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Originally posted by Valhall
The Downing St. Memo and the disclosure that the administration knew that the intell of Iraq trying to buy yellow cake from Nigeria was not true are about the intelligence BEFORE WE INVADED!
Did the Bush Administration knowingly and purposely use the Niger yellow cake documentation and did they know that they were forged or incorrect?
Originally posted by Valhall
Freedom...YOU'RE NOT GETTIN' IT MAN!
The Downing St. Memo and the disclosure that the administration knew that the intell of Iraq trying to buy yellow cake from Nigeria was not true are about the intelligence BEFORE WE INVADED!
Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy
Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
Originally posted by HowlrunnerIV
Freedom for sum:
Here's what you wrote, with my explanations of why you opened yourself to such criticism as you have received from me.
Originally posted by ArchAngel
It was proven beyond a shadow of a doubt to be forgery as soon as it was presented publicly.
The letterhead not used at the time, and the official who supposedly signed it retired more than a year before the date on it.
Yet Bush continued to cite the yellow cake purchase as if it were fact from then until the invasion, and beyond.
The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.
Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.
Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.
The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary, he is deceiving.
2003-03-24
.....................
Then the story fell apart. On March 7th, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Vienna, told the U.N. Security Council that the documents involving the Niger-Iraq uranium sale were fakes. “The I.A.E.A. has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents . . . are in fact not authentic,” ElBaradei said.
One senior I.A.E.A. official went further. He told me, “These documents are so bad that I cannot imagine that they came from a serious intelligence agency. It depresses me, given the low quality of the documents, that it was not stopped. At the level it reached, I would have expected more checking.”
The I.A.E.A. had first sought the documents last fall, shortly after the British government released its dossier. After months of pleading by the I.A.E.A., the United States turned them over to Jacques Baute, who is the director of the agency’s Iraq Nuclear Verification Office.
It took Baute’s team only a few hours to determine that the documents were fake. The agency had been given about a half-dozen letters and other communications between officials in Niger and Iraq, many of them written on letterheads of the Niger government. The problems were glaring. One letter, dated October 10, 2000, was signed with the name of Allele Habibou, a Niger Minister of Foreign Affairs and Coöperation, who had been out of office since 1989. Another letter, allegedly from Tandja Mamadou, the President of Niger, had a signature that had obviously been faked and a text with inaccuracies so egregious, the senior I.A.E.A. official said, that “they could be spotted by someone using Google on the Internet.”
The large quantity of uranium involved should have been another warning sign. Niger’s “yellow cake” comes from two uranium mines controlled by a French company, with its entire output presold to nuclear power companies in France, Japan, and Spain. “Five hundred tons can’t be siphoned off without anyone noticing,” another I.A.E.A. official told me.
This official told me that the I.A.E.A. has not been able to determine who actually prepared the documents. “It could be someone who intercepted faxes in Israel, or someone at the headquarters of the Niger Foreign Ministry, in Niamey. We just don’t know,” the official said. “Somebody got old letterheads and signatures, and cut and pasted.” Some I.A.E.A. investigators suspected that the inspiration for the documents was a trip that the Iraqi Ambassador to Italy took to several African countries, including Niger, in February, 1999. They also speculated that MI6—the branch of British intelligence responsible for foreign operations—had become involved, perhaps through contacts in Italy, after the Ambassador’s return to Rome.
Continued....
The New Yorker
Originally posted by Freedom_for_sum
And BTW: There is nothing mentioned in that memo about "yellow cake" from Nigeria--if that's what you meant. If not, I would like to see this "disclosure" you're talking about.
In August 2002, a CIA NESA [Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis] report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities did not include the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium information. (page 48)
In September 2002, during coordination of a speech with an NSC staff member, the CIA analyst suggested the reference to Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Africa be removed. The CIA analyst said the NSC staff member said that would leave the British "flapping in the wind." (page 50)
The uranium text was included in the body of the NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] but not in the key judgments. When someone suggested that the uranium information be included as another sign of reconstitution, the INR [State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research] Iraq nuclear analyst spoke up and said the he did not agree with the uranium reporting and that INR would be including text indicating their disagreement in their footnote on nuclear reconstitution. The NIO [national intelligence officer] said he did not recall anyone really supporting including the uranium issue as part of the judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, so he suggested that the uranium information did not need to be part of the key judgments. He told committee staff that he suggested, "We'll leave it in the paper for completeness. Nobody can say we didn't connect the dots. But we don't have to put that dot in the key judgments." (page 53)
On Oct. 2, 2002, the Deputy DCI [director of central intelligence] testified before the SSCI [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]. Sen. Jon Kyl asked the Deputy DCI whether he had read the British White Paper and whether he disagreed with anything in the report. The Deputy DCI testified that "the one thing where I think they stretched a little bit beyond where we would stretch is on the points about Iraq seeking uranium from various African locations." (page 54)
On Oct. 4, 2002, the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs testified that "there is some information on attempts ... there's a question about those attempts because of the control of the material in those countries ... For us it's more the concern that they [Iraq] have uranium in-country now." (page 54)
On Oct. 5, 2002, the ADDI [associate deputy director for intelligence] said an Iraqi nuclear analyst -- he could not remember who -- raised concerns about the sourcing and some of the facts of the Niger reporting, specifically that the control of the mines in Niger would have made it very difficult to get yellowcake to Iraq. (page 55)
Based on the analyst's comments, the ADDI faxed a memo to the deputy national security advisor that said, "Remove the sentence because the amount is in dispute and it is debatable whether it can be acquired from this source. We told Congress that the Brits have exaggerated this issue. Finally, the Iraqis already have 550 metric tons of uranium oxide in their inventory." (page 56)
On Oct. 6, 2002, the DCI called the deputy national security advisor directly to outline the CIA's concerns. The DCI testified to the SSCI on July 16, 2003, that he told the deputy national security advisor that the "President should not be a fact witness on this issue," because his analysts had told him the "reporting was weak." (page 56)
On Oct. 6, 2002, the CIA sent a second fax to the White House that said, "More on why we recommend removing the sentence about procuring uranium oxide from Africa: Three points (1) The evidence is weak. One of the two mines cited by the source as the location of the uranium oxide is flooded. The other mine cited by the source is under the control of the French authorities. (2) The procurement is not particularly significant to Iraq's nuclear ambitions because the Iraqis already have a large stock of uranium oxide in their inventory. And (3) we have shared points one and two with Congress, telling them that the Africa story is overblown and telling them this is one of the two issues where we differed with the British." (page 56)
On March 8, 2003, the intelligence report on my trip was disseminated within the U.S. government, according to the Senate report (page 43). Further, the Senate report states that "in early March, the Vice President asked his morning briefer for an update on the Niger uranium issue." That update from the CIA "also noted that the CIA would be debriefing a source who may have information related to the alleged sale on March 5." The report then states the "DO officials also said they alerted WINPAC [Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control] analysts when the report was being disseminated because they knew the high priority of the issue." The report notes that the CIA briefer did not brief the vice president on the report. (page 46)
It is clear from the body of the Senate report that the intelligence community, including the DCI himself, made several attempts to ensure that the president did not become a "fact witness" on an allegation that was so weak. A thorough reading of the report substantiates the claim made in my opinion piece in the New York Times and in subsequent interviews I have given on the subject. The 16 words should never have been in the State of the Union address, as the White House now acknowledges.
Sincerely,
Joseph C. Wilson IV, Washington, D.C.
Almost all of the memo is devoted to describing why State Department intelligence experts did not believe claims that Saddam Hussein had in the recent past sought to purchase uranium from Niger.
The memo was delivered to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell on July 7, 2003, as he headed to Africa for a trip with President Bush aboard Air Force One.
The material in the memo was based on notes taken by an INR analyst who attended a Feb. 19, 2002, meeting at the CIA where Wilson's intelligence-gathering trip to Niger was discussed.
The memo was drafted June 10, 2003, for Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman, who asked to be brought up to date on INR's opposition to the White House view that Hussein was trying to buy uranium in Africa.
It records that the INR analyst at the meeting opposed Wilson's trip to Niger because the State Department, through other inquiries, already had disproved the allegation that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger. Attached to the INR memo were the notes taken by the senior INR analyst who attended the 2002 meeting at the CIA.
Originally posted by Freedom_for_sum
Originally posted by HowlrunnerIV
Freedom for sum:
Here's what you wrote, with my explanations of why you opened yourself to such criticism as you have received from me.
HowlrunnerIV;
It's seems my satire has hit a raw nerve for you; which was not my intent. I believe it's time to bury this dead horse.
Originally posted by Freedom_for_sum
Originally posted by LostSailor
You have voted Freedom_for_sum for the Way Above Top Secret award. You have two more votes this month.
Nicely said and I agree 100%.
Thank You LostSailor; I appreciate the vote
Any additional comments would certainly be appreciated since, as a deep purple Independent, I clearly seem to be a minority here.
Originally posted by Mahree
It did scare me as to why all the intelligence agencies of the world were so far out of the picture if Iraq never had these WMD. One of two explanation comes to mind....The intelligence agencies failed miserably or Iraq moved these WMD while they were doing all their dancing around about obeying the resolution.
Originally posted by Mahree
I don't believe President Bush lied to us.
Originally posted by Valhall
Originally posted by Freedom_for_sum
And BTW: There is nothing mentioned in that memo about "yellow cake" from Nigeria--if that's what you meant. If not, I would like to see this "disclosure" you're talking about.
You really need to do a bit of reading on this subject Freedom. It would help you understand what other people are talking about, and it would help you avoid poo-pooing off things because you haven't spent any time on them.
Originally posted by HowlrunnerIV
Originally posted by Mahree
It did scare me as to why all the intelligence agencies of the world were so far out of the picture if Iraq never had these WMD. One of two explanation comes to mind....The intelligence agencies failed miserably or Iraq moved these WMD while they were doing all their dancing around about obeying the resolution.
Why not a third?
That the weapons inspections and weapons destruction of the 1990s and the sanctions and no-fly-zones of the same period actually did what they were designed to do and destroyed or nullified Saddam's WMD programmes.
As reported by UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, who was unable to give his report before Bush jumped the gun and invaded.
Originally posted by BlackThought
Mahree most of the countries you site as had creditable intelligence are western countries. And they had an underlying policy when dealing with non-western countries.
If the UN and the International court are the gauges of democracy and rights then I rather go by them than Western powers.
IAEA said no WMD Need more time... Some of Americas own inspectors said there were not WMD's, Most "evidence" was not valid and still used , My god they used an essay from the British that was a Term paper from a university in California. None of the facts were real!
[edit on 12/09-2005 by BlackThought]
all peoples have the right to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
This includes the need to respect and to observe human rights and to promote self-determination. The definition of aggression adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 also provides that it if "the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination." Violations of this duty may constitute an international crime.
Originally posted by TristanBW9456
What if the US coerce them into having the same intell to get people scared???
Sounds like them.
Originally posted by TristanBW9456
What if the US coerce them into having the same intell to get people scared???
Sounds like them.
"I can confirm that after the events of September 11, 2001, and up to the military operation in Iraq, Russian special services and Russian intelligence several times received ... information that official organs of Saddam's regime were preparing terrorist acts on the territory of the United States and beyond its borders, at U.S. military and civilian locations," Putin said.
Originally posted by zappafan1
REPLY: Hans Blix.... AKA Mr. Magoo, couldn't find his a$$ with both hands in his back pockets.