officer), failure
to discipline, failure to supervise, failure to train, or negligent
nonfeasance (failure to act).



To those engaged in the training of police officers, the
principles of 42 U.S. Code, s 1983 can never be far behind. This
states:

"Every person (acting under the color of law), of any state,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States...to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and Laws shall be liable to the party
injured in the action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceedings for redress."



Persons acting under the color of law are police officers or
federal law enforcement agents. Although many volumes have been
printed on court decisions concerning 42 U.S. Code, s 1983, we will
discuss only one which is impacted directly by USASFC 350-1.



In Popow v. City of Margate, 476 Federal Supplement, 127 (D.N.J.,
1979), the court held that firearms training received was
inadequate for the circumstances under which officers had to
operate.

This case resulted from the shooting of a running suspect, in the
dark, in a residential neighborhood. Specifically, the court
mandated that training must include the following: shooting at
moving targets, night shooting, and shooting in residential areas.

The training must also include instruction on state law, city
regulations or policies on shooting, and how they are applied in
practice.



The problem arises when Special Forces personnel are precluded
from "friend and foe identification" training which is commonly
referred to in police training as "Shoot/No Shoot." At the same
time, police agencies are mandated under Popow v. Margate to
integrate that very subject into their programs under the "shooting
in residential areas" ruling, and applying shooting policies in
practice mandates.



A legal paradox is now created. Restricted subjects can not be
integrated into the training of police or law enforcement personnel
trained by Special Forces personnel under USASFC 350-1, but that
training will not be defensible for the police agency under section
1983 because subjects mandated under Popow v. Margate can not be
integrated into the training conducted by Special Forces personnel
by regulation!

Returning to the North Star sniper training, a legal decision was
issued by the 10th SFG(A) Judge Advocate General stating, in
effect, that instruction would be limited to training in accordance
with Army doctrine. This further aggravated a bad situation since
the current Army sniper manual, Field Manual 23-10, does not
address the needs of a law enforcement sniper in the area of Use of
Deadly Force.


Legal briefings for North Star and JTF-Six missions are routinely
treated as a nuisance to be endured. One North Star legal briefing
conducted by the 10th SFG(A) Judge Advocate General's office lasted
all of ten minutes. The only topic discussed was that all training
would be in accordance with Posse Comitatus and the soldiers were
told only;

"...you cannot participate with search, seizure, arrest or
detaining." Local press were to be referred to North Star
Headquarters in Buffalo, NY. Members of the training team could not
be any Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) other than combat
arms.

The greatest emphasis was placed on making sure that none of the
participants had an MOS in Military Intelligence, as this had been
a problem before. Finally, the subject topic was to remain firmly
in focus, with other subjects not being discussed or taught.



What is important here is what the 10th SFG(A) JAG failed to do.
Lesson plans were not reviewed for legal content or impact on
police officers. Instead, the position was taken that lesson plans
discuss military techniques and procedures for a given task.

It was considered the responsibility of the receiving law
enforcement agency to disseminate the information and apply it in
accordance with federal, state and local law, as well as police
policy. This was a clear case of the bureaucratic mind set that,
"an action passed is an action completed;" an attitude that no
reputable police trainer would ever consider.



No attempt was made to review the qualifications of personnel to
be trained or that of the personnel doing the training. This
further reinforces the appearance of Special Forces trainers doing
something "high speed" while ignoring the realities of training law
enforcement personnel.

Finally, no mention was made of required mandatory training nor
forbidden subjects based on law, limitations, security clearances,
or qualifications.

When Special Forces soldiers are preparing to work with foreign
troops, local customs briefings take much longer than ten minutes.
How much longer then, should a legal briefing be for training that
could embroil a police department or an individual officer in a
million dollar lawsuit?

This does not bode well for the constitutional separation of police
and military powers. Sources within JTF-Six confirm that the
JTF-Six legal staff is constantly researching loopholes in the law
and the Posse Comitatus Act.

As one legal advisor admitted to one of our observers: "I wouldn't
want to be the test case," for some of the so-called loopholes
under consideration. This is definitely a legal and constitutional
matter that bears close watching and thorough investigation


The Corruption of U.S. Martial Ethics



When the Posse Comitatus Act was amended in 1981 following the
declaration of the so-called War on Drugs, cooler heads in the U.S.
military argued that direct involvement by the armed forces would
ultimately lead to widespread corruption within the military. This
belief was grounded in observations of the endemic corruption in
law enforcement agencies by virtue of their close proximity to the
drug trade.



These cooler heads were correct in their assessment that
corruption would become widespread, but their logic was faulty.

Their error was in focusing on the things involved, not the ethical
and moral corruption that would befall participants as the
constitutional separations of police and military powers were
eroded slowly over time. Now, the cumulative effect of military
involvement with law enforcement has been the militarization of,
first federal, then state and local police.

These militarized police, falling rapidly under the control of a
militarized federal law enforcement bureaucracy, now constitute
what the Framers feared the most; a standing army in times of peace
used to enforce domestic laws.



The ethical corruption of the U.S. military did not result from
proximity to drugs. It resulted from willful intellectual apathy by
commanders toward the Constitution they were sworn to defend.

No man's life, liberty, or property is safe while the legislature
is in session.

Judge Gideon J. Tucker, 1886


Combat Arms Survey

On 08 April 1995, xxx xxxxxxxx conducted a telephone interview
with LCDR Earnest Guy Cunningham, USN, regarding his Combat Arms
Survey given to 300 U.S. Marine Corps combat trained marines at
Twenty-Nine Palms California on 10 May 1994.

One of the first questions we asked LCDR Cunningham pertained to
the timing of his questionnaire. There had been rumors of a
questionnaire of similar content being administered to U.S. Navy
SEAL Team Six in the fall of 1993, and the February 1994 issue of
MODERN GUN magazine publicized the existence of such a
questionnaire.

LCDR Cunningham denied that was his questionnaire and maintained
that the first, and only, time his questionnaire was given at
Twenty-Nine Palms of 10 May 1994. When asked if he had made test
versions, and conducted test runs of his questionnaire to refine
his product, he replied that he had not.

When asked if he was aware of any other person, or organization,
conducting similar research, he replied that he was aware of no
such questionnaire or research. (This raises the question; "Who, or
what agency, was surveying special operations personnel to
determine if they would participate in firearms confiscation?")

Our conversation then ranged over the construction and content of
the Combat Arms Survey. LCDR Cunningham stated that the Combat Arms
Survey was specifically designed to elicit responses indicative to
the effect the described non-traditional missions, under either U.S
or U.N. control, would have on cohesion of small units engaged in
such operations.


With specific regard to the infamous question #46, we agreed that
unit cohesion would evaporate. Officers who gave the order would
make their widows rich, and the most serious threat to the public
would be the ensuing firefight between those refused to confiscate
firearms, and the bullet-bait who would.



An important distinction discussed regarding the results of the
Combat Arms Survey was the age of the respondents and their
acceptance of foreign control of U.S. forces. The younger the
respondent (in other words; the lesser the pay grade of the
respondent), the more amenable he was to Operations Other Than War
and non-traditional missions, including U.N. operational control
over U.S. forces. this was true of both officers and enlisted men.



During the interview we commented that an individual marking an
opinion space in a questionnaire merely indicated the opinion of
that individual, but was not indicative of whether that individual
would, or would not, follow illegal or immoral orders, or perform
a mission he had strong personal misgivings about, and that, for
the most part, despite personal misgivings, soldiers would follow
orders regardless of the legality , morality, or constitutionality
of those orders.

LCDR Cunningham conceded that such distinctions were outside the
scope of the Combat Arms Survey, but that the margin responses to
certain questions indicated that the long term result of compliance
with questionable orders would eventually result in intra-unit
factionalism and destroy unit cohesion.



LCDR Cunningham further related that the most frightening
statistic of the Combat Arms Survey was the number of "No Opinion"
responses to a number of questions, most significantly to question
#46.

Twelve percent of respondents answered "No Opinion" when asked if
they would fire on American citizens who refused to surrender their
firearms. Including the total who responded that they WOULD fire on
Americans (26.34 percent), and given the fact that those with no
opinion on moral issues will mindlessly do what they are told, over
38 percent of those ordered to fire Americans refusing to surrender
their firearms would do so.



We objected that even those who had a moral aversion to following
illegal orders would do so, either out of a sense of duty, or for
no more substantial reason than the preservation of their military
careers, and that the percentage of those who would fire on
Americans, even if they disagreed with the order to do so, was
probably significantly higher than 50 percent.

We further objected that the personal opinions of officers who
would give the orders relied less on their willingness to issue, or
ensure the successful execution of, immoral orders, than their
desire to achieve a one or two block on their OER. LCDR Cunningham
agreed in principle that "careerism' had the logical consequence of
diluting moral responsibility, but could offer no substantive
evidence to the extent of impact of careerism on unit cohesion
based solely on his thesis or research.



Although we do not agree with some of LCDR Cunningham's premises
regarding the constitutionality, or desirability, of even benign
Operations Other Than War, particularly the bifurcation of the U.S.
military into national defense and peacekeeping forces--as a result
of our interview, and review of his thesis--we find no
justification for anybody questioning his patriotism.

LCDR Cunningham's thesis was purely a research effort to determine
the long term effects of Operations Other Than War and non-
traditional missions on both horizontal cohesion (how the unit
coalesces, supports itself, and performs as an integrated whole),
and vertical cohesion (trust and confidence in the unit's
leadership).



Anybody who doubts this need only talk to the man.


COMBAT ARMS SURVEY



This questionnaire is to gather data concerning the attitudes of
combat trained personnel with regards to nontraditional missions.
All of your responses are confidential. Write your answers directly
on the questionnaire form. In Part II, place an "X" in the space
provided for your response.



Part I. Demographics



1. What service are you in?



2. What is your pay grade? (e.g. E-7, O-7)



3. What is your MOS code and description?



4. What is your highest level of education in years?



5. How many months did you serve in Operation Desert Storm/Desert
Shield?



6. How many months did you serve in Somalia?



7. What state or country did you primarily reside in during
childhood?



Part II. Attitudes



Do you feel that U.S. Combat troops should be used within the
United States for any of the following missions? 8. Drug
enforcement ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree
Strongly agree No opinion

9. Disaster relief (e.g. hurricanes, floods, fires, earthquakes) (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
No opinion

10. Security at national events (e.g. Olympic Games, Super Bowl) (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
No opinion

11. Environmental disaster clean-up ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

12. Substitute teachers in public schools ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

13. Community assistance programs (e.g. landscaping, environmental
clean-up, road repair, animal control) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

14. Federal and state prison guards ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

15. National emergency police force ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

16. Advisors to S.W.A.T. units, the FBI or the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (B.A.T.F.) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

17. Border patrol (e.g. prevention of illegal aliens into U.S.
territory)



Do you feel that U.S. combat troops under U.S. command should be
used in other countries for and of the following United Nations
missions? 18. Drug enforcement ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

19. Disaster relief (e.g. hurricanes, floods, fires, earthquakes)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
No opinion

20. Environmental disaster clean-up ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

21. Peace keeping ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree
Agree Strongly agree No opinion

22. Nation building (Reconstruct civil government, develop public
school system, develop or improve public transportation system,
etc.) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly
agree No opinion

23. Humanitarian relief (e.g. food and medical supplies, temporary
housing, and clothing) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree
Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion



Do you feel that U.S. combat troops should be used in other
countries, under command of non-U.S. officers appointed by the
United Nations for any of the following missions? 24. Drug
enforcement ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree
Strongly agree No opinion

25. Disaster relief (e.g. hurricanes, floods, fires, earthquakes)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
No opinion

26. Environmental disaster clean-up ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

27. Peace keeping ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree
Agree Strongly agree No opinion

28. Nation building (Reconstruct civil government, develop public
school system, develop or improve public transportation system,
etc.) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly
agree No opinion

29. Humanitarian relief (e.g. food and medical supplies, temporary
housing, and clothing) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree
Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

30. Police action (e.g. Korea, Vietnam, but serving under non-U.S.
officers)

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
No opinion



Consider the following statements: 31. The U.S. runs a field
training exercise. U.N. combat troops should be allowed to serve in
U.S. combat units during these exercises under U.S. command and
control. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree
Strongly agree No opinion

32. The United Nations runs a field training exercise. U.S. combat
troops under U.S. command and control should serve in U.N. combat
units during these exercises. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree
Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

33. The United Nations runs a field training exercise. U.S. combat
troops should serve under U.N. command and control in U.N. during
these exercises. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree
Agree Strongly agree No opinion

34. U.S. combat troops should participate in U.N. missions as long
as the U.S. has full command and control. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

35. U.S. combat troops should participate in U.N. missions under
United Nations command and control. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

36. U.S. combat troops should be commanded by U.N. officers and
non- commissioned (NCOs) at battalion and company levels while
performing U.N. missions. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree
Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

37. It would make no difference to me to have U.N. soldiers as
members of my team. (e.g. fire team, squad, platoon) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

38. It would make no difference to me to take orders from a U.N.
company commander. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree
Agree Strongly agree No opinion

39. I feel the President of the United States has the authority to
pass his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief to the U.N.
Secretary General. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree
Agree Strongly agree No opinion

40. I feel there is no conflict between my oath of office and
serving as a U.N. soldier. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree
Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

41. I feel my unit's combat effectiveness would not be affected by
performing humanitarian missions for the United Nations. ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No
opinion

42. I feel a designated unit of U.S. combat soldiers should be
permanently assigned to the command and control of the United
Nations. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree
Strongly agree No opinion

43. I would be willing to volunteer for assignment to a U.S. combat
unit under a U.N. commander. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree
Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion

44. I would like U.N. member countries, including the U.S., to the
U.N. all the soldiers necessary to maintain world peace. ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No
opinion

45. I would swear to the following code: "I am a United Nations
fighting person. I serve in the forces which maintain world peace
and every nation's way of life. I am prepared to give my life in
their defense." ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Strongly disagree Disagree
Agree Strongly agree No opinion

46. The U.S. government declares a ban on the possession, sale,
transportation, and transfer of all non-sporting firearms. A thirty
(30) day amnesty period is permitted for these firearms to be
turned over the local authorities. At the end of this period, a
number of citizen groups refuse to turn over their firearms.
Consider the following statement:

I would fire upon U.S. citizens who refuse or resist confiscation
of firearms banned by the U.S. government. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree No opinion
*

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- End Note



Our civilian readers maybe wondering why the Combat Arms Survey
was circulated so heavily within the Department of the Navy. The
reason is simple; the Navy is not subject to USC Title 10 Posse
Comitatus prohibitions against using federal military forces for
domestic law enforcement. This includes the US Marine Corps.

Just thought you would like to know.

Ok, i thought that it was totally illegal to use military 'force' inside US. (against citizens..)

There was even issue made out of use of military RPV:s in hunt for the 'Washington sniper'..

I allways thought that only National Guard can be used..

But seems like i was wrong.

[Edited on 25-9-2003 by Creepy]

Originally posted by Creepy
just wanted to let ya know in case you werent aware...

THURSDAY FEBRUARY 11 1999
&
TUESDAY FEBRUARY 16 1999

...are the dates of the two articles in your links

[Edited on 25-9-2003 by Creepy]

oh well sorry, i guess we cant talk about the roswell incident either, since it happened in 1947. damn time.

Originally posted by ADVISOR
The following information I have been holding onto until the "right" time presented it's self. That time is now, I fear...

Just thought you would like to know.

Nm, its always great to get some more info. sorry for taking your subject

Originally posted by TheSwordMaster

Originally posted by Creepy
just wanted to let ya know in case you werent aware...

Thursday February 11 1999
&
Tuesday February 16 1999

...are the dates of the two articles in your links

oh well sorry, i guess we cant talk about the roswell incident either, since it happened in 1947. damn time.

i guess i did come off as a smartass...not my intentions at all

i was just making sure you knew the date of the articles...
i assumed you thought it was "new" news,i apologize if i was wrong

there has been many "urban" wargames before 1999 all over the country...there have been many since...and the "nice going georgee" remark led me to believe the post was a mindless jab at the President in the guise of a post about wargames...which i thought by the title refered to "new" news of wargames

....again i apologize for my mistake

[Edited on 26-9-2003 by Creepy]