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Originally posted by antar
So its ok for them to own our borders, and have free rein to our ports, to transport goods (if you can call them that) and services to our country, but they dont want us going near their waters? BS! I am sick of the double standard. If we stopped sending them our stuff to send back to us like the best wood and steel and everything else they sell back to us marked up 1000%, then I could see them having a problem with us nearing their waters, but we support them!!!
With the horrible way they are treating the world I am getting sick of china. Not the people or the culture or country, just the military industrial complex.
If its true Rockefeller owns their banks, let him pull out...
Foreign ownership of US Debt
A traditional defense of the national debt is that Americans "owe the debt to themselves", but that is becoming increasingly less accurate. The US debt in the hands of foreign governments was 25% of the total in 2007, virtually double the 1988 figure of 13%. Despite the declining willingness of foreign investors to continue investing in US dollar denominated instruments as the US dollar fell in 2007, the U.S. Treasury statistics indicate that, at the end of 2006, foreigners held 44% of federal debt held by the public.
About 66% of that 44% was held by the central banks of other countries, in particular the central banks of Japan and China. In total, lenders from Japan and China held 47% of the foreign-owned debt. This exposure to potential financial or political risk should foreign banks stop buying Treasury securities or start selling them heavily was addressed in a recent report issued by the Bank of International Settlements which stated, "'Foreign investors in U.S. dollar assets have seen big losses measured in dollars, and still bigger ones measured in their own currency. While unlikely, indeed highly improbable for public sector investors, a sudden rush for the exits cannot be ruled out completely."
en.wikipedia.org...
Originally posted by Leto
It's the other way around, China owns us. The U.S. owes trillions to China, this is fact, look it up.
The three co-authors, Russian, American, and Chinese, show that the critical decision to initiate the war was made by Stalin in April 1950 when he decided to support Kim Il Sung's attempt to forcibly reunify Korea. The authors have also interviewed former high-ranking North Korean officers who were closely concerned with the launching of the war on that fateful Sunday morning of June 25 1950.
The primary concern of Sergei Goncharov, John H. Lewis, and Xue Litai in Uncertain Partners lies in Sino-Soviet security relations and their influence on the beginnings of the Korean War.
The three co-authors, Russian, American, and Chinese, show that the critical decision to initiate the war was made by Stalin in April 1950 when he decided to support Kim Il Sung's attempt to forcibly reunify Korea.
The telling of this complicated story has benefited much from new written and oral sources on the subject made available in Moscow and Peking as a result of the end of the Cold War. The authors have also interviewed former high-ranking North Korean officers who were closely concerned with the launching of the war on that fateful Sunday morning of June 25,
The authors then take their own advice, wisely avoiding any simple, monocausal explanation of the war.
The new evidence presented here makes Uncertain Partners an important contribution to Korean War studies and points the way to further work based on new Russian, Chinese, and Korean sources. But its main merit is the compelling drive of its historical reconstruction. That reconstruction focuses most of all on Soviet-North Korean relations.
Well there really isn’t anything to disagree with! This is what really happened read the whole thing here I supply the link again. This isn't my opinion of what happened it's what really happened consider the sources not my opinion.
“ . . Secretary of State Dean Acheson's famous speech of January 12, 1950 to bolster his case with Stalin. On this notorious occasion, Acheson had appeared to exclude South Korea from the American Pacific defense perimeter.
Stalin consented in a general way to Kim's plan but insisted on consultations with Mao as a precondition "for his unequivocal assent to any future detailed plan of action."
Preoccupied with the problem of Taiwan, and reluctant to express fears of American intervention, Mao gave Kim his blessing. It was thus the convergence of Soviet and North Korean objectives that produced the decision for war; China's role at this stage of the decision process was far less significant.
Total victory was then expected in less than a month. Kim personally set the timing for the invasion at 0400 hours on Sunday, June 25, 1950 but his Soviet advisors were closely involved in this aspect of the planning as well.
Yet the combination of political miscalculation and strategic adventurism that characterized the invasion made a quick victory unattainable. Seoul fell on schedule within three days but the southern uprising, supposedly the centerpiece of the operation, did not occur.
Premier Zhou Enlai called a special meeting of the Chinese Central Military Commission to assess Chinese options in the conflict. So began the process through which China, not the Soviet Union, paid the major price for Kim and Stalin's decision to launch the war.
When it became clear that the United States would not turn over these [Pusan, Inchon and an island to the west] vital points in its occupation zone, Soviet policy shifted to maintaining firm control of North Korea while paying lip service to the concept of a unified Korea.
Moscow thus sought to protect Soviet security "by maintaining a compliant government in the northern half of the country and shoring up the military strength of that client state."
At the insistence of Kim Il Sung, the beginning of military activity was scheduled for June 25, 1950 ....
Although conclusive evidence is not available, Weathersby believes that Stalin's main motive in backing Kim may have been to prevent any rapprochement between Mao's China and the United States. Whether true or not, hers is a valuable contribution to the literature on the origins of the war.
The United States gained much political authority from the mantle of the United Nations during the fighting.
Europe was the cockpit of the early Cold War, "the strategic prize that, in the hands of either of the superpowers, would tip the balance in the competition."
During the prolonged crisis of the Korean War, the United States transformed a paper commitment to the defense of Western Europe into reality "demonstrating an intention to keep major forces on the continent permanently and taking the lead in coordinating their operations with NATO partners."
Without the Western response to the North Korean attack "a tragedy of far greater magnitude might have occurred."
Thus of the great powers, "the Soviet Union was clearly the prime loser by virtue of the Korean War."
The real interests of the Soviet State were badly served. The war provoked an unprecedented buildup of American nuclear and conventional forces and militarized the Cold War. Soviet security declined and the USSR's economic and intellectual isolation in a hostile world was to shackle its modernization efforts for decades to come.
(1) See Alexander H. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). findarticles.com... END
So, Stalin finally took the decision to initiate preparations for the war. At exactly the same time that the above mentioned exchange of cables between Moscow and Pyongyang took place, Mao Zedong was present in the Soviet capital. Stalin discussed with Mao the Korean situation, but according to all available data the Soviet dictator never mentioned to the Chinese guest his decison to launch an attack on the South as well as his invitation to Kim II Sung to come to Moscow.
Kim II Sung and his delegation spent almost all of April 1950 in the Soviet Union. The first issue on the agenda was: ways and methods of unification of Korea through military means. (10) Stalin gave his approval to an invasion of the South and outlined his view on how the war had to be prepared. Unfortunately, memorandums of conversations between Stalin and Kim in April 1950 have not been found as yet in the Russian archives. However, from some secondary sources (testimonies of people involved in the negotiations, reports of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR), and from earlier and later statements and positions of Moscow and Pyongyang, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. Stalin changed his mind on the Korean war because of: a) the victory of the communists in China; b) the Soviet acquisition of the atom bomb (first tested by Moscow in August 1949); c) the establishment of NATO and general aggravation of Soviet relations with the West; and d) a perceived weakening of Washington's position and of its will to become militarily involved in Asia.
Stalin was now more confident of the communist bloc's strength, less respectful of American capabilities, and less interested in the reaction of Western public opinion to communist moves.
Unfortunately, memorandums of conversations between Stalin and Kim in April 1950 have not been found as yet in the Russian archives. However, from some secondary sources (testimonies of people involved in the negotiations, reports of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR), and from earlier and later statements and positions of Moscow and Pyongyang, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. Stalin changed his mind on the Korean war because of: a) the victory of the communists in China; b) the Soviet acquisition of the atom bomb (first tested by Moscow in August 1949); c) the establishment of NATO and general aggravation of Soviet relations with the West; and d) a perceived weakening of Washington's position and of its will to become militarily involved in Asia.
This article is based on recently declassified Soviet archives. The article was originally presented by Dr. Evgeni Bajanov to the conference on "The Korean War, An assessment of the Historical Record," 24-25 July 1995.
After initially insisting on the peaceful reunification of Korea, Josif Stalin suddenly decided in early 1950 to give North Korean leader Kim Il Sung permission to invade South Korea. Documents from the Russian archives and materials published in China help explain this abrupt shift in Stalin's position.
They show that Stalin carefully assessed the likely American reaction and mistakenly concluded that North Korean forces would quickly seize South Korea, giving the United States no opportunity to respond. The documents also reveal that Stalin's attitude toward Korea was strongly influenced by Sino-Soviet relations in 1949–1950, particularly his desire to maintain Soviet privileges on Chinese territory and his concern that Beijing would challenge Moscow's leadership of the international Communist movement. Stalin believed that a North Korean invasion of the South would greatly strengthen the Soviet Union's leverage vis-a÷-vis China.
As you probably know China was the worlds superpower for hundreds of years. When Europe was paddling around the med in 80 foot sailboats China had trans oceanic fleets consisting of 300 foot long treasure ships, numbering in the hundreds, and capable of landing 50,000 soldiers.
This all changed when an Empress destroyed the navy and much of the military in favor of domestic priorities roughly the mid 1400's, and China closed itself off from international affairs. China is now coming back into its own. Chinese people are rediscovering their History, and their place in the world. The Government is slowly letting go and guiding the shift towards a capitalist/socialist society.
The USA had a 60 year window of opportunity to use its position and status to lead the world into a golden age of exploration, trade, outreach and scientific discovery.
Instead we supported coups when it suited us, and murdered foreign leaders when it didn’t. Our claim to fame is being the worlds largest weapons dealer and enslaving our own population to a European Banking system. We blew it, big time. It is slowly dawning on USA leadership the slippery slope is rapidly becoming steeper and will soon become freefall into subservient status to Europe and Asia. This is what terrifies USA war strategists ( AKA defense companies). Who will they sell their weapons platforms to?
Here is something interesting I found some PDFs check them out. Now this conversation has peaked my curiosity. I have to throw some steaks on the grill and then take off to the airport let me know what you think.
This is ridiculous, China is sadly misinterpreting international treaties, which it has ratified, and therefore must observe.
So once again we are reminded of why Ronald Reagan sank the Law of the Sea Treaty.
The problem is that, as with any document that contains 320 articles and nine annexes, the treaty creates as many ambiguities as it resolves. In this case, the dispute involves the so-called "Exclusive Economic Zones," which give coastal states a patchwork of sovereign and jurisdictional rights over the economic resources of seas to a distance of 200 miles beyond their territorial waters.
Thus, the U.S. contends that the right of its ships to transit through or operate in the EEZs (and of planes to overfly them) is no different than their rights on the high seas, including intelligence gathering, and can point to various articles in the treaty that seem to say as much. But a number of signatories to the treaty, including Brazil, Malaysia, Pakistan and China, take the view that the treaty forbids military and intelligence-gathering work by foreign countries in an EEZ. Matters are further complicated by the claims China made for itself over its EEZ when it ratified the Law of the Sea in the 1990s.
We don't have a view on the legal niceties here, which amounts to a theological dispute in a religion to which we don't subscribe. But the incident with the Impeccable is another reminder that China's ambitions for regional dominance, and for diminishing U.S. influence, remain unchanged despite a new American Administration; and that the Law of the Sea Treaty, far from curbing ambitions or resolving differences, has served only to sharpen both.
online.wsj.com...