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Originally posted by Grommer
Rather, I want to know whether you think that belief in God is the kind of thing that can be rationally supported.
Your response may be based on personal feelings, values, or sentiments, but you must provide good reasons for any claim that you make. In other words, I want you to address the issue by providing either a sound deductive argument or a cogent inductive argument for your view."
Originally posted by Grommer
thanks for the replies. well, I'm pretty sure my professor wants to know is the belief part is rational, not particularly that God exists. Rather, how is the belief rational? Analogy: I have faith that Aliens exist (faith as I define it is a form of hope), therefore, because I have faith, they must exist. Obviously there's plenty of evidence to the contrary. That was the main part of my paper, several analogies, and rhetorical questions. I got a 100% on my last assignment following the same guideline...we'll see what happens.
I'm finding this Philosophy class very interesting. Some of the reading is tough, but still enjoyable. I never realized how deep it can go....
"In light of the arguments, both pro and con, given by Clarke, Mackie, and Descartes, etc., is belief in God rational?
1. I WILL now close my eyes, I will stop my ears, I will turn away my senses from their objects, I will even efface from my consciousness all the images of corporeal things; or at least, because this can hardly be accomplished, I will consider them as empty and false; and thus, holding converse only with myself, and closely examining my nature, I will endeavor to obtain by degrees a more intimate and familiar knowledge of myself. I am a thinking ( conscious ) thing, that is, a being who doubts, affirms, denies, knows a few objects, and is ignorant of many,-- [who loves, hates], wills, refuses, who imagines likewise, and perceives; for, as I before remarked, although the things which I perceive or imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me [and in themselves], I am nevertheless assured that those modes of consciousness which I call perceptions and imaginations, in as far only as they are modes of consciousness, exist in me. [ L] [ F]