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I was replying to the OP. There is nothing anyone can contribute to this topic that is not already known to me.
as i said , acttacking the infrastructure of the entire operation was viable IF the allies wanted to - but as you said yourself a form of ` dont ask don`t tell` was in force , do not publically acknowledge it and maybe the problem would go away.
Originally posted by Harlequin
they could have attacked them , the rail lines , and later the crematoria and gas chambers - but didnt.
they could have attacked them , the rail lines , and later the crematoria and gas chambers - but didnt.
November 24, 1942 — U.S. State Department confirms the existence of Nazi extermination camps and the murder of two million Jews to date. Rabbi Stephen Wise holds press conference to announce that the Nazis were deporting Jews throughout German-occupied territory to Poland for mass slaughter. The news makes little impact as the next day's New York Times reported this news on its tenth page. Throughout the rest of the war, the N.Y. Times and most other newspapers failed to give prominent and extensive coverage to the Holocaust.
May 31, 1944 — Aerial reconnaissance photograph taken of the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp, by the U.S. Army Air Force's 8th Division. The U.S. had aerial reconnaissance photos of Auschwitz as early as April 4, 1944. Go here for more information.
Whether precision bombing of the crematoria and gas chambers was possible, and whether that would have stopped the Nazis from committing further murders at Auschwitz, is one of history’s unanswered questions.
First to the historical issues: The question of bombing Auschwitz first arose in the summer of 1944, more than two years after the gassing of Jews had begun and at a time when more than 90 percent of the Jews who were killed in the Holocaust were already dead. It could not have arisen earlier because not enough was known specifically about Auschwitz, and the camps were outside the range of Allied bombers. By June 1944 information concerning the camps and their function was available—or could have been made available—to those undertaking the mission. German air defenses were weakened, and the accuracy of Allied bombing was increasing. All that was required was the political will to order the bombing.
Bombing a concentration camp filled with innocent, unjustly imprisoned civilians posed a moral dilemma for the Allies. To be willing to sacrifice innocent civilians, one would have had to perceive accurately conditions in the camp and to presume that interrupting the killing process would be worth the loss of life in Allied bombings. In short, one would have had to know that those in the camps were about to die. Such information was not available until the spring of 1944.
The Vrba-Wetzler report provided a clear picture of life and death at Auschwitz. As a result, Jewish leaders in Slovakia, some American Jewish organizations, and the War Refugee Board all urged the Allies to intervene. However, the request was far from unanimous. Jewish leadership was divided. As a general rule, the established Jewish leadership was reluctant to press for organized military action directed specifically to save the Jews. They feared being too overt and encouraging the perception that World War II was a “Jewish war.” Zionists, recent immigrants, and Orthodox Jews were more willing to press for specific efforts to save the Jews. Their voices, however, were more marginal than those of the established Jewish leadership, and their attempts were even less effective.
It would be a mistake to assume that anti-Semitism or indifference to the plight of the Jews—while present—was the primary cause of the refusal to support bombing. The issue is more complex. On June 11, 1944, the Jewish Agency executive committee meeting in Jerusalem refused to call for the bombing of Auschwitz. Jewish leadership in Palestine was clearly neither anti-Semitic nor indifferent to the situation of their brethren. David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the executive committee, said, “We do not know the truth concerning the entire situation in Poland and it seems that we will be unable to propose anything concerning this matter.” Ben-Gurion and his colleagues were concerned that bombing the camps could kill many Jews—or even one Jew. Although no specific documentation reversing the decision of June 11 has been found, officials of the Jewish Agency were forcefully calling for the bombing by July.
not the infrastructure of the country - the extermination camps -thats what i meant , that they knew about the camps as early as 1942 , but did nothing. they could have attacked them , the rail lines , and later the crematoria and gas chambers - but didnt.
Requests were made to both American and British officials to bomb Auschwitz. Similarly they were asked to come to the aid of the Poles in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 by bombing the city. Yet the Americans denied the requests to bomb Auschwitz, citing several reasons: military resources could not be diverted from the war effort (as they were to support the non-Jewish Poles); bombing Auschwitz might prove ineffective; and bombing might provoke even more vindictive German action. On the other hand, the Americans did not claim that Auschwitz was outside the range of the most effective American bombers. In fact, as early as May 1944 the U.S. Army Air Forces had the capability to strike Auschwitz at will. The rail lines from Hungary were also well within range, though for rail-line bombing to be effective it had to be sustained. On July 7, 1944, American bombers flew over the rail lines to Auschwitz. On August 20, 127 B-17s, with an escort of 100 P-51 fighter craft, dropped 1,336 500-pound bombs on the IG Farben synthetic-oil factory that was less than 5 miles (8 km) east of Birkenau. German oil reserves were a priority American target, and the Farben plant ranked high on the target list. The death camp remained untouched. It should be noted that military conditions imposed some restrictions on any effort to bomb Auschwitz. For the bombing to be feasible, it had to be undertaken by day in good weather and between July and October 1944.
In August, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy wrote to Leon Kubowitzki of the World Jewish Congress, noting that the War Refugee Board had asked if it was possible to bomb Auschwitz. McCloy responded: After a study it became apparent that such an operation could be executed only by the diversion of considerable air support essential to the success of our forces now engaged in decisive operations elsewhere and would in any case be of such doubtful efficacy that it would not warrant the use of our resources. There has been considerable opinion to the effect that such an effort, even if practicable, might provoke even more vindictive action by the Germans. Cremation ovens at the Auschwitz concentration camp, Poland. Archivo Iconográfico, Barcelona, España McCloy’s response remains controversial. There had been no study on bombing Auschwitz. Instead, the War Department had decided in January that army units would not be “employed for the purpose of rescuing victims of enemy oppression” unless a rescue opportunity arose in the course of routine military operations. In February an internal U.S. War Department memo stated, “We must constantly bear in mind, however, that the most effective relief which can be given victims of enemy persecution is to insure the speedy defeat of the Axis.” No documents have been found in the records of the leaders of Army Air Forces considering the possibility of bombing Auschwitz.
n the late 1980s and early ’90s, debate over the issue intensified. Military historians challenged Holocaust historians in an ineffectual debate characterized as the “Dialogue of the Deaf.” In 1993 both Holocaust scholars and military historians of divergent points of view addressed the issue in a symposium at the National Air and Space Museum that marked the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. At issue was the nature of the aircraft that could have been used. Was bombing feasible, and when? From what air fields would the bombers take off, and where would they land? What airplanes would be used? What escorts would be required, and at what cost in men and material? Could lives have been saved and how many? At what cost to the Allies? But in addition to military considerations, political questions were at issue. Did the plight of the Jews matter? To whom and how deeply? Were Jews effective or ineffective in advancing the cause of their brethren abroad? Did they comprehend their plight? Were they compromised by their fears of anti-Semitism or by the fears they shared with American political leaders that the World War would be perceived as a Jewish war? Historians are uncomfortable with the counterfactual speculation “What if…” But such is the debate over bombing Auschwitz.
Those with a basic knowledge of air-to-ground warfare in the WWII era will see the impossibility of preventing the Holocaust by bombing the rail lines. Railroad track can be repaired quickly and easily, and even a knocked out train bridge could be repaired by the Gemans in amazing time. The gas chambers were developed at the behest of Heinrich Himmler who after witnessing a mass execution by machine gun demanded something more efficient. Also, few people realize that the first mid-air refueling was done in 1929. The aircraft, named the Question Mark, set a world record for remaining in the air for 150 hours. Only after the war when Communism became the new enemy was it decided that bombers needed an inflight refeuling capability. Bombing surely could have saved some Holocaust victims, but it also would have killed some in the process. Only an invasion of Germany, delayed until 1945 by the squabbling Allies, could have stopped the Holocaust.
You still have posted any war-time aerial pictures wherein the crematoria and gas chambers can be distinguished....
Originally posted by SLAYER69
reply to post by mf_luder
I do however find it rather odd though that with all the intense aerial surveillance & photographing going on during that period that nobody had spotted them.
But instead of bombing the concentration camps and the railways supplying them, they reacted by first suppressing eye-witness reports and then claiming they were exaggerated.
But instead of bombing the concentration camps and the railways supplying them, they reacted by first suppressing eye-witness reports and then claiming they were exaggerated.
Auschwitz 1944
But instead of bombing the concentration camps and the railways supplying them, they reacted by first suppressing eye-witness reports and then claiming they were exaggerated.
That's because you're thinking with a modern head. A viewer in the early 1940's would never have heard of death camps, and would have no mental concept of such a place existing. Case in point, some newly discovered aerial photos of Auschwitz came to light about 5 years ago. You could even see the smoke coming out of the (what we now know to be) crematorium chimney. Apparently the pictures weren't given any great importance when inititally developed because it was just assumed to be a camp of some kind. So the photos were given the once over and filed away, no further action.
the allies had photo`s taken by the sonderkommando and had photographed the entire place from its contrustion to liberation by the red army.
A photograph taken by an RAF reconnaissance aircraft on August 23, 1944, shows not only the regular ranks of barracks but also smoke rising not from the crematoria but from the pyres burning in mass graves (there is also ground-level documentation from this period in the form of photographs taken clandestinely by members of the Sonderkomando).
By the summer of 1944, detailed information about the true nature of the death camps had reached the West, but it was not until months later that Auschwitz was finally liberated by the advancing Red Army.
Here is the source of the first known camp photo taken in April 1944:
the allies had photo`s taken by the sonderkommando and had photographed the entire place from its contrustion to liberation by the red army.
They simply were not a priority. When the RAF and US were loosing sometimes 1/3 to 1/2 of the bombers in raids over Germany's Industrial and civilian populations do you think they would have risked that kind of losses to attempt a bombing of the walls and fences of a prisoner camp to free the prisoners? Thanks Oatmeal.