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originally posted by: Kandinsky
Nobody would sit on a 'smoking gun' if they were ethical and the information was significant and credible.
originally posted by: Kandinsky
a reply to: EightAhoy
What could possibly need 83gb? Movies run from 700mb and low-res YT vids can be downloaded at ~100mb. Documents even less.
If you think about it, a 'smoking gun' wouldn't need anything like 83gb.
Nobody would sit on a 'smoking gun' if they were ethical and the information was significant and credible.
originally posted by: anonentity
a reply to: roadgravel
Try some thing relevant from 1984. That's the sort of thing that he would use.
originally posted by: Alchemst7
Does anyone remember right around the US elections a memo or video from Wikileaks that there will be another release of documents on Christmas Eve (2016) that will be some of the most incriminating leaks they have? I tried searching google and ATS but with no luck to referencing to what I vaguely remember hearing.
originally posted by: roadgravel
a reply to: Kandinsky
I wondered also when I saw that size. Makes me think there is a lot fluff in there also. But then, who knows.
The size becomes prohibited for many people.
Anyone whose life, freedom, and livlihood was at stake would certainly have reason to sit on said information and use it as a sword of Damoclese, hanging over his enemys' heads.
originally posted by: Kandinsky
a reply to: EightAhoy
Could be anything. Maybe JA has uploaded it to protect himself and it contains nothing of significance? A bluff.
originally posted by: EightAhoy
originally posted by: Kandinsky
a reply to: EightAhoy
Could be anything. Maybe JA has uploaded it to protect himself and it contains nothing of significance? A bluff.
I wonder if these are posted when *new* leaks arrive, and the insurance aspect is "here it is in case something happens to WL before we can disseminate, verify, and post."
In any case, one interview between Assange and Google's Eric Scmidt from 2011 shined some light on the controversial storage of such sensitive information.
"We openly distribute encrypted backups of materials that we view are highly sensitive that we are to publish in the coming year," Assange said.
"Ideally, we will never reveal the key [...] redactions sometimes need to be done on this material."
www.ibtimes.co.uk...
originally posted by: Kettu
The key is out there. Most discussions about how/where it is seem to get nuked though.
It looks as if the entire mass of U.S. diplomatic cables that WikiLeaks had is available online somewhere. How this came about is a good illustration of how security can go wrong in ways you don't expect.
Near as I can tell, this is what happened:
- In order to send the Guardian the cables, WikiLeaks encrypted them and put them on its website at a hidden URL.
- WikiLeaks sent the Guardian the URL.
- WikiLeaks sent the Guardian the encryption key.
- The Guardian downloaded and decrypted the file.
- WikiLeaks removed the file from their server.
- Somehow, the encrypted file ends up on BitTorrent. Perhaps someone found the hidden URL, downloaded the file, and then uploaded it to BitTorrent. Perhaps it is the "insurance file." I don't know.
- The Guardian published a book about WikiLeaks. Thinking the decryption key had no value, it published the key in the book.
- A reader used the key from the book to decrypt the archive from BitTorrent, and published the decrypted version: all the U.S. diplomatic cables in unredacted form.
Memo to the Guardian: Publishing encryption keys is almost always a bad idea. Memo to WikiLeaks: Using the same key for the Guardian and for the insurance file -- if that's what you did -- was a bad idea.
EDITED TO ADD (9/1): From pp 138-9 of WikiLeaks:
Assange wrote down on a scrap of paper: ACollectionOfHistorySince_1966_ToThe_PresentDay#. "That's the password," he said. "But you have to add one extra word when you type it in. You have to put in the word 'Diplomatic' before the word 'History'. Can you remember that?"
EDITED TO ADD (9/1): WikiLeaks says that the Guardian file and the insurance file are not encrypted with the same key. Which brings us back to the question: how did the encrypted Guardian file get loose?
www.schneier.com...
edit on 12/24/2016 by roadgravel because: (no reason given)
Apparently, when Wikileaks' presence was attacked by Lieberman and his ilk, the encrypted Guardian archive made it into the mirroring kit. possibly the document collection was arranged somewhat hastily and Assange didn't even realize first what was in there.
That mirroring kit was then distributed as one big torrent, thus irrevocably distributing the encrypted guardian archive.
So once the Guardian book came out, everything was sitting there in plain sight.
And it gets worse. Apparently, at some point in time the people around Daniel Domscheidt-Berg - the disgruntled ex-Wikileaks architect - realized what had happened there - and sat on that knowledge. But when the mud slinging contest between DDB and Assange escalated they tipped off the press - namely a "Der Freitag" reporter.
"Der Freitag" is a young magazine still trying to make a name for itself. So when they got this scoop, they of course published a very thinly veiled version of the story.
Soon people started adding 2 and 2, and voilà - we have unencrypted Cablegate archives.