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Originally posted by HowardRoark
The only think that "allowed" Pearl Harbor to happen was hubris, arrogance, and racial streotyping.
Much like America in August, 2001. It was unthinkable for that attacks to happen, so no one planned to prevent them.
The only people that knew in advance what was going to happen were the Japanese.
www.rationalrevolution.net...
The McCollum Memo
9. It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following course of action is suggested:
A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the
vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue
economic concessions, particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.
10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.
H. McCollum
On November 26, 1941 Secretary of State Hull presented "peace terms" to the Japanese. The terms presented by Hull were such that in order for Japan to agree to them they would have had to withdraw from China, and essentially end all hostilities, something that the administration knew was not going to happen....
Of Hull's presentation to Japan, the American Ambassador to Japan stated that it was: "The document that touched the button that started the war."
After the Hull presentation to the Japanese, this warning was issued on November 27, 1941, 10 days prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. This memo clearly shows that an attack was suspected, but the nature of the attack was unknown and in fact the primary suspicion was that an attack would occur west of Hawaii.
FDR did intentionally see that important intelligence information was kept from commanders. This was done so that the commanders would not defy orders and take actions that may have prevented an attack on American forces. He was trying to provoke an attack, but he intended to notify American forces if he gained knowledge of an impending attack....
What is most important about the Pearl Harbor incident is understanding why FDR resorted to such measures in the first place to get into war.
Congress was not letting FDR get into the war in Europe or the Pacific. This is partly because many of the members of Congress were backed by wealthy Americans who were working with the fascist powers of Europe. America had significant financial ties to the fascist powers at the time of WWII, and the European fascists were backed by private Americans as an anti-Communist force....
American businessmen had been supplying the fascist powers with oil and FDR was finally advised to embargo the trade of oil to the Axis powers in order to help instigate them into declaring war on America as well.
In March of 1941 FDR said to Winston Churchill: "I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war they might argue about it for three months."
On September 11, 1941 fascist sympathizer and famous American pilot Charles Lindbergh of the "America First Committee" proclaimed :"If any one of these groups--the British, the Jewish, or the administration--stops agitating for war, I believe there will be little danger of our involvement."...
In 1944 British Cabinet Minister Sir Oliver Lyttelton noted that: "Japan was
provoked into attacking the Americans at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty on
history ever to say that America was forced into the war. Everyone knows where American sympathies were. It is incorrect to say that America was ever truly neutral even before America came into the war on a fighting basis."
Even after the attack on Pearl Harbor some American isolationists maintained that the US should have done more to "appease" Japan. Just after the Pearl Harbor attack Senator Vandenberg wrote that the United States would have had to yield "relatively little" to pacify Japan. Of Japan he said that "we may have driven her needlessly into hostilities through our dogmatic diplomatic attitudes." "We asked for it, and we got it."...
Pearl Harbor - Mother of All Conspiracies
1932 - In The Grand Joint Army Navy Exercises the attacker, Admiral Yarnell, attacked with 152 planes a half-hour before dawn 40 miles NE of Kahuku Point and caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise.
1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.
7 Oct 1940 - Navy IQ analyst McCollum wrote an 8 point memo on how to force Japan into war with US. Beginning the next day FDR began to put them into effect and all 8 were eventually accomplished....
11 February 1941 - FDR proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2 carriers at
Manila to get into war. Navy Chief Stark objected: "I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom....
23 Jun 1941 - Advisor Harold Ickes wrote FDR a memo the day after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, "There might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it not only possible but easy to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia."...
On July 24 FDR told the Volunteer Participation Committee, "If we had cut off the oil off, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war." The next day FDR froze all Japanese assets in US cutting off their main supply of oil and forcing them into war with the US. Intelligence information was withheld from Hawaii from this point forward.
14 August - At the Atlantic Conference, Churchill noted the "astonishing depth of Roosevelt's intense desire for war." Churchill cabled his cabinet "(FDR)obviously was very determined that they should come in.".
18 October - diary entry by Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes: "For a long
time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan."...
In 1979 the NSA released 2,413 JN-25 orders of the 26,581 intercepted by US between Sept 1 and Dec 4, 1941. The NSA says "We know now that they contained important details concerning the existence, organization, objective, and even the whereabouts of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force."
FDR was personally briefed twice a day on JN-25 traffic by his
aide, Captain John Beardell, and demanded to see the original raw messages in English. The US Government refuses to identify or declassify any pre-Dec 7, 1941 decrypts of JN-25 on the basis of national security, a half-century after the war.
Magic - the security designation given to all decoded Japanese diplomatic
messages. It's hard not to conclude with historians like Charles Bateson that "Magic standing alone points so irresistibly to the Pearl Harbor attack that it is inconceivable anybody could have failed to forecast the Japanese move." The NSA reached the same conclusion in 1955.
Ultra - the security designation for military codes. No Pearl Harbor
investigation discussed Ultra even though on June 7, 1942 the Chicago Tribune and six other newspapers betrayed the fact we were reading JN-25.
27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This information was sent to the State Department and Naval Intelligence and to Admiral Kimmel at Hawaii.
10 July - US Military Attache Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay closely resembles Pearl Harbor.
July - The US Military Attache in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
10 August 1941, the top British agent, code named "Tricycle", Dusko Popov, told the FBI of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it would be soon. The FBI told him that his information was "too precise, too complete to be believed....
10 July - US Military Attache Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay closely resembles Pearl Harbor.
July - The US Military Attache in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
10 August 1941, the top British agent, code named "Tricycle", Dusko Popov, told the FBI of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it would be soon. The FBI told him that his information was "too precise, too complete to be believed.
Kilsoo Haan, an agent for the Sino-Korean People's League, told Eric Severeid of CBS that the Korean underground in Korea and Japan had positive proof that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor before Christmas. Among other things, one Korean had actually seen the plans. In late October, Haan finally convinced US Senator Guy Gillette that the Japanese were planning to attack in December or January. Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and Navy Intelligence and FDR personally. 24 September 1941, the " bomb plot" message in J-19 code from Japan Naval Intelligence to Japan' s consul general in Honolulu requesting grid of exact locations of ships pinpointed for the benefit of bombardiers and torpedo pilots was deciphered. There was no reason to know the EXACT location of ships in harbor, unless to attack them - it was a dead giveaway. Chief of War Plans Turner and Chief of Naval Operations Stark repeatedly kept it and warnings based on it prepared by Safford and others from being passed to Hawaii. The chief of Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was replaced because he insisted on warning HI....
Why the Roosevelt administration allowed flagrant Japanese spying on PH has never been explained, but they blocked 2 Congressional investigations in the fall of 1941 to allow it to continue.
Oct. - Soviet top spy Richard Sorge, the greatest spy in history, informed Kremlin that Pearl Harbor would be attacked within 60 days. Moscow informed him that this was passed to the US. Interestingly, all references to Pearl Harbor in the War Department's copy of Sorge's 32,000 word confession to the Japanese were deleted. NY Daily News, 17 May 1951.
13 Nov. - The German Ambassador to US, Dr. Thomsen an anti-Nazi, told OSS that Pearl Harbor would be attacked.
CIA Director Allen Dulles told people that US was warned in mid-November that the Japanese Fleet had sailed east past Tokyo Bay and was going to attack Pearl Harbor. FOIA #F-1998-00977.
5 Nov. - British decrypted the Winds setup message sent Nov. 19. The US decoded it Nov. 28. It was a J-19 Code message that there would be an attack and that the signal would come over Radio Tokyo as a weather report - rain meaning war, east (Higashi) meaning US.
25 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary "FDR stated that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday." FDR asked: "the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves.
25 Nov. - Navy Department ordered all US trans-Pacific shipping to take the southern route. PHH 12:317 ADM Turner testified "We sent the traffic down to the Torres Straight, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic." PHH 4:1942
This was decoded by the British on November 25 and the Dutch on November 27. When it was decoded by the US is a national secret, however, on November 26 Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action.
26 Nov. 3 A.M. - Churchill sent an urgent secret message to FDR, probably containing above message. This message caused the greatest agitation in DC. Of Churchill's voluminous correspondence with FDR, this is the only message that has not been released (on the grounds that it would damage national security). Stark testified that "On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese intention to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States." C.I.A. Director William Casey, who was in the OSS in 1941, in his book THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HITLER, p 7, wrote "The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii." Washington, in an order of Nov 26, ordered both US aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as possible". This order included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter protection.
29 Nov. - Hull sat in Layfayette Park across from the White House with ace United Press reporter Joe Leib and showed him a message stating that Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 7. This could well have been the Nov. 26 message from Churchill. The New York Times in its 12/8/41 PH report on page 13 under the headline "Attack Was Expected" stated the US had known that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked the week before. Perhaps Leib wasn't the only reporter Hull told.
1 Dec. - Office of Naval Intelligence, ONI, Twelfth Naval District in San Francisco found the missing Japanese fleet by correlating reports from the
four wireless news services and several shipping companies that they were getting strange signals west of Hawaii. The Soviet Union also knew the exact location of the Japanese fleet because they asked the Japanese in advance to let one of their ships pass (Layton p 261). This info was most likely given to them by US because Sorge's spy ring was rolled up November 14. All long-range PBY patrols from the Aleutians were ordered stopped on Dec 6 to prevent contact.
4 Dec. - In the early hours, Ralph Briggs at the Navy's East Coast Intercept station, received the "East Winds, Rain" message, the Winds Execute, which meant war. He put it on the TWX circuit immediately and called his commander. This message was deleted from the files. One of the main coverups of Pearl Harbor was to make this message disappear. Japanese Dispatch # 7001. In response to the Winds Execute, the Office of US Naval IQ had all Far Eastern stations (Hawaii not informed) destroy their codes and classified documents including the Tokyo Embassy.
4 Dec. - Kilsoo Haan called Maxwell Hamilton at the State Department and told him that the Korean underground had information that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor the coming weekend.
4 Dec. - The Dutch invoked the ADB joint defense agreement when the Japanese crossed the magic line of 100 East and 10 North. The U.S. was at war with Japan 3 days before they were at war with us.
4 Dec. - General Ter Poorten sent all the details of the Winds Execute command to Colonel Weijerman, the Dutch military attache' in Washington to pass on to the highest military circles. Weijerman personally gave it to Marshall, Chief of Staff of the War Department.
4 Dec - US General Thorpe at Java sent four messages warning of the PH attack. DC ordered him to stop sending warnings. 5 Dec. - All Japanese international shipping had returned to home port. 5 December - In the morning FDR dictated a letter to Wendell Wilkie for the Australian Prime Minister, "There is always the Japanese to consider. The situation is definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment...Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the matters."...
5 Dec. - Washington Star reporter Constantine Brown quotes a friend in his book The Coming of the Whirlwind p 291, "This is it! The Japs are ready to attack. We've broken their code, and we've read their ORDERS." ...
7 December 1941 very early Washington time, there were two Marines, an emergency special detail, stationed outside the Japanese Naval Attache's door. 9:30 AM Aides begged Stark to send a warning to Hawaii. He did not. 10 AM FDR read the 14th part, 11 A.M. FDR read the 15th part setting the time for the declaration of war to be delivered to the State Department at 1 PM, about dawn Pearl Harbor time, and did nothing. Navy Secretary Knox was given the 15th part at 11:15 A.M. with this note from the Office of Naval IQ: "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today." Naval IQ also transmitted this prediction to Hull and about 8 others, including the White House...
7 December - 9 hours later, MacArthur's entire air force was caught by surprise and wiped out in the Philippines. His reaction to the news of Pearl Harbor was quite unusual - he locked himself in his room all morning and refused to meet with his air commander General Brereton, and refused to attack Japanese forces on Formosa even under orders from the War Department. MacArthur gave three conflicting orders that ensured the planes were on the ground most of the morning. MacArthur used radar tracking of the Japanese planes at 140, 100, 80, 60, down to 20 miles to time his final order and ensure his planes were on the ground. Strategically, the destruction of half of all US heavy bombers in the world was more important than naval damage in Pearl Harbor. Either MacArthur had committed the greatest blunder in military history or he was under orders to allow his forces to be destroyed. If it were the greatest blunder in history, it is remarkable how he escaped any reprimand, kept his command and got his fourth star and Congressional Medal of Honor shortly later.
The US government had nine official enquiries into the attack � the inquiry by Secretary of the Navy Knox (1941), the Roberts Commission (1941�42), the Hart Inquiry (1944), the Army Pearl Harbor Board (1944), the Naval Court of Inquiry (1944), the Hewitt investigation, the Clarke investigation, the Congressional Inquiry (1945�46) and the top-secret inquiry by Secretary Stimson authorized by Congress and carried out by Henry Clausen (the Clausen Inquiry (1945)).
Moreover, the notion that Kimmel, if only properly warned, would have taken action is, to use Stinnett's phraseology, difficult to believe. Rochefort told Kimmel on October 22 that Japan was in the midst of a large-scale "screening maneuver," and while Hitokappu Bay references (where supposedly the Japanese fleet was to stage for its Pearl Harbor attack) were deleted from the messages passed to Kimmel to conceal American decoding success, Stinnett again takes this as denying the Admiral critical information. But Stinnett misses the key phrases---it wasn't the starting point that was important, but the "screening" mission that convinced Kimmel that this indicated "a move from Japan proper to the south." On my Rand-McNally, Hawaii is due east of Japan. Singapore is south.
J. Edgar Hoover told his friends in early 1942 that FDR had known about the Pearl Harbor plan since the early fall. It was totally in character for FDR to concoct such a plan. Not only had the US Senate already censured FDR for utterly lacking moral perspective, but as Walter Lippmann wrote: "his purposes are not simple and his methods are not direct." To get into the war, FDR used the Atlantic Fleet as bait to be shot up; Pearl Harbor was the same thing in the Pacific. US Admiral Bloch testified "The Japanese only destroyed a lot of old hardware. In a sense they did us a favor." This was obviously FDR's view as well, because on 7 December at 2:15 PM, minutes after hearing of the attack and before any damage reports were in, FDR called Lord Halifax at the British Embassy and told him "Most of the fleet was at sea...none of their newer ships were in harbour."
Why does the government refuse to release all the messages
to the attack fleet, or any JN-25 messages decoded before Dec 7? There is
absolutely nothing about national security to hide in JN-25. It is a trivial and worthless 19th century code. The techniques for cracking it had been published world-wide in 1931.
In November FDR ordered the Red Cross Disaster Relief director to secretly
prepare for massive casualties at Pearl Harbor because he was going to let it be attacked. When he protested to the President, President Roosevelt told him that "the American people would never agree to enter the war in Europe unless they were attack [sic] within their own borders." See U.S. Naval Institute - Naval History - Advance Warning? The Red Cross Connection by Daryl S. Borgquist CHURCHILL--FDR KNEW.
The US was warned by, at least, the governments of Britain, Netherlands,
Australia, Peru, Korea and the Soviet Union that a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor was coming. All important Japanese codes were broken. FDR and Marshall and others knew the attack was coming, allowed it and covered up their knowledge. It's significant that both the the chief of OP-20-G Safford and Friedman of Army SIS, the two people in the world that knew what we decoded, said that FDR knew Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked.
Stark, in answer to charges that he denied IQ to Hawaii, publicly offerred a Nuremberg defense in August 1945 that everything he did pre-Dec 7, 1941 was on FDR's orders. The handfull of military men in DC responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor were directly under the control of FDR and were later promoted and protected from investigation; promoted with FDR's full knowledge that they were responsible for not warning Hawaii. On the record, Intelligence tried to warn HI scores of times but were prevented by FDR's men.
Oct, 1944, "Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War, and Navy Departments in all of their Top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack. " In response to this report, Marshall offered his resignation - the sign of a guilty conscience. Marshall testified at the MacArthur hearings that he considered loyalty to his chief superior to loyalty to his country.
Two and only two courts of law have decided the issue of whether FDR and
Washington or the commanders in Hawaii were responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster. Both the Navy Court and the Army Board found Washington guilty (in 1944).
-NAVY Court of Inquiry
Note that none of the 3 diplomatic messages or the many naval messages
identifying Pearl as the target were forwarded (not to mention HUMINT).
Only 5 of the 74 Navy IQ packets delivered to FDR in the 2 weeks before
Dec 7 can be found.
December - In a conversation with his speechwriter Rosenman, FDR "emphasized that Hitler was still the first target, but he feared that a great many Americans would insist that we make the war in the Pacific at least equally important with the war against Hitler."
Later, Jonathan Daniels, administrative assistant and press secretary to FDR said, "The blow was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be...But the risks paid off; even the loss was worth the price..."
FDR reminisced with Stalin at Tehran on November 30, 1943, saying "if the Japanese had not attacked the US he doubted very much if it would have been possible to send any American forces to Europe." Compare this statement with what FDR said at the Atlantic Conference 4 months before Pearl: "Everything was to be done to force an 'incident' to justify hostitlities." Given that a Japanese attack was the only possible incident, then FDR had said he would do it.
as posted by twitchy
Here's a few more fallacies you can debunk seekerof.
Collected here are documents from the 23 volume, 40 part, 25,000 page report of HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS which was released on July 20, 1946.
Here are transcripts of the intercepted text of part 1 and also part 5 of the 14 part message from Tokyo to Washington, 6/7 December 1941.
The transcript of a super-enciphered PURPLE message from 1941 can be found here.
RE: Pearl Harbor Attack, December 7, 1941
I. Did President Roosevelt know that war with Japan was imminent?
II. Did Roosevelt know the date the war would start?
III. Did Roosevelt know that Pearl Harbor was the main Japanese
target?
as posted by Twitchy
As to quoting my sources for my prior post, had you read my source with some retention, you would have recognised the information as being from the self same source as I have been quoting all along. For your benefit however, I'll edit the post and provide the same link.
as posted by seekerof
Second, since the ATS server was being transitioned over to a new server, I had an abundant amount of time today to spend looking at revisionist claims and assertions and those based on historical fact, fact based on historical documents, inquiries, hearings, etc.
as posted by Twitchy
If the official story is all you are going to base your arguement on, then Why are you even on a conspiracy site, honestly... You'd get more truth from a stump.
7 December - 1:50 P.M. Washington time. Harry Hopkins, who was the only person with FDR when he received the news of the attack by telephone from Knox, wrote that FDR was unsurprised and expressed "great relief." Eleanor Roosevelt wrote about December 7th in This I Remember p 233, that FDR became "in a way more serene." In the NY Times Magazine of October 8, 1944 she wrote: "December 7 was...far from the shock it proved to the country in general. We had expected something of the sort for a long time."
Pearl
Originally posted by Seekerof
And as stated FredT, FDR, along with the General Staff of the combined armed forces in the Pacific theatre also expected an attack. Again, the intelligence indicating the place and time is where?
1932 - In The Grand Joint Army Navy Exercises the attacker, Admiral Yarnell, attacked with 152 planes a half-hour before dawn 40 miles NE of Kahuku Point and caught the defenders of Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.
1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in another exercise.
1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue personally with FDR in October and he was soon after replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the same issues with FDR in June 1941.
www.whatreallyhappened.com...
as posted by FredT
NSA's predicessor agency does have a large number of intercepts that have never been declassified and there is evidence that the entire series of Japanese codes were cracked and U.S. intell was reading most traffic.
I do agree that perhaps the exact time of the attack was not known, but that it was iminent is an open question mark. The other point is I doubt highly that if such evidence existed it would NEVER be declassified.
It is well established that the SRN series of Japanese naval messages in the National Archives were decrypted in 1945-46 and translated in 1946-47, but Stinnett incorrectly suggests they may only have been transcribed at those times and that these decrypts (or at least some of them) were available not only in radio intelligence centers in Washington, but Stations Hypo (Rochefort) in Hawaii and Cast on Corregidor. Among other things, the book misinterprets an article by Captain Pelletier in the "Cryptolog." Even though Pelletier is now dead, he also wrote in the NCVA History Book that all such JN-25B raw messages were two months old by the time he saw them in Washington and that no Kido Butai transmissions while enroute from the Kuriles to Hawaii were ever found before or after 7 December 1941. Further, the book fails to inform its readers that Rochefort and his Hypo personnel were only assigned to and only worked on the unproductive Flag Officer's Code and not the main Japanese Fleet Code JN-25B as well as the fact that they were only given the go ahead to work on JN-25B a few days or so after the Pearl Harbor attack. As mentioned before, Stinnett also omits the well known information that JN-25B intercepts from Corregidor, Guam and Station H were only forwarded to Washington by mail and took up to two months to arrive mostly by ship and rail. Thus, even Washington's alleged 10 percent capability on JN-25B decrypts had not even begun to be applied to the November and December 1941 intercepts enroute there while Stinnett maintains they were available to all commanders except of course Kimmel and Short due to FDR's co-conspirators.
--snip--
In conclusion, it is still clear that no U.S. official knew beforehand of the Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor or discovered that the Kido Butai was on its way to Hawaii for such an attack in spite of this latest in a series of revisionist conspiracy theory books.
history.acusd.edu...
January 27, 1941 Joseph C. Grew, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, wired Washington that he had learned information that Japan, in the event of trouble with the U.S., was planning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
As the Japanese were conducting preliminary planing for the attack, Americans were preparing to defend American property. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prepared Hawaii for attack. Defence of the islands was an Army responsibility though the Navy did play a major role in preparing to repel an attack.
Adm. Kimmel planed on taking his fleet out of the harbor and confronting the enemy at sea.
With this in mind both officers communicated with their seniors in Washington attempting to obtain additional men and equipment to insure a proper defence of all military instillations on Oahu.
www.microworks.net...
It is important to emphasize the lack of any formal distribution procedures to inform responsible fleet commanders of the intelligence information being gleaned from decrypts of Japanese communications. In the Navy, this was complicated by the self appointed intelligence expert of then Captain Richmond K. Turner known as “Terrible Turner”, the new head of the Navy’s War Plans department of CNO. The weakness of Admiral Stark as CNO let Turner completely usurp the functions of ONI and DNC to fulfill their responsibilities to properly warn fleet commanders of the impending Japanese actions based on the Purple diplomatic decrypts and other indicators. More serious war warning messages and a more accurate picture of the current situation as indicated by Japanese decrypts that were advocated by Captain Laurence Stafford as OP-20-G, Admiral Noyes DNC, and the acting Director of Intelligence (DNI), Captain Kirk, were forestalled or greatly watered down by Turner. One excuse Turner tried to give for such perfunctory warnings was that Pearl Harbor had all the Japanese diplomatic decrypts, which was false....
The new DNI Theodore S. Wilkinson refused to challenge Turner’s rebuff of a further specific war warning drafted by Captain Arthur H. McCollum on 5 December. Again on 6 December, Stafford tried again but was dismissed by Noyes so as not to antagonize Turner. On the Army side, General George G. Marshall and intermediaries vetoed similar requests made by Colonels Rufus S. Bratton and Otis K. Sadtler. Later, Marshall denied receiving the related decrypts. As Washington politics go, both Stafford, Bratton and Sadtler were relegated to rather minor posts and discredited, while Noyes and Turner were given prime advancement billets and promotions.
www.independent.org...
The latter question was answered in the affirmative last year on October 30, 2000, when President Bill Clinton signed a defense appropriations bill containing congressional findings that both Kimmel and Short were denied crucial military intelligence.However, despite the numerous pardons he issued shortly before leaving office, President Clinton deferred to the Pentagon’s long-standing policy against posthumously restoring the commanders to their 1941 ranks. Nonetheless, the congressional findings should be widely seen as an exoneration of years of blame assigned to Kimmel and Short....
At least 1,000 Japanese radio messages per day were intercepted by monitoring stations operated by the U.S. and her Allies, and the message contents were summarized for the White House. The intercept summaries from Station CAST on Corregidor Island were current—contrary to the assertions of some who claim that the messages were not decoded and translated until years later—and they were clear: Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 7, 1941, by Japanese forces advancing through the Central and North Pacific Oceans.
www.apfn.org...
On 5 December 1941 at a Cabinet meeting, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox said, “Well, you know Mr. President, we know where the Japanese fleet is?” “Yes, I know, …Well, you tell them what it is Frank,” said Roosevelt (Toland 294). Knox became extremely excited with the ok from Roosevelt, and he went to tell the group of where the Japanese were and where they were headed. Just as Knox was about to speak Roosevelt interrupted saying, “ We haven’t got anything like perfect information as to their apparent destination (Toland 294).” All Navy reports showed the Japanese were in Pacific Water, and were in a direction towards Hawaii and Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt knew this information, but one must wonder why in the world would he not want to tell his cabinet this information, unless he wanted to hide something? On 6 December 1941 at a White House dinner Roosevelt was given the first thirteen parts of a fifteen part decoded Japanese diplomatic declaration of war and said, “This means War (Toland 318).”
Later that night, Roosevelt along with top advisor Harry Hopkins, Henry Stimson, George Marshall, Secretary of the Navy Knox, with aides John McCrea and Frank Beatty deliberately sat through the night waiting for the Japanese to strike Pear Harbor (Toland 320). Not until the morning of 7 December 1941 at 7:55 Hawaii Time did Japan deliberately and forcefully attack the United States at Pearl Harbor, finally ending disillusioned isolationist ideas of an only European War. United States countrymen immediately ran to recruiting offices after the news of the attack, to join the armed forces and fight against the Japanese and Hitler....
The operating Pearl Harbor attack story long has been that the Japanese Navy task force, commanded by Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, kept strict radio silence as the fleet crossed the Northern Pacific en route to Pearl. That's what really happened, Kahn said. No wonder.
``Central to the surprise [attack] was the radio silence of the strike force,'' Kahn says. ``The Japanese commanders and radio operators alike, say unanimously they never transmitted any messages.''
He adds that the Japanese code at that time, labeled JN 25, by the United States, had not been cracked, and U.S. intelligence summaries produced in Hawaii stated there was no information on submarines or carriers.
Now it's Stinnett who is scoffing.
Sitting in his basement office in his house near Lake Merritt, he pulls out a sheaf of photocopied message intercepts from the days and hours before the Pearl Harbor attack. All were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act in May of this year.
The intercepts show that American radio operators in Hawaii, Corregidor in the Phillippines and near Half Moon Bay here in the Bay Area tracked the Japanese fleet before the Pearl Harbor attack. The information went to Washington - but it never reached the two key commanders in Hawaii, Stinnett said.
www.oilempire.us...
British Prime Minister Churchill notified his Pacific commanders that the Japanese were heading for Pearl Harbor. FDR, on the other hand, did not notify his commanders. Instead, he sent the most strategic ships (the aircraft carriers) out to sea where they would be safe, and instructed key observation outposts on the island of Kauai to stand down.
www.lewrockwell.com...
It is now clear that FDR did know the Japanese attack was coming. He knew more than a year in advance of Japanese plans to bomb the United States’ Pacific fleet at Pearl, and he knew more than a week before that the attack would come early Sunday morning. He knew because American naval intelligence had cracked the Japanese naval codes in the early fall of 1940, 15 months before the fateful attack.
www.carpenoctem.tv...
It may not have been such a surprise to Generals George C. Marshall and Leonard T. Gerow and Admirals Harold R. Stark and Richmond Kelly Turner. They were the military's top brass in Washington and the only officers authorized to forward such sensitive intelligence to outlying commanders. But the decoded war declaration did not reach Kimmel and Short until the morning, with the attack well underway off in the Pacific. Marshall and Stark, supreme commanders of the U.S. Army and Navy respectively, later testified that the message was not forwarded to Kimmel and Short because the Hawaiian commanders had received so many intercepted Japanese messages that another one would simply confuse them....
There were eight investigations of Pearl Harbor altogether. The most spectacular was a joint House-Senate probe that reiterated the Roberts Commission findings. At those hearings, Marshall and Stark testified, incredibly, that they could not remember where they were the night the war declaration came in. But a close friend of Frank Knox, the secretary of the Navy, later revealed that Knox, Stark, and Marshall spent most of that night in the White House with Roosevelt awaiting the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the chance for America to join World War II. A widespread coverup ensued. A few days after Pearl Harbor, reports historian John Toland, Marshall told his top officers, "Gentlemen, this goes to the grave with us."...
Completely apart from the cloak and dagger of cryptography, the Australian intelligence service, three days before the attack, spotted the Japanese fleet of aircraft carriers heading for Hawaii. A warning went to Washington where it was dismissed by Roosevelt as a politically motivated rumor circulated by Republicans. A British double agent, Dusko Popov, who siphoned information from Germany, learned of the Japanese intentions and desperately tried to warn Washington, to no avail. And there were others.