The new cold war

a reply to: Zaphod58

the video russia put up shows a object like the HTV-2/3 and has unlimited range. so it would have to dip and glide so much it might as well be an aircraft of sorts seeing as it will be in the atmosphere so much, unless i missed the point of BGW being able to skip or bounce back into space

a reply to: penroc3

You know what, you're right. They're the same thing.

a reply to: Zaphod58

YES!, i win.

i wasn't being argumentative on purpose. if im wrong, im wrong. i just want to know why

stupid question. but for objects travelling outside the atmosphere where there's no sound why do they still use terms like hypersonic or measure using mach. why not use just mph. or make up a new term for space based stuff like .0018 AU-PH

a reply to: BASSPLYR

Because mach and hypersonic have nothing to do with sound.

a reply to: Zaphod58

explain what you mean. I all confuseded nows

a reply to: BASSPLYR

i think it is relative to the earth or ground speed....1000mph is 1000mph here or the moon.

the air is effected by high mach numbers but is not directly tied to air.


or something like that

a reply to: BASSPLYR

They're simply different ways to measure speed by using how fast sound moves. It doesn't use actual sound. At sea level and 15C, mach 1 is roughly 761 mph. That's the speed that sound would travel, but it's not measuring actual sounds. The higher you go, the lower the speed to reach mach 1. At 60,000 feet, and -56C, mach 1 is about 660 mph. Hypersonic speeds begin at roughly Mach 4-5 and above.

a reply to: Zaphod58

so i assume i have used up all my responses for the night?

just kidding. i still want to know why im wrong(in the most sincere way)

a reply to: Zaphod58

Are you sure about this? I mean there's really no way to prove or dis-prove whether the US has far more advanced weaponry than anyone knows. Except for those who know. Ya know?

a reply to: PillsCosby
Flying black triangles,Green exhaust out of the back of extremely quick aircraft plus Texas and Kansas sightings ring a bell?

Well, can Russia afford to go beyond the artist impressions and CGI? With a GDP the size of South Korea, Russia is not an economic powerhouse. The more Russia spends on defence, the less money Russia will spend on its crumbling infrastructure et al. At some point someone in Russia is going ask why they are living in such a poor country.

a reply to: paraphi
But.... but Putin

a reply to: PillsCosby

The point of the video is new publicly released weapons systems. That means white world weapons. So yes, I'm sure. And as I said, weapons produced in the classified world aren't going to be mass produced. But feel free to prove me wrong.

a reply to: Blackfinger

Not one thing you just mentioned is publicly released in the white world. This isn't about big black triangles that go to Mars, and can't be proven to exist, fast ISR aircraft that aren't going to do much beyond giving us Intel, and aircraft seen once that no one knows (or believes) what the mission is.

But,but photos!!!! :-P

Can anyone offer a summary? There is a lot of BS on Youtube so I wouldn't want to waste my time (I am being a bit hypocritical here I know...). I did read the comments in this thread.

So here is my 20c on the idea of a new "Cold War".

After the Cold War ended, the Russian arsenal was in poor shape, sometimes without any ballistic missile submarines at sea. Increases in funding and availability have reinstated the concept of MAD, where both sides would be destroyed in a total nuclear war.

The US has also upgraded its SLBMs, which would enable them to destroy Russia's land based arsenal much more effectively, but Russia would always have such a number of SLBMs at sea. Thus, the concept of MAD is still present, ABM systems do not have close to the capacity of prevent MAD, now or in the future.

What the new Russian weapons for? They are not for total nuclear war. They are for something different. Introducing NUTS. From the Wikipedia article. I have copied the relevant parts to US and Russia.

Introduction

Nuclear utilization target selection (NUTS) is a hypothesis regarding the use of nuclear weapons often contrasted with mutually assured destruction (MAD).[1] NUTS theory at its most basic level asserts that it is possible for a limited nuclear exchange to occur and that nuclear weapons are simply one more rung on the ladder of escalation pioneered by Herman Kahn.[2][3] This leads to a number of other conclusions regarding the potential uses of and responses to nuclear weapons.

Limited countervalue strikes

Some NUTS theorists hold that a mutually assured destruction-type deterrent is not credible in cases of a small attack, such as one carried out on a single city, as it is suicidal. In such a case, an overwhelming nuclear response would destroy every enemy city and thus every potential hostage which could be used to influence the attacker's behavior. This would free up the attacker to launch further attacks with and remove any chance for the attacked nation to bargain. A country adhering to a NUTS-style war plan would likely respond to such an attack with a limited attack on one or several enemy cities.

Missile defense

Since NUTS theory assumes the possibility of a winnable nuclear war, the contention of many MAD theorists that missile defense systems should be abandoned as a destabilizing influence is generally not accepted by NUTS theorists. For NUTS theorists, a missile defence system would be a positive force in that it would protect against a limited nuclear attack. Additionally, such a system would increase the odds of success for a counterforce attack by assuring that if some targets escaped the initial attack, the incoming missiles could be intercepted. But protection against a limited attack means that the opponent has incentive to launch a larger scale attack, against which the defence is likely to be ineffective. Additionally, increased possibility of success of counterforce attacks means that the opponent has the incentive to act preemptively, which increases the risk of a large scale response to misinterpreted signals.

NUTS and US nuclear strategy

NUTS theory can be seen in the US adoption of a number of first-strike weapons, such as the Trident II and Minuteman III nuclear missiles, which both have an extremely low circular error probable (CEP) of about 90 meters for the former and 120 meters for the latter.[4] These weapons are accurate enough to almost certainly destroy a missile silo if it is targeted.

Additionally, the US has proceeded with a number of programs which improve its strategic situation in a nuclear confrontation. The Stealth bomber has the capacity to carry a large number of stealthy cruise missiles, which could be nuclear-tipped, and due to its low probability of detection and long range would be an excellent weapon with which to deliver a first strike.[5]

And to provide a more specific example where Russia might threaten the use of nuclear weapons:

This report outlines how NATO and Russian force levels and capabilities have evolved in the post–Cold War era and what recent trends imply for the balance of capabilities in the NATO member states that border Russia in the Baltic Sea region. It is intended to inform debate over appropriate posture and force structure for NATO forces to respond to the recent growth in Russian military capability and capacity and to increased Russian assertiveness in the use of force. Given NATO's current posture and capability, including European battalions and a rotational U.S. armored brigade combat team, Russia can still achieve a rapid fait accompli in the Baltic states followed by brinksmanship to attempt to freeze the conflict. Nothing about this analysis should suggest that Russian conventional aggression against NATO is likely to take place; however, prudence suggests that steps should be taken to mitigate potential areas of vulnerability in the interest of ensuring a stable security relationship between all NATO members and Russia. NATO has sufficient resources, personnel, and equipment to enhance conventional deterrence focused on Russia; a more robust posture designed to considerably raise the cost of military adventurism against one or more NATO member states is worthy of consideration.

www.rand.org...

In other words, the Russian nuclear weapons are for blackmail against NATO in the event of hostilities. The nuclear missile shield in Eastern Europe would be beneficial to stopping this, hence why Russia has scrambled to find ways around it (even though their existing weapons systems would likely provide that role just fine, because Russia is a paranoid military deep state).

Since anti-ballisic missile systems can be bypassed and the threat remains, one way to prevent this from happening is some good old fashioned deterrence. Another is increased military presence in eastern Europe so they couldn't get a foothold in the first place. But is that likely to happen? And that move would be provocative in itself. Anyway, there's no point in trying to tit-for-tat copy their weapons systems, because Russia cannot defend against our existing and planned weapons. In fact, the new Russian weapons have limited utility compared to some of the new US weapon systems anyway and likely exist largely for propaganda purposes.

Continued...:

What needs to be made clear is that a small, limited, or tactical nuclear strike against NATO, will be responded with a small, limited, or tactical nuclear strike against Russia. The latest US nuclear posture review did that even before the new Russian weapons were announced, thus there is no need for further response. I actually think the newest US nuclear posture review is somewhat overkill as the new Russian weapons do not change much and can be regarded largely as Wunderwaffe.

Also the arguments against the US having smaller, more usable nuclear weapons are faulty. They provide deterrence against a smaller and limited nuclear attack, thereby reducing the threat of nuclear war. In addition (Tyler Rogoway was wrong), putting tactical nuclear weapons in SLBMs does not risk escalation, and instead lowers the risk of nuclear conflict. My only suggestion is to allow European states that are part of the nuclear sharing agreement to respond to nuclear attack with nuclear attack more effectively, via integrating the B61-12 internally within the F-35, instead of (as currently planned) externally. And/or allowing integration with the Eurofighter Typhoon.

Anyway, no need for further response than already planned, and the current plan could be overkill. The funding that both sides need to get its planned weapons operational and in any meaningful numbers is significant. As far as to whether this is a Cold War or an arms race? I guess...? At least it's lop-sided this time around...

originally posted by: gariac
a reply to: penroc3

No sarcasm here. The experts believe the silos based systems are useless due to improved accuracy of enemy guidance systems. If we think missiles are incoming, we have no choice but to launch since it is a 100% certainty our silos will be destroyed.

foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com...

www.google.com...

The nuclear based silos impose a huge cost on the enemy. They are much more likely to attack the silos before launching a counter value attack on cities. Since there's so many, the cost of a nuclear strike against the US mainland is much higher as a result of these silos. There's also a "use it or lose it" phenomena at play here, it means if anyone is mad enough to launch a strike against the US, the US is likely to respond with a nuclear attack of its own very quickly before its missiles are destroyed, thereby reducing the odds of a nuclear attack, and thereby aiding deterrence.

Still, I understand that Russia has enough nuclear weapons to destroy both the silos and cities whilst China doesn't even attempt to threaten the US via nuclear weapons. China's nuclear weapons are to prevent nuclear blackmail only (as I have repeated before, they are at least civilized).

But, if the funding were moved from the silos to other, cheaper, parts of the nuclear arsenal, it wouldn't necessarily be a bad trade.

a reply to: C0bzz

Generally speaking, i dont think NUTS would work in reality.

As soon as one side starts using nuclear weapons the other side will be under extreme pressure to not only respond in kind but initiate a wide scale counterforce strike.

So lets say the evil Russians try to liberate their oppressed comrades in the Baltics and the invasion actually develops into a full blown war between Russia and the West, with NATO forces advancing through Belarus and the Kaliningrad Oblast threatening to encircle the Russian invaders … how would an nuclear strike to ‘freeze’ the conflict look like?

Keeping it as limited as possible the Russians could drop a tactical warhead on advancing NATO forces in Belarus.
Going for a wider scale attack they could go for the logistic chain and take out important military bases or infrastructure (bridges, railroads) in Poland.
Going crazy they could also initiate an actual countervalue attack, taking out a polish or preferable German city with a thermonuclear weapon.

What would happen in any of these scenarios? There would be an immediate, time critical need to limit the Russian capabilities to conduct follow up strikes. One nuke dropped on a advancing armored battalion is bad, two, three or four all along the front is much worse…
This is were this limited NUTS stuff falls apart. Once one side resorts to nuclear weapons, there is no guarantee whatsoever that there wont be another, worse attack. Nuclear weapons being as powerful as they are means you can’t really afford to wait long enough to find out. You don’t assume they are playing some NUTS theory, you assume the worst, panic and go from there.

Therefore, once nukes start flying the highest priority is to go after the launch systems in the theater. Don’t want to lose another city? You don’t wait for the call coming in on the red line possibly telling you little more than fairytales anyway, you shoot back immediately.

But not by retaliating in kind… this mirrored response thing has never made any sense. Russia nuking advancing NATO battalions wont result in NATO nuking retreating Russian battalions. It will result in NATO going after the Russian capabilities to conduct such attacks – in the most extreme, forceful manner possible. Russia nuking a city wont immediately result in NATO responding in kind, but NATO trying go take out the Russian capability to nuke more cities.

In the hypothetical NATO-Russia War scenario, NATO would have contingency forces on high alert for immediate counterforce strikes. That means nuclear armed tactical fighter jets going in against identified Russian launch positions and military bases. An countervalue attack will in kind result in the implementation of counterforce strikes covering the entire strategic spectrum. It wouldn’t take much at all to from losing a city to launching a full scale attack against the Russian nuclear triad.

Facing this responds of course, would the Russians be willing to eat an NATO theatre counterforce strike against their strategic assets in western Russia or even an multi megaton attack aimed against their entire arsenal without responding? Would they be willing to wait for the dust to settle once warheads are coming over the horizon and start to detonate? Would they responds with a wide scale counterforce strike of their own or would they be pushed to initiate a larger countervalue attack, aimed at forcing the political leadership of NATO to stop?

With multiple European cities destroyed, would the US President really be inclined to stop hostilities at this point? Again, what guarantees can there be in a nuclear war? If Russia is willing to nuke several European cities, will a US President surrender to the threat of the same happening to American cities? Or would he continue the war, aimed not at eliminating the Russian populace but at eliminating the Russian capability to continue the slaughter?

All of this is indeed nuts. Limiting any nuclear exchange to a mere couple of warheads most likely wont work. Once the genie is out of the bottle its all but impossible to get him back in. IMO wide scale counterforce strikes would be a given once one sides starts using nukes even only on the battlefield. At best, there is a case to be made for it not escalating to full range countervalue attacks.

As a sidenote, there is actual a very decent fictional novel about a confrontation like this called Arc Light by Eric L. Harry. Written in the early 90s but still very relevant today.

a reply to: mightmight

I couldn't agree more. NUTS proponents are lowering the threshold for a full strike, exactly the opposite of what they are trying to prevent.

NUTS may only work on smaller nuclear armed states. The Russians have restated their willingness to respond massively to even tactical nuclear strikes. Why anyone could think they could simply stop a tit-for-tat exchange before overwhelming pressure to launch a massive strike before your opponent does is beyond me, and terribly dangerous thinking.