It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.
Please white-list or disable AboveTopSecret.com in your ad-blocking tool.
Thank you.
Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.
There are already ways to siphon data from computers without a network connection or old-fashioned physical theft, but this might be one of the cleverer examples. Researchers have found a way to steal data from "air-gapped" computers (that is, no way to connect to other devices) using an LCD's brightness. The approach has a compromised computer relay imperceptible changes in the LCD's RGB color values that a camera-equipped device can detect. You could theoretically trick someone into loading malware on the target system through a USB drive and use nearby hijacked security cameras to transmit that information.
originally posted by: Maxatoria
This group seem to release 'new' methods every now and again and they generally follow similar methods and while they work in theory they probably wouldn't work in real life as you have to get the receiver very close to the air gapped machine which probably for anything important would be in a locked room.
The data transfer rates of stuff via these methods is normally very low meaning it would take ages to read something and it would only take someone to walk in front of the monitor or turn it off and you are stuffed.
Van Eck phreaking (also known as Van Eck Radiation) is a form of eavesdropping in which special equipment is used to pick up side-band electromagnetic emissions from electronic devices that correlate to hidden signals or data for the purpose of recreating these signals or data in order to spy on the electronic device. Side-band electromagnetic radiation emissions are present in (and with the proper equipment, can be captured from) keyboards, computer displays, printers, and other electronic devices.
In 1985, Wim van Eck published the first unclassified technical analysis of the security risks of emanations from computer monitors. This paper caused some consternation in the security community, which had previously believed that such monitoring was a highly sophisticated attack available only to governments; van Eck successfully eavesdropped on a real system, at a range of hundreds of metres, using just $15 worth of equipment plus a television set.