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Originally posted by Stealth Spy
Originally posted by Daedalus3
I agree with yuo abt the Iraq part but not about the SLBM part.. Im pretty sure India does not haev SLBM capability..
They have the Kilo launched Klub missiles but not ballistic missiles..
India has SLBM capacity with its recently test fired Dhanush Missile which is a SLBM derrivative of the Prithvi-3
Originally posted by chinawhite
India attacked china first. remeber that high way china was building. they attacked it and china responed
Originally posted by Stealth Spy
Originally posted by chinawhite
India attacked china first. remeber that high way china was building. they attacked it and china responed
That is the heright of ignorance...the world and everyone knows the truth....dont post things that you know are untrue....the attack on india was a part of Mao's vision of an expanded chinese empire...and he invaded and occupied tibet too... but his designs for india never materialised as he siverely underestimated india's response and international pressure.
India at that time was under Neheru, a contemporary of Mahatma Gandhi and an ardent preacher of non-violence or ahimsa .Even on hearing the news of the chinese attack, he refused to order a counter attack, but instead tried to take the diplomatic route by lodging complaints with the UK, USA and USSR.
The indian armed forces too were reletively incompetant at that time as india was still 10 years old after independence..hardly anything was spent of defence at that time.
Moreover Mao launched an unexpected surprise attack when india were least prepared for it and when they least expected it, as Neheru had just signed a freindship pact with china, and had even mooted a non-aggression pact.
Unable to reach political accommodation on disputed territory along the 3,225-kilometer-long Himalayan border, the Chinese attacked India on October 20, 1962. At the time, nine divisions from the eastern and western commands were deployed along the Himalayan border with China. None of these divisions was up to its full troop strength, and all were short of artillery, tanks, equipment, and even adequate articles of clothing
Causes of the War
India and the PRC shared good relations through the 1950s, including the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, proposed by the prime ministers of the two countries in 1953. However, after the PRC established control over Tibet in 1950, the Indian government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru adopted a policy of forward military deployment in the border area into areas controlled by China. China reacted angrily, disputing India's claims about border areas. For several years up to 1962, India and China both maintained forces in the disputed area. At times, each side accused the other of having moved troops into 'their' side of the border as each side tried to extend its line of actual control. A few skirmishes occurred during this time. The cause of the escalation into war is disputed but generally is considered to have been precipitated by Operation ONKAR in which India decided to move troops and establish patrol posts as far forward as possible, in some sectors north of the McMahon line into territory that was previously not under dispute. China disputed the troop movement and border claimed by India. India's invasion and annexation of Portuguese Goa the previous year (1961) may have contributed to Chinese suspicion over Indian motives. Negotiations between the two countries deterioriated over the following months and eventually culminated on October 12, 1962 with Prime Minister Nehru declaring that he had issued orders to "free" the invaded areas. Fighting began shortly thereafter with both sides claiming to that the other was the aggressor.
Before Indian independence, the British had earmarked Tibet as a neutral buffer zone in view of British India's defence environment vis-à-vis the similar imperialistic leanings of China and Russia. Most Indian politicians failed to anticipate the strategic ramifications of the Chinese aggression and loss of this buffer.
Nehru held the view that newly independent India could ill afford a confrontation over Tibet. Later, Nehru not only recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet but also went to great lengths to assure that friendship with China was the keystone of India's foreign policy and India along with China could mutually hold the non-aligned balance of power in Asia.
Indian and China signed Panchsheel pact on 29 April 1954. Under the agreement, India gave up all extra-territorial rights and privileges it enjoyed in Tibet, which it inherited from the British. India formally recognised Tibet to be a region of China. The five principles were:
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equal and mutual benefit working relationship
5. Peaceful co-existence
Aiming to consolidate its grip on Tibet, China started developing infrastructure in the region's strategic areas. It planned a ring road from China to Tibet and from there via the Karakorum Range to Sinkiang and Mongolia and then back to China. India's Ladakh district of Askai Chin region of Jammu and Kashmir obstructed this road. It could have forced China to build the road through the harsh Takla Makan desert. But, asserting that they had not signed 1914 Simla agreement, China published maps showing that Aksai Chin belonged to them and rejected the McMahon line.
India discovered the road only in October 1958. Both sides exchanged angry messages, charging each other with territorial transgressions. Nehru was severely criticised, both in Parliament and on streets.
Nehru and Chinese foreign minister Chou En-Lai decided in a 1959 that two countries won't send patrols within two miles of McMahon Line in NEFA. However, On August 7, 1959, about 200 Chinese troops intruded into Indian border at Khenzemane in the Kameng frontier division at east of Thagla Ridge. China claimed that the international border ran through Drokung Samba bridge.
On 25th August 1959, around 300 Chinese troops crossed into Longju region of the Subashin Frontier division and captured an Indian post. In both cases the Chinese heavily outnumbered Indians.
The Chinese excusions became more frequent by late 1959. As a result Indian Army was given total control of Indian border in NEFA. The 4th Indian Division was sent to Assam from Punjab. Although ill-quipped, it was told to defend the entire McMahon line from Bhutan tri-junction to Burma border.
Chou En-lai visited Delhi in April 1960. Nehru was keen to reach a settlement with China. En-lai had earlier indicated that China would agree to India's claim in the north-eastern sector, but went back on this when India didn't agree to Chinese claim-line in Ladakh. So, the talks broke down and a good opportunity to solve the dispute was lost.
Amid accusations in media that China was training Maoists in India, Chou made an anti-India statement in Nepal flaring up tensions.
As the frequency of Chinese incursions increased, Indian leaders went into a huddle on Nov 2, 1961 to evolve a response.
The meeting at Pdt Nehru's house was attended Defence Minister Krishna Menon, Chief of Army Staff Lt. General Thapar and Quarter Master General Lt. General Kaul among others. The meeting decided that:
• In Ladakh sector, Indian Army would patrol forward areas. Posts would be established on the border of Indian territory to prevent further Chinese intrusions.
• The same would also apply to areas in Uttar Pradesh on Indo-China border where posts would be established as far as possible in Indian territory.
These activities angered China. The Forward Posts orders were given to the Eastern and Western commands on December 5, 1961. The whole exercise was codenamed "Operation ONKAR".
India Army was grossly ill-equipped to implement the orders to set up Forward Posts in Ladakh and in NEFA. No roads and infrastructure were there to help them in one of the highest battlefields in the world. Almost all the forward posts depended on airlifts. Nearly everything had to be air dropped, right down to the daily rations. But due to bad terrain, it was later estimated that only 30 per cent of supplies actually reached the troops.
Oil cookers, essential for keeping warm and cooking, were also in short supply. Medical facilities were also poor.
Even the Russian-made helicopters used for airlifts were inadequate for high-altitude operations. The army had no means of carrying heavy loads in the mountains and hence its mobility and firepower was severely reduced. Its main means of transport in the era of jets were mules and human porters.
Troops also lacked the training for a war in such difficult areas. TO make it worse, almost all equipment and weapons were of 1950s vintage.
At this time, a "feud" between the then Finance Minister Morarji Desai and the Defense Minister Krishna Menon made the matters worse.
At 8 A.M on 8 September 1962, about 600 Chinese soldiers crossed Thagla Ridge and surrounded Dhola post. The Chinese had chosen the spot and the timing well: Thagla Ridge, which overlooked the key Chinese garrison at Leh, was an exceedingly remote area with terrain that was not conducive for troop movement. Further, it was a Saturday and it would take a long time for the information to reach Delhi along the chain of command.
Nehru, who was attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London at that time, immediately flew back to India. His cautious response to media was, "Our instructions are to free our territory. I can't fix a date'. But, some media reports misquoted him, and exaggerated his response.
On 20th September, a Chinese sentry near Bridge II on Namka Chu threw a grenade on Indian position resulting in heavy firing from both sides. Four Chinese and five Indians were killed.
At this point, all the PM, the Defence Minister and the Finance Minister were abroad. In their absence, the officiating Defence Minister Raghunath called a meeting to discuss the Thagla situation with Gen. Sen. The meeting decided to evict the Chinese from the North bank of Namka Chu, to contain the Thagla Ridge and to patrol Tsangle areas.
The Chinese launched two major attacks on 20th October. The well-coordinated attacks were 1000 km apart in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh and the Namkachu river.
The Chinese attacked with an artillery bombardment of 76 mm and 120 mm mortars at the Indian positions of Bridge III and Bridge IV. Massive infantry assaults followed in divisional strength. The Rajput and Gorkha positions in Dhola area were attacked with 2 brigades.
By 9 am, the Chinese had completely wiped out the two regiments of the Rajputs and the Gorkhas. Out of 513 Rajputs, 282 killed were killed, 81 wounded and captured and 90 unwounded and captured. Brig. Dalvi, finding that 7 Brigade was being run over by the Chinese, tried to lead a small retreating party of Indian troops back to Indian lines but was taken prisoner at Dhola. Indian posts at Tsangle were eliminated giving the Chinese control over the western end of NEFA.
At the eastern edge of NEFA, fighting commenced near the Indian strongpoint of Walong. Also on 20 October, the Chinese attacked the forward posts in Ladakh. The Galwan post fell within a few weeks.
India shocked: India was shocked at the Oct 20 events. China had betrayed India and had forced an unwanted war on India.
India's invasion and annexation of Portuguese Goa the previous year (1961) may have contributed to Chinese suspicion over Indian motives
the attack on india was a part of Mao's vision of an expanded chinese empire...and he invaded and occupied tibet too... but his designs for india never materialised
Further, Pakistan illegally gifted China with a 2,600 Sq. km tribute of Jammu and Kashmir territory in 1963.
The Chinese assault into had extended their line of communication and supplies much too far.
Being unable to maintain it, they made a virtue of necessity and declared a unilateral cease-fire on October 24, 1962. While not withdrawing claim, they withdrew occupation to the pre-war boundaries north of the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, but kept a Switzerland-sized area 38,000 Sq. km of seized territory up to their Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh district.
India rejected the cease-fire offer and tried to regroup during the lull in the fighting.
The US Air Force flew in massed supplies to India in November, 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities
Krishna Menon resigned and Nehru's dream of Sino-Indian friendship was shattered, but India did not relinquish its independent policy of Non-Alignment, though a shadow was shed on India's position as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
The main lesson India learned was that right does not make might in the world of geopolitics, and that India must strengthen its defences and stand on its own feet to be of consequence in the world.
In the early '80s, following a new paradigm shift in the Indian military, it was decided that the Army was to actively patrol the Line of Actual Control. Friction began to ensue over the Chinese occupation of the Sumdorong Chu pasturage, lying north of Tawang. The media, catching wind of the situation, gave it national prominence, and an angry exchange of official protests between the Indian and Chinese governments followed. Adding to the bickering, a bill was passed creating the state of Arunachal Pradesh, a territory that China claims in its entirety.
The indian military re-occupied Hathung La ridge, across Namka Chu, twenty-five years after vacating it. Army chief K. Sundarji airlifted an entire brigade to nearby Ximithang, alarming the panicked Chinese.
In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian bilateral Peace and Tranquillity Accords, an agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC. Several meetings of Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) have taken place to determine where the LAC.
But the biggest 'mystery' of 1962 is the non-use of offensive air power by India. The whole conflict was run as a personal show by Kaul and there was very little co-ordination with the air force. At that time the Chinese had barely two airfields in Tibet and their fighter aircraft were decidedly inferior to India's British-made Hunters.
The Indian Air Force was guaranteed virtual air superiority on the battlefield. With air power on its side, India could have overcome the tactical disadvantage of lack of artillery in Ladakh and could have intercepted the foot and mule columns of the Chinese in Tawang area (like it did during the Kargil conflict in 1999). But such was the irrational fear of Chinese retaliation against Indian cities that India did not use its air power.
This fear of danger to cities was a result of panic in Calcutta... The only long-range aircraft the Chinese had at that time was the Ilyushin 24, operating at extreme ranges. The Indian Air Force with its network of airfields in the East (thanks to World War II) was well capable of dealing with it.
Right till the end, Krishna Menon was in favour of use of air power, but was overruled by a leadership that had lost its nerve. Use of offensive air power could have tilted the balance on the ground and boosted the morale of our troops. The morale factor is of great importance as essentially even the Sela disaster was due to loss of morale.
Originally posted by Stealth Spy
Chinawhite read what you post...that source does'nt talk about the 1962 indo-chiana war but simply talks of the annexation of tibet by china in 1952.
The 1962 war is totally different.Neheru had visited china in 1961 and signed a freindship pact with Mao.
But Mao soon backstabbed by by launching the shameless attack. Neheru, an apostle of non-violence refused to use the indian air force which was superior to the chinese one, on the grounds of non-violence.
But china buckled under international pressure and later resitance from the re-organised indian army.China was forced to withdraw from most parts.
But china maintained it reacted to indian provacation, a notion which was dismissed by international observers. Britain too condemed Chian as an "aggressor".
[edit on 21-5-2005 by Stealth Spy]
But china maintained it reacted to indian provacation, a notion which was dismissed by international observers
Originally posted by chinawhite
no chinese government ever reconized the McMahon line as the border.
BEIJING: China on Tuesday expressed astonishment at Indian media reports alleging that its troops intruded into Indian territory last week, with a senior official expressing the hope that both Beijing and New Delhi could find a mutually acceptable solution to the boundary dispute based on the political guidelines reached last month.
Originally posted by Stealth Spy
this is the universally accepted truth about the war, the world over. even china had the same story, with some minor alterations on its troop losses.
Even USA condemned china as an aggressor and started supplying stuff to india.
all the info is from a link in the same website you posted earlier from..go check it out....
BTW : china infilitrated into india just a few days, back
[edit on 21-5-2005 by Stealth Spy]
universally accepted truth
Originally posted by chinawhite
i have asked for links and you haven't given one