Wonder-weapons, or not?

So we all hear the stories about how deadly, efficient and accurate all these new high tech weapons are.... My question is basically this; Are they really all that or does it still, as it's always been, come down to the people wielding the technology?

Suppressed Air Force Report on Kosovo Bombing Shows Little Damage Done to Milosevic's Forces, Contrary to Early NATO and Pentagon Claims

And

Aerospace America

January, 1990

Radar combat and the illusion of invincibility

by Jeffrey L. Ethell, Contributing Editor

Evidence mounts that the stunning capabilities of radar guidance may prove to be its greatest liability

Ever since World War II proved the stunning capabilities of radar, military planners have come to depend on it more and more in modern combat. At present, the U.S. builds weapons and trains personnel in preparation for the radar war of the future, relying almost exclusively on the combat advantages of radar-guided missiles, radar-avoiding stealth technology, air- and land-based early warning radar, low-level terrain-following radar, and target acquisition radar.

At the heart of radar's performance is an uncanny ability to find and hit targets at distances beyond enemy killing range, primarily beyond visual range (BVR). At the same time, radar can be used to provide early warning of an enemy's intentions while radar-jamming and stealth techniques can help to avoid detection by enemy radar. It is almost as if radar has become a kind of Rosetta Stone for the practice of modern warfare.

Unfortunately, radar has not only turned out to be less than invincible, it has recently become a liability. Fueling what is now a raging debate are the last few shooting engagements in the Middle East: The USS Stark could not defend itself against two Exocet sea-skimming missiles; USS Vincennes Aegis cruiser fired BVR at what its crew thought was an attacking fighter and downed an Iranian airliner; and two F-14s fired twice at intruding Libyan fighters, missing them BVR with radar-guided Sparrows and shooting them down within visual range with a Sparrow and a heat-seeking Sidewinder.

The DOD has been trying since 1977 to ive birth to the advanced medium range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) as a replacement for the AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinder. Almost 13 years later, the technical challenges of creating the AMRAAM are still to be met. One of those responsible for developing the missile in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Myers, says "the drive to create it was a reflection of the frustrations in the radar weapons community."

The dogfight was consigned to the scrapheap of history when radar-guided missiles appeared in the '50s. Guns disappeared from from fighter planes, and missiles were hung in their place to defend U.S. borders and naval vessels from air attack. Sorting friend from foe was never considered worrisome, even at the higher closing speeds of jet aircraft and greater firing range of the airborne missile. Then came Vietnam and what one-time combat pilot Myers calls "military-political gymnastics" instead of a real air war.

Suddenly, a minor enemy arose who put up a limited air challenge with inferior MiGs. The U.S. fielded its front-line fighters, in particular the F-4 Phantom II, which had been designed for fleet defense rather than violent close-combat aerial maneuvering. Back came the dogfight, but since pilots had little dogfight training and worried about killing their buddies, the Americans did not do well, especially with radar-guided Sparrows and especially beyond visual range.

Even though Vietnam drove home the lesson that pilots and aircraft must learn to dogfight within visual range, the air services asked for improved radar missiles. The AMRAAM emerged, supported by advocates inside and outside the DOD. To score a kill during a swirling dogfight, a pilot would have to launch missiles one after the other at multiple targets, a dubious tactic quickly called "launch-and-leave." "What no one wanted to say," says Myers, "is that they already had a missile that did this -- the cheap, accurate heat-seeking Sidewinder."

At $ 500,000 a missile, the AMRAAM solution has a cost 10 times higher than a Sidewinder. It is so expensive that the services have been forced to stop buying the Sidewinder because they can no longer afford both radar-guided and heat-seeking missiles.

In the AMRAAM project office, Air Force Col. James Burton had been handed the job of collecting hard information on the effectiveness of missiles in air-to-air combat. Burton studied all 407 known missile kills made in the air since 1958 (except for the 1967 Middle East war and Pakistan's 1971 clash with India), focusing hard on the 2,014 missile firings made during the Vietnam War and the 1973 and 1982 Middle East skirmishes.

Burton fast became one of the most unpopular men in the Pentagon. He titled the briefing he gave on his findings "Letting Combat Results Shape the Next Air-to-Air Missile." His findings? Of more than 260 Arab aircraft knocked down by Israel in 1973, only five fell to Sparrows in 12 firings. Of the 632 Sparrows fired in all the wars Burton studied, only 73 destroyed the airplane they were fired at, for a kill rating of 11%. The ancient Sidewinder did almost three times better: of some 1,000 Sidewinder firings, 308 kills resulted in a kill rating of 30%.

In Southeast Asia, Sparrow had such a poor reputation that pilots routinely ripple-fired their Sparrows, firing off two or more in a row rather than taking a chance on a single shot. Even though few fighters came to Vietnam equipped with guns, they had a better kill rating than Sparrow-equipped fighters. Burton found that guns actually made about one-third of all the kills counted in Vietnam.

To the horror of those he briefed, Burton told them he found only four BVR kills in all the wars he covered. What is more, each of the four (two by Israel, two by F04s in Vietnam) was carefully staged outside the confusion of combat to prove BVR's combat worthiness. One Southeast Asia kill was listed as a MiG-21 when it was really an F-4 mistakenly identified and shot down using Combat Tree, the BVR identification equipment of the era that was supposed to sort friend from foe. According to Burton, the only reason Israel went after its two BVR kills was strong pressure from the U.S. to establish BVR doctrine.

In summarizing how the 407 missile kills were made, Burton came up with some unsettling conclusions:

* Most targets were unaware and were fired on from the rear.

* An insignificant number of targets were aware and maneuvered hard to avoid the attack.

* Many rear shots were fired from above the target, making them more difficult shots to hit.

* There were almost no head-on BVR shots because of the high closing speeds of the aircraft involved.

Even though BVR shots were almost nonexistent in the wars Burton studied, he reached one unsettling conclusion: "The most dominant aspect of missile air combat to date has been the requirement to positively identify the target." And the only sure way to do that has been by eye.

When validation tests were under way in the late '70s, on the air combat missiles and doctrines of the next generation, the cry went up that the results would be useless since most of the flying was done under clear air visual conditions and BVR shooting was so limited. Myers suggested giving AMRAAM's proposed operational BVR parameters and air-to-air anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) to Red Force. This would give everybody some rules and results worth measuring, but the idea was struck down by the AMRAAM office. Clearly, the new rules might have pointed up radar's inherent weakness: A simple, inexpensive missile like ARM can home in on radar and kill in an instant.

In 1984, Burton managed to have the idea tested in McDonnell Douglas' differential maneuvering simulators. The results were devastating. Over and over, ARM-equipped fighters shot down AMRAAM aircraft and missiles. The results were turned over to the AMRAAM office, which invalidated them and threw out the exercise. In airborne tests in Nevada, Red Force aircraft using simple radar homing and warning devices could see Blue Force AMRAAM radars coming on 10 mi. away. The warnings allowed Red Force to turn away and beat the missile. When the AMRAAM radar was reset to come on 5 mi. from the target aircraft, the change negated the longed-for BVR scenario.

In addition, the missile's fabled multiple-target tracking and killing capability turned out to be no more effective than single-target shooting, either in simulations or live aerial firings. "The simple launch-and-leave ARM casts a pall over the whole issue since it homes in perfectly on an illuminating radar," says Defense Dept. analyst Thomas Amlie. "This means you can't use AMRAAM, AIM-7, Phoenix, or any other radar-guided missile in combat."

Meanwhile, the USSR has a well-developed series of ARMs, including the AA-10 Alamo for air-to-air combat. They have also converted the AS-4 Kitchen and AS-6 Kingfish, both with 2,200-lb warheads, into ARMs. Notes Amlie: "They never throw anything away. Flying at Mach 3+, these are a tremendous threat to the U.S. fleet, which is virtually bathed in radar. Now our prime weapons systems, such as Aegis, STARS, E-3A, Patriot, and Hawk, are in serious jeopardy."

Targeting the enemy has never proved difficult for the Soviets, especially with American fighters. "All fighter radars in the U.S. transmit on the same frequency, right around 10,000 MHz, to get all-weather capability," Amlie says. "That is very convenient, a missile designer's dream. The Soviets have no need for IFF transponder identification since their radar frequencies are higher or lower, so ARM use is almost risk free, even in a mixed air-to-air fight." As soon as U.S. pilots turn on their radars, the opposition gets some valuable information as well -- how many fighters are out there, their nationality, their direction, whether they are locked on to fire, and type of fighter -- based on their radar pulse signature.

The pilot firing the ARM still has problems, such as obtaining distance from the target, the need for his own radar to paint the target and give its range, the possibility of the ARM homing in on multiple enemy and friendly radars in the air, ground, and sea, and the very strong possibility of homing in on decoys. Regardless, the mere presence of ARMs in the air can lead to everyone turning off their radars, which puts the real combat arena squarely back into the visual, maneuvering, close-up fight that, AMRAAM supporters say, is not likely to happen because of the "reality" of BVR combat.

In 1969, the DOD tried to test an air-to-air ARM developed from the Sparrow airframe under the project name Brazo. At modest cost, three test firings destroyed three target drones. Amlie says the program "was cancelled when it could be interpreted as eliminating large radar fighters such as the F-14 and F-15, since the tests proved you could not use a radar fighter in combat when up against ARMs. The only countermeasure was to turn the radars off, so everything was swept under a rug." Now, department rumblings suggest that development of an air-to-air ARM is again under consideration.

The host of U.S. radar-based weapons are all vulnerable to ARMs. The E-3A AWACS has a superb radar antenna that can detect hundreds of targets simultaneously -- and can itself be seen at extremely long distances. An AS-4 or -6 could be launched 300-400 mi. away and home in on it with ease. The same is true for the 40 Aegis cruisers and destroyers destined for fleet service with the Navy. With hundreds of Soviet ARMs ready for firing from submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and land, a U.S. carrier battle group, heavily dependent on radar, might be in serious trouble, especially if the missiles were sea-skimmers.

At best, Navy countermeasures are limited against so simple a weapon. Sea-skimmers pop up over the radar horizon a bare 14 mi. away, and when radar does detect the missile, the radar reflections bounce off the waves, making it difficult to determine altitude, thus throwing off tracking. A third Soviet line of attack comes from their radar jammers, among the world's most powerful.

Pilots of B-1 and B-2 bombers penetrating Soviet airspace most likely will use terrain-following radar to stay low and avoid detection. Using inexpensive radar finders, like the fuzzbusters motorists use to avoid police speed traps, on hiss surrounded by flat terrain, the Soviets should have no trouble seeing the bombers coming. And Soviet radar homing and warning equipment can pick up VHF transmissions or over-the-horizon radar from distant approaching aircraft. In fact, the whole issue of stealth technology could become moot, if one considers that a radar antenna runs along the entire length of a B-2 wing's leading edge. Once in visual range, stealth is irrelevant. It is more than probable that an F-117 or a B-2 can be found, identified, and shot down using basic common sense. The F-117 has to make such wide turns that its survival in a visual air-to-air fight is precarious.

Myers, who proposed the first stealth aircraft ideas under Project Harvey (after the famous invisible rabbit), is extremely disappointed over where things have ended up. He recommended a small, inexpensive aircraft that would be hard to find with radar and eye. Yes, payload would have been small, but the idea was to confuse the opposition. "Suppose I weigh only 75 lb, with the payload of a hatpin, but I'm visible," he says. "How much trouble and chaos could I cause in the enemy camp?" A small aircraft carrying a small ARM and a gun, Myers' original stealth plane was to effectively blind the enemy by taking out radar vans and emplacements. The F-117 seems to have a similar mission, but had to be bigger to carry weapons like the Maverick missile as required by current Air Force doctrine.

Still, a growing number of soldiers and analysts are asking tough questions about the future of radar warfare. "We cannot go around radiating signals," says Amlie. "The French sell a missile to the entire Third World that will hit an Aegis every time. We are building a peacetime military that will never be effective in combat."

So that is my first contribution and i hope to see some more interesting links you guys found on your various travels.

Thanks ( I hope).

Stellar

Data for American weapons are just more readily available and thus what you will mostly find. The data should be taken as a general indication of modern weapon systems and not some kind of bias! Please....

High Tech Weapons In Desert Storm: Hype or Reality? Detailed briefing on why newer does not have to say much...

Stellar

A lot fhe statements from your two articles seem to be completely twisted.

Burton fast became one of the most unpopular men in the Pentagon. He titled the briefing he gave on his findings "Letting Combat Results Shape the Next Air-to-Air Missile." His findings? Of more than 260 Arab aircraft knocked down by Israel in 1973, only five fell to Sparrows in 12 firings. Of the 632 Sparrows fired in all the wars Burton studied, only 73 destroyed the airplane they were fired at, for a kill rating of 11%. The ancient Sidewinder did almost three times better: of some 1,000 Sidewinder firings, 308 kills resulted in a kill rating of 30%.

And what is to be expected? You are comparing short range and long range missiles here. Of course the short range is going to be more successful. That doesn't make the other less significant or useful, though.

The host of U.S. radar-based weapons are all vulnerable to ARMs. The E-3A AWACS has a superb radar antenna that can detect hundreds of targets simultaneously -- and can itself be seen at extremely long distances. An AS-4 or -6 could be launched 300-400 mi. away and home in on it with ease. The same is true for the 40 Aegis cruisers and destroyers destined for fleet service with the Navy. With hundreds of Soviet ARMs ready for firing from submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and land, a U.S. carrier battle group, heavily dependent on radar, might be in serious trouble, especially if the missiles were sea-skimmers.

The E-3 is able to jam and scramble enemy radars. It's performed this job well in Kosovo and Iraq. Your entire article seems to take no account of jamming capabilities at all.

Pilots of B-1 and B-2 bombers penetrating Soviet airspace most likely will use terrain-following radar to stay low and avoid detection. Using inexpensive radar finders, like the fuzzbusters motorists use to avoid police speed traps, on hiss surrounded by flat terrain, the Soviets should have no trouble seeing the bombers coming. And Soviet radar homing and warning equipment can pick up VHF transmissions or over-the-horizon radar from distant approaching aircraft. In fact, the whole issue of stealth technology could become moot, if one considers that a radar antenna runs along the entire length of a B-2 wing's leading edge. Once in visual range, stealth is irrelevant. It is more than probable that an F-117 or a B-2 can be found, identified, and shot down using basic common sense. The F-117 has to make such wide turns that its survival in a visual air-to-air fight is precarious.

Tell this to the Serbs and Iraqis who failed to shoot them down while they flew overhead...

Still, a growing number of soldiers and analysts are asking tough questions about the future of radar warfare. "We cannot go around radiating signals," says Amlie. "The French sell a missile to the entire Third World that will hit an Aegis every time. We are building a peacetime military that will never be effective in combat."

I suppose this French missile is the Exocet, which was in use during the Gulf War, as well as in the Falklands. In spite of all its hype, it had little impact.

As the cheapest U.S. Air Force combat aircraft used in Desert Storm, the A-10 Thunderbolt II stands out as a rare example what can be accomplished by simple, inexpensive, reliable weapons. Promoted by military reformers, and derided by many Air Force officials slow and unmaneuverable, the $12 million(4) A-10 not only proved its value in Desert Storm, but it far outperformed more expensive aircraft. The list of superlative is astounding, especially given the small number (144) of A-10’s deployed:

The A-10 certainly did prove itself, but not at the expense of other aircraft. The A-10 performed its role, which no other could compare with. At the same time, we obviously couldn't expect the A-10 to fill the roles of other combat aircraft.

Over 300 Apaches worldwide were essentially grounded in order to provide spare parts for 274 Apaches in the Gulf. Apaches outside of the Gulf flew an average of four minutes per day, only 10 percent of normal operations, in order to save spare parts.(24) In essence, this means the taxpayer bought over 600 expensive attack helicopters in order for the Army to be able to field 274 of them. Instead of fixing the $11 billion Apache program’s logistical shortcomings, the Army is pressing ahead with a new, $34 billion light attack helicopter program

Or, to put it in a more logical way, there simply wasn't the need or desire to employ all of them to one region, and instead they focused on a small amount. This says nothing about what they were capable of doing, just what was the cheapest solution at the time.

Despite receiving massive logistical support, Apaches in the Gulf only flew at or below peacetime rates, even during the ground war reporting period.(26) The peacetime rate is about 1/2 hour of flying per day, averaged over a month. This means that throughout the war Apaches flew only one fifth of the hours the Army stated it would require for combat.(27) However, statistics detailing hours flown by Apaches in the shorter four day period of the ground war are not yet available.(28) It is possible that combat objectives for the Apache were achieved during the 100 hour ground war. But even if so, it remains extremely unclear how a longer conflict would have strained Apache supply and readiness.

Which doesn't mean anything, because as said, it could have (and most likely did) achieve all of its roles in combat.

This is not to suggest that the M60A1 is a match for the M1 or M1A1, but that it was good enough to defeat the fourth largest army in the world. There are several other main battle tanks available that can match the performance of the M1, at a much lower cost.

And what would happen if you pitted a M60A1 (oh, it's also wrong...M60A3's were employed) up against a T-90, or a more advanced American tank...? While arguing over prices, the author obviously doesn't take into account survivability. If you are losing multiple M60A1's per Abram (as would be likely in a large scale affair for a more lightly armored tank), the price means nothing.

These same reports say that the M1 must be shut down for repairs every three to five hours, and could not travel more than twenty miles before requiring emergency maintenance.

I would kind of doubt such a claim considering the fact that the allied forces moved with the speed they did. Either way, it seems in conflict with this:

The Abrams' thermal sights were unhampered by the clouds of thick black smoke over the battlefield that were the result of burning Kuwaiti oil wells. In fact many Gunners relied on their "night" sights in full daylight. Such was not the case with the sights in the Iraqi tanks, which were being hit from units they could not even see. Concerns about the M1A1's range were eliminated by a massive resupply operation that will be studied for years as a model of tactical efficiency.

During the Gulf War only 18 Abrams tanks were taken out of service due to battle damage: nine were permanent losses, and another nine suffered repairable damage, mostly from mines. Not a single Abrams crewman was lost in the conflict. There were few reports of mechanical failure. US armor commanders maintained an unprecedented 90% operational readiness for their Abrams Main Battle Tanks.

Source - www.fas.org...

One way to look at the effectiveness of the F-117A versus non-stealthy aircraft is to examine the survival figures. While the F-117 arguably flew some of the most dangerous missions, it flew very few of them, perhaps avoiding harm merely by not tempting the odds. During the course of the war, which consisted of over 100,000 aircraft sorties, a total of 41 airplanes of all kinds were lost in combat.(52) Of that total, almost half (18) of the airplanes were lost in the first week, when Iraqi air defenses were at their strongest. Thus, the Iraqi air defenses at peak effectiveness claimed one aircraft for every 555 flights.(53) the F-117As in the Gulf flew an average of 217 sorties per week.(54) Even considering the possibility that the F-117 flew a disproportionately high number of missions in the first week, it is highly unlikely to have flown anywhere near the 555 times that would, on average, put the plane in statistical danger of being shot down. The Stealth Fighter may have escaped the odds simply by not throwing the dice enough times to crap out.

This is a rather blatant misuse of statistics. A F-117 is giong to be flying the most dangerous missions, where it's going to have a higher rate of being shot down. They were the first ones in (while your article laughably tries to avoid admitting it), facing the toughest of Iraqi defenses.

The idea that “high-tech saves lives” does not seem to reflect the actual record of the Patriot system. Israelis and American scientists point out that damage to buildings tripled and casualties increased by 50 percent after Patriot was deployed to Israel. 67 This makes a great deal of sense considering that a minimum of two $700,00 Patriot missiles(68) were fired at each incoming Scud, increasing the amount of debris and explosives flying low over defended cities. Video clips show Patriot missiles following Scud debris into the ground – in essence helping Scuds to strike their targets

The Patriots failure to protect a city is widely noted by critics of such weaponry. At the same time, it wasn't designed for such a role when it was employed in Israel, and it has since been upgraded significantly.

the f117 "sucess" in the iraq war was mainly by the horde of tomahawks launched and HARM attacks, also by the saturation of the radar system, and also by other resons, for example a very heavy proportion of the iraq radars were aimed to iran, actually if i remember well the apaches did the first strikes against radar instalations -well any heli would do that if your bases are close enought-

about the other stuffs, well i dont want again such debate




[edit on 3-12-2005 by grunt2]

the f117 "sucess" in the iraq war was mainly by the horde of tomahawks launched and HARM attacks, also by the saturation of the radar system, and also by other resons, for example a very heavy proportion of the iraq radars were aimed to iran, actually if i remember well the apaches did the first strikes against radar instalations -well any heli would do that if your bases are close enought-

"Aimed" at Iran? That makes loads of sense...

Anyway, they were highly used during the opening stages of the war:

Although only 36 stealth fighters were deployed in Desert Storm and accounted for 2.5 percent of the total force of 1,900 fighters and bombers, they flew more than a third of the bombing runs on the first day of the war. In all during Desert Storm, the stealth fighter conducted more than 1,250 sorties, dropped more than 2,000 tons of bombs, and flew more than 6,900 hours. More than 3,000 antiaircraft guns and 60 surface-to-air missile batteries protected the city, but despite this seemingly impenetrable shield, the Nighthawks owned the skies over the city and, for that matter, the country. The stealth fighter, which is coated with a secret, radar-absorbent material, operated over Iraq and Kuwait with impunity, and was unscathed by enemy guns.

www.abovetopsecret.com...

ohhhh noooo is disturbed delivery, the defender of the american militar nacionalists.....

look this

www.campbell.army.mil...

Aviation Regiment, the unit that drew the dangerous mission that was code named "Normandy."He should know because he was piloting one of the Apaches when simultaneous attacks knocked out two key early-warning radar sites in western Iraq at precisely 2:38 a.m. Jan. 17
Moments later, some 100 Air Force jets streaked across the border for an undetected bombing run on Baghdad that marked the start of Desert Storm's punishing air war

where are your holy f177???....

If stealth wasn't good or didn't work you wouldn't have countries all over the world trying to copy it plain and simple.

Russia, Iran, France, Sweden and so many others are all trying to build either stealth planes, UAVS or missiles.

The Shafagh, The SU-47, Petit Duc UCAV are just a few examples

YEAHHHH LIKE HIGH BYPASS FIGHTERS TURBOFANS

shadow, also that logic is complety stupid and even arogant, i mean the russians tryed to copy the shutlle concept, now with your hand at your heart, the shuttle have a real and practical use???

look i dont say that stealth is useless, is a plus in the design, but isnt the holy grail, isnt so efective as most fans think, and ist so hard to reach, the germans for example designed a stealth plane and put it under test -not flight test- later that was discarted because wasnt practical in all the duties



[edit on 3-12-2005 by grunt2]

What exactly is that link supposed to show me? That F-117's weren't attacking those radars? That has absolutely no relevence and does nothing to downplay the F-117's role.

the fact is that the f117 were not detected because that tactical move that was done by APACHES, actually that was the main pylon of all the air strike

What has this thread got to do with stealth??


Anyway - it has been known for a while about BVR missiles - even in GW1 AIM9`s killed more aircraft than anything else - IIRC AIM7`s didn`t hit anything at all.

Originally posted by Harlequin
What has this thread got to do with stealth??

From the first post

And Soviet radar homing and warning equipment can pick up VHF transmissions or over-the-horizon radar from distant approaching aircraft. In fact, the whole issue of stealth technology could become moot, if one considers that a radar antenna runs along the entire length of a B-2 wing's leading edge. Once in visual range, stealth is irrelevant. It is more than probable that an F-117 or a B-2 can be found, identified, and shot down using basic common sense. The F-117 has to make such wide turns that its survival in a visual air-to-air fight is precarious.

I think this thread has something to do with stealth

i was refering to the part about BVR missiles acounting for less aircraft `kills` than aircraft hitting the ground on low level runs.......


The russians also have A2A home-on-jam missiles - which would kinda kill an AWACS

New weapons have certain abilities that old ones didn't have... But are they as good as ana verage WW2 soldier... NO... that's my opinion...

the fact is that the f117 were not detected because that tactical move that was done by APACHES, actually that was the main pylon of all the air strike

The role was nothing more than opening a bridgehead for the F-117. The only thing this shows is your own misconception of stealth. You seem to have some belief that it is expected of the B-2 or F-117 to, without any sort of support, break through all air defenses.

The fact is, the F-117 was flying over the most heavily defended areas in Baghdad while other planes weren't allowed to go near it.

The russians also have A2A home-on-jam missiles - which would kinda kill an AWACS

Just hope they can get past the defenses of an awacs, and in range to take such a shot...

New weapons have certain abilities that old ones didn't have... But are they as good as ana verage WW2 soldier... NO... that's my opinion...

There may be something to be said of the toughness of the WW2 era weapons, but many modern weapons have shown some of that same toughness in difficult terrain. Abrams, for instance.

Originally posted by Disturbed Deliverer
A lot fhe statements from your two articles seem to be completely twisted.

I am sure you will be correcting all of them then ....

And what is to be expected? You are comparing short range and long range missiles here. Of course the short range is going to be more successful. That doesn't make the other less significant or useful, though.

Actually i am not comparing anything; the article is. Why should a short range missile be more accurate when it's based on very different technology and ideas? What logically leads to the assumption that short range systems works better than long range and should a long range system not be designed to better standards? Why would you base your doctrine around missiles wich can not do the job knowing that the short range one's can?

The E-3 is able to jam and scramble enemy radars. It's performed this job well in Kosovo and Iraq. Your entire article seems to take no account of jamming capabilities at all.

It will TRY to jam and scramble enemy radards. Do not believe just what you want to believe and then attack articles for disagreeing with your assumptions. Where is the evidence that it did it's job as desribed in those wars? You assume that because few aircraft were shot down the aircraft was somehow involved? Logical connection please? It is NOT my article and it does take account of the fact that jamming might work.

Tell this to the Serbs and Iraqis who failed to shoot them down while they flew overhead...

How are the the issues related? Please clarify why wars against vastly different enemies should tell us something about the gulf of a difference that a war with Russia will involve.

I suppose this French missile is the Exocet, which was in use during the Gulf War, as well as in the Falklands. In spite of all its hype, it had little impact.

Both countries had small ammounts of these missiles and in the Falklands case the few that were fired proved to be very deadly weapons. Please go read about the missile and it's good track record before assuming the author did not.

The A-10 certainly did prove itself, but not at the expense of other aircraft. The A-10 performed its role, which no other could compare with. At the same time, we obviously couldn't expect the A-10 to fill the roles of other combat aircraft.

That was the point of the article. The A-10's could have won the war all on their own had they been deployed in the same numbers as the other weapon systems mentioned. Such deployment would have been far far cheaper and would have led to the same outcome. That is the point if you did not gather as much.

Or, to put it in a more logical way, there simply wasn't the need or desire to employ all of them to one region, and instead they focused on a small amount. This says nothing about what they were capable of doing, just what was the cheapest solution at the time.

Your clearly not reading the article as doing so would indicate how inefficienct it is for any airforce to have to ground half of any plane type to keep the others flying at JUST peace time hours per day. This article tells you that the helicopes, however efficient and deadly when in the air, rarely were so thus making their effectiveness in battle a moot point. Having a awesome weapon is pointless if it can not reach the battlefield often.

Which doesn't mean anything, because as said, it could have (and most likely did) achieve all of its roles in combat.

Other planes and helicopters could have done the job for a fraction of the cost probably saving lives. The did not perform to design specifications as no sane designed intends for his weapon to work 1 hour out of 50.

And what would happen if you pitted a M60A1 (oh, it's also wrong...M60A3's were employed) up against a T-90, or a more advanced American tank...?

That depends on at least dozens of factors and in this case i belive the T-90's would have still lost the battle. The Germans during the second world war opted for more mobility and firepower instead of more armor. If you train your crews properly all they will expect is a chance to kill the enemy at a reasonable distance. They will assume the responsibility of keeping themself alive without question if they are given the chance to inflict proportionate damage.

While arguing over prices, the author obviously doesn't take into account survivability. If you are losing multiple M60A1's per Abram (as would be likely in a large scale affair for a more lightly armored tank), the price means nothing.

The Gulf war indicates that both tanks suffered the same type of casualties ( actually the M60's suffered less but probably due to smaller numbers involved. A tanks first line of defense is destroying opposing tanks or infantry first. Relying on armor to defend you is rarely effective as enemy tanks are designed to defeat your armor or negate it strategically or tactically.

Strategically speaking price is everything. Winning but being dead broke just makes you a target. If you can not win efficiently you should not be fighting.

I would kind of doubt such a claim considering the fact that the allied forces moved with the speed they did. Either way, it seems in conflict with this:

The piece you quoted mentioned effectiveness when they did reach enemy lies not how fast or in what numbers they did. You assume far too much in a defense that you never needed to stage.

The Abrams' thermal sights were unhampered by the clouds of thick black smoke over the battlefield that were the result of burning Kuwaiti oil wells. In fact many Gunners relied on their "night" sights in full daylight. Such was not the case with the sights in the Iraqi tanks, which were being hit from units they could not even see.

Wich is a great ability for your tanks but also something the M60's could do.

Concerns about the M1A1's range were eliminated by a massive resupply operation that will be studied for years as a model of tactical efficiency.

That is men and equipment that could have been employed fighting the enemy and is till this day a reason the German army performed so well. Every person driving a truck is someone that could be doing something else and that is not even mentioningn the resources needed to produce the truck or ressuply system.

During the Gulf War only 18 Abrams tanks were taken out of service due to battle damage: nine were permanent losses, and another nine suffered repairable damage, mostly from mines.

Wich does not mention how long it took them to get to the point where they did not get harmed. Having to stop while the enemy flees means you have to fight them again and again instead of destroying them the first time. If those abrams tanks did not have to stop so often far less would have been hit as they could destroy whole formations in flight instead of having to engage them on ground chosen by the regrouping enemy.

Not a single Abrams crewman was lost in the conflict. There were few reports of mechanical failure. US armor commanders maintained an unprecedented 90% operational readiness for their Abrams Main Battle Tanks.

Wich is great thing for CNN but pretty meaningless in terms of warfare. You could have all your 100 tanks survive but since their slow( or consume so much gas that they can not go far) they will be bypassed and their logistal chain destroyed. The enemy can with superior numbers and inferior design simply avoid your massive battle tanks and make them strategically ineffective. Go look at the the German experience in the last 2 years. Hundreds of panthers and tigers lost never firing a shot simply because they were bypassed and did not get enough fuel to double back and break out.

This is a rather blatant misuse of statistics. A F-117 is giong to be flying the most dangerous missions, where it's going to have a higher rate of being shot down.

Is the theory but their not cheap and few commanders would want to get them involved i missions where they will likely get shot down. Imagine if you were responsble for assigning the mission where the first stealth fighter was show down? Goodluck with your career.

They were the first ones in (while your article laughably tries to avoid admitting it), facing the toughest of Iraqi defenses.

Bring me the evidence that show they in fact did face such air defenses. Iraqi air defenses were nothing compared to what the Stealth would have faced for their primary cold war mission.

The Patriots failure to protect a city is widely noted by critics of such weaponry. At the same time, it wasn't designed for such a role when it was employed in Israel, and it has since been upgraded significantly.

If a weapon system increases civilian casualties it is not doing it's assigned function. It has been upgraded yes but according to what i have read that did not help all that much.

Next time assume i evaluated the articles before posting them. Assume i would not waste people's time with nonsense.

Stellar

[edit on 4-12-2005 by StellarX]

Originally posted by Disturbed Deliverer
The role was nothing more than opening a bridgehead for the F-117. The only thing this shows is your own misconception of stealth.

I have not met a person who do not believe something crazy about stealth aircraft.

The fact is, the F-117 was flying over the most heavily defended areas in Baghdad while other planes weren't allowed to go near it.

Wich we can not prove and is only what they tell us. Tornadoes actually did the most dangerous flying in the first Gulf war suffering the type of casualties these missions entail.

Just hope they can get past the defenses of an awacs, and in range to take such a shot...

As the article indicated those missiles have been around for a long time to do that specific job. I for instance would call 300 miles " in range".

There may be something to be said of the toughness of the WW2 era weapons, but many modern weapons have shown some of that same toughness in difficult terrain. Abrams, for instance.

There are far better example's than the Abrams and all your doing is letting your bias hang out.... Of all the American fighting systems you could pick ( Humvee's for instance) you go and pick the tank that could not cross bridges in Kosovo due to weight after being sipped around the world to do so....

Stellar

Originally posted by grunt2
YEAHHHH LIKE HIGH BYPASS FIGHTERS TURBOFANS

shadow, also that logic is complety stupid and even arogant, i mean the russians tryed to copy the shutlle concept, now with your hand at your heart, the shuttle have a real and practical use???
[edit on 3-12-2005 by grunt2]

Well they didnt tried to copy it, they copied it,this was just a reply to the US shuttle ,actually they made a better one.

Stellar, what the hell are you on? abrams cant cross a bridge because of its weight. if you even thought about that for one more second and we looked at that in an UNBIASED way, you'd acutally know, most MBT's cant cross certain bridges because of weights, way to make it sound like the abrams is a POS

Originally posted by StellarX
The Germans during the second world war opted for more mobility and firepower instead of more armor.

The German tanks in WWII were far heavier than comparable allied tanks and weren't nearly as manouverable as Soviet tanks. As the war progressed German tanks became less manouverable and far heavier with due to the thicker armour. If anything the opposite of your statement is true.
Your statement is more correct if applied to Soviet thinking.