Satoshi Nakamoto did not understand the "Byzantine Generals Problem," as is evidenced by the following:
satoshi.nakamotoinstitute.org...
The proof-of-work chain is a solution to the Byzantine Generals' Problem.** I'll try to rephrase it in that context.
Let us first make it quite clear that, for 2n+1+m nodes (which vertices are simultaneously message-radiating "generals", message-reflecting or, in the
case of faulty/malignant elements, transmitting or absorbing witnesses, and message-absorbing lieutenants), no "do gooder consensus", in the case
interesting us to be understood as meaning that truth is what "good guys" *decide* it to be, can be ascertained unless the traitors/fomenters'
contingent m isn't above n (the problem isn't a problem if n vanishes, because for evil to overcome good, it has to exist.)
Instead of a reductio ad absurdum we shall succinctly analyze i.e., slaughter the beast at hand and excise from within its innards, that is in the
very question, its general solution.
We shall as well discover that substituting reason for faith, computation for trust, complicates, slows down, hampers, squanders, pollutes i.e., is,
in a word, inefficient.
Imagine a multitude of nodes and let one of them, x, ask a question to some other, say y. Now if x were endowed with simple and despised faith it
would accept y's answer confining annoying solicitations to a singleton, but this age is a haughty and voluble one, we ask for proofs even of axioms,
blind as we are to the fact that we still are giving our credence to authorities or, as is the case for Bitcoin, to the hardware, to the software, to
the network supporting it, if only they belittle faith. Such a x won't be satisfied with y's answer but will have to beg all the other nodes for what
is it that y told them in response to x's question. Far from being done with it, taking a majority of the reports, it will have to, for the same
reason, ask, for any z, all the remaining nodes what is it that z told them that x said. As you can judge, we have an infinite regress in the making,
"fortunately" enough for infidels, they are to be held in the chains of finitude and therefore these sequences can be terminated. How deep such a pit
need be? If it were to heap n "good" nodes t0, t1, ... tn-1 where t0 would be y, then if there still remained, in addition to x, taken as "good" for
argument's sake, n other "good" nodes, and at most n "bad" ones, then lo, x would find itself in the pleasant position of agreeing with any of the n
other remaining "good" nodes concerning tn-1's witness, this because tn-1 being "good" will send the same message to all the askers, and so will
"reflect" x, mirror as it were, or the n remaining "do gooders." Hence when x will ask these n "good" nodes "what is it that tn-1 said that ... t1
said that t0 vomited?," it will find itself sprinkled with the same droplets of noisome diarrhea that tn-1 itself benefitted it with, and therefore
whatever the no more than n "false witnesses" told x in regard to t0, ... tn-1, it will have a majority of n+1 equal votes vs. less than or equal to n
diverging ones. Now that, if you take some time to think instead of indulging in prolefeed such as that ridiculous but nonetheless pernicious
"Lucifer" TV show or some pr0n, belongs to the species of worse scenario and by that we mean that the maximum number of "goodies" is chained for n
badies, beyond which disagreement among the nice vertices is not impossible. Now picture yourself tn-1 as "bad", shall the unchained n+2 "good" nodes
agree on t0, ... tn-1? Not necessarily, as a counterexample shows: tn-1, being a contrarian, isn't bound to send the same datum to all nodes, let it
report i to x, j to a "good" w and any random heterogeneous, all different from i and j, garbage to all the others, where i and j are different. Now x
and w will ask all the remaining nodes, whether "good" or "bad" they have no inkling of, what tn-1 told that ... t0 said. The evil nodes may very well
bombard x with i all the while assuring w of j. For x this state of affairs will result in his assigning i to t0, ... tn-1 seeing that it has a
majority of n occurrences of i against n+1 votes, no n of which are equal but w will conclude j for the same t0, ... tn-1. And yet, although the
"good" nodes will differ on t0, ... tn-1 with an evil tn-1 appendage, they still will agree on t0, ... tn-2, because they will value the well-ending
t0, ... tn-1 equally which is, for each "goodie", n+1 identical decisions against n on bad-ending t0, ... tn-1. The cases where t0, ... tn-1 is
mongrelous i.e., with both "good" and "evil" ti, i < n-1 are easier because there are fewer free fomenters. This procedure ensures hivemindeness on
the "good" nodes' part: they'll decide on the same value for t0, ... tn-2, for t0, ... tn-3 and so on until they come to consensus on t0 that is y.
edit on 2.15.2021 by Zarniwoop because: added external quote tags