Accurate report on Kurt Gödel's discovery:
morgenstern.jeffreykegler.com...
Loophole:
P: president, C: congress (both houses), X: order, resolution or vote, Vi: vote
0. C passes X: C produces V0
1. C sends V0 to P
2. P returns V0 to C
3. C reconsiders V0: C produces V1, V0 shall become a law because V1 exists (shall be of effect)
4. C sends V1 to P
5. P returns V1 to C
6. C reconsiders V1: C produces V2, V1 shall become a law, etc.
The president can postpone indefinitely anything resulting from the concurrence of both houses:
0: X is an order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of both houses is necessary. This concurrence is a vote, V0:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment*) shall be presented to the President of the United States; (U.S. const. I.7, §2)
1: X’s vote, i.e., V0, should be sent to president, because if X is sent then V0 of effect:
and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House
of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. (I.7, §3)
2: If he [the President of the United States] approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
shall have originated
P doesn’t approve, he returns V0 to that house in which V0 has originated.
3: who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House
shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered
Such reconsiderations result in a vote V1, the mere existence of which causes V0’s becoming of effect. But to become isn’t to be: if V1 exists
then V0 of effect, if V0 of effect then V1 of effect and if V1 of effect then V1 sent to P because V1 is not excepted from:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; (U.S. const. I.7, §2)
4: Which is what happens in 4, Congress must send the reconsideration vote V1 to P.
5: P returns V1 because he can for, after all, V1 is but a vote for which both houses of C are responsible.
6: C must reconsider V1 for otherwise neither V1 nor V0 will take effect, in contradiction with 3. C thus makes a V2, the existence of which causes V1
to become of effect, which requires V2’s effect, which won’t happen before its having been sent to P. Etc. X won’t even be presented to P if P
disagrees on the Vs. But even if X were presented to P, P can still return X & any further V that C may present.
* Amusingly enough, what actually happens is adjournment, but not according to the meaning of the term as it is used in the constitution.
No Amending of this Constitution will be done without the President’s allowing it. For the proposal of Amendments by the Congress supposes that two
thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary. But both Houses need also agree before they shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States (V). These are respectively, a Resolution and an Order to which the Concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary. What this implies is that the amending process won’t start while disapproved by the
President. But neither ends if forbidden by the same. For the very mode of Ratification, since determined by Congress also needs the President’s
approval to take Effect (all of this because of I.7, §3).
No Judgment in Cases of Impeachment will be reached without the prior Consent of the President. For such Judgments require Indictment, Trial &
Conviction. Now, on the one hand, the Indictment in such Cases is an Order which only the House of Representatives can issue:
The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment (I.2, §5)
On the other hand: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments and the Conviction needs the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present (I.3, §6)
Which is a Resolution or Vote. So, because the Concurrence of both Houses is necessary, the Verdict is not going to take Effect before its (or a
related Vote’s) having been signed or left unreturned in excess of 10 days (Sundays excepted) by the President (cf. I.7, §3).
Now Congress acted anti-constitutionally by making Amendment I, breaking the following fragment of the same (by then in the Constitution):
Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech
Congress is to be held accountable for that. For Congress made a Law abridging its own freedom of speech (as a legislator). This act is forbidden by
the (then amended) Constitution. Moreover, Amendment I becomes a Law because Congress inserts it in the Constitution and this insertion (towards its
end) becomes anti-constitutional because of (the just inserted) Amendment I: Amendment I is an ex post facto law, which is against the
Constitution.
Amendment XXV, Section 4 is no remedy. For President can Commission the Vice President with some Military Trust (because of II.3 and the Vice
President’s being an Officer, see e.g., Amendment XII’s "But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to
that of Vice-President of the United States" where "that" refers to "office"). President as Commander in Chief can then order the Vice President to
resign from the Office of Vice President. Should he refuse, being subjected to Martial Discipline, he incurs at least his being arrested; but he could
also be Impeached, Convicted and removed from Office, because Constitution’s II.4 seems to apply to such disobediences. Now by Amendment XXV’s
Section 2, President should nominate a Vice President: he can nominate his own self, and keep doing so upon each non-confirmation by Congress.
This results in the Office of Vice President remaining empty as long as President finds fit, unless Congress agrees with the President’s nomination.
In this way, President can ensure his not being ousted by Vice President (except by his own self). But even if Vice President were to become
President, and Vice President’s Office should, as a result of his becoming President, be considered vacated, he, as President, is expected to
nominate a Vice President (XXV.2): he can proceed as explained above (thus leaving that Office empty if not filled with himself); then, the new
Dictator can no longer be removed following XXV.4 (except, again, by his own self).
edit on 15-2-2021 by Sheshbazzar because: (no reason given)