The Military Doctrine of "Two-front War"

There is a military doctrine or strategy called a "two-front war."

A two-front war is a battle that is fought when an army encounters enemy forces on two separate battle-fronts. Physically separate forces of two or more allied armies or two divisions of the same army will engage simultaneously a single opponent. The strategy is especially useful if the enemy does not expect this and if the engagement seems counter-intuitive to what is expected, precipitating a level of confusion within the enemy ranks. This could happen if, say, an enemy seems to be physically or geographically united then suddenly they split. The defensive force is taken aback by this sudden and seemingly foolish maneuver, but then finds itself facing the enemy in two places. The initial confusion as the attacking army divides and begins assaults on separate fronts can precipitate a moment of vulnerability as the defensive force has to re-strategize to counter the new form of attack, and may leave its resources stretched and more vulnerable.

Sun Tzu had some interesting things to say that could apply to this kind of strategy:

“Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.”

“All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.”

“Engage people with what they expect; it is what they are able to discern and confirms their projections. It settles them into predictable patterns of response, occupying their minds while you wait for the extraordinary moment — that which they cannot anticipate.”

“Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak.”

Just a thought ...

Those pushing the great reset look to be giving up, all getting too much for them and getting ready to hit delete on their lives. Warp speed has a lot going on in the science community, hope the facts win.

a reply to: incoserv

I believe we are fighting on
multidimensional fronts.

As well as "atypical" warfare
maneuvers.

S&F

Ala the Tet offensive, pretty much ended the US involvement in Vietnam via forcing the US to re evaluate its strategy and outcome.
People just got tired and sick of it, their will was defeated

Though, pretty clear I think Vietnam probably stopped the roll out of communism in Asia

a reply to: incoserv

I had thought a two-front war was the ability for the United States to engage in 2 simultaneous large scale conflicts, or am I thinking of something different?

originally posted by: peter_kandra
a reply to: incoserv

I had thought a two-front war was the ability for the United States to engage in 2 simultaneous large scale conflicts, or am I thinking of something different?

May use the same terminology, but historically and strategically it refers to an attack on two separate fronts.

a reply to: peter_kandra

Yeah sounds right, I think what the OP is describing would be called a flank.

Coming from a military history amateur (with a very shallow, potentially even wrong, understanding of actual historical WW II facts), isn't that what Nazis found themselves in in WW II?

They were already wining (and have all but finished, save for UK) their European Blitzkrieg campaign (and were slightly less winning their African campaign) when they decided they could open a second front with Russia (in addition to the African front)... only to find themselves having to fight a losing two-front war when U.S. entered Europe.

They would've actually have to fight a three-front war at that point (1944 D-Day) had they not already pulled out of Africa a year before.

Granted, Nazis had to reach some oil sources to keep fueling their war machine, either in Russia (Russian campaign) or in the Middle East (African campaign, apparently, was initially about securing oil fields in Libya, but also about establishing a ground/future train route to the Middle East), so their rush east was somewhat justified. They, however, failed to close all of their other fronts (African and UK, the latter one proving to be the cause of their ultimate downfall) before opening the new one (Russian), and had thus failed by making a premature (though otherwise completely justified) move.

Since WW II, no serious military strategist has ever proposed entertaining that concept again, as it has clearly proven disastrous.

Pentagon generals have certainly proclaimed their "willingness" to fight a two-front war with both Russia and China, but that could've been just a bluff, blowing themselves out of proportion (beyond U.S. military's actual capabilities) like blowfish does when faced with an overwhelming threat (and underwhelming chances of survival).

What was you question about a two-front war? Is it a good idea to do it? Personally, I don't think it is, in general, but I guess it does depend on the circumstances.

a reply to: incoserv
The Germans, in 1914, were deliberately planning for a two-front war, and that's what turned a local Balkans conflict into a World War.

They would not have chosen one for preference- I don't suppose any professional army ever does- but they felt obliged to prepare for one because they knew about the alliance between France and Russia. Their intended strategy was to ignore the Russians as long as possible, until they had beaten the French, and then to turn back and repel the Russians. In other words, they hoped to turn the expected two-front war into a two-fronts-in-succession war.

When the Austrian threat to Serbia provoked the Russians to mobilise, the Germans encouraged the Austrians and promised to support them. But when the question arose "Can't we limit the war to fighting the Russians?", the German General Staff dug in their heels, All their plans, in minute detail, were devoted to delivering most of the German army along the railway network to the French frontier at the very beginning of any war. Trying to reverse the direction now would cause chaos. You must go west, young man.

They also went through Luxembourg and Belgium, which is what turned it into a general war. The link is graphically illustrated in the pages of a Methodist newspaper which I once read through for a dissertation. One day they were saying "Of course England won't fight for those brigands in Serbia." The next day it was a case of "We must save poor little Belgium!"

In the end, the German strategy was wrecked by the Czar pushing an invasion of Germany more quickly than they expected. They only beat him back by taking baxk part of the armies they had sent west. Thus the Germans saved their eastern front at the cost of failing to win on the western front, and being forced into the real two-front war which they had been trying to avoid.

Conversely, the Czar saved the western allies at the ultimate cost of destroying his own throne.

I think the moral is- don't enter into a two-front war if you can help it. As long as you're not under multiple threat, concentrate your own forces for victory in one area.