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WASHINGTON, D.C. -- At least 30 letters containing suspicious powder have been mailed to Dallas federal buildings and Chase banks in eight other cities cities but so far appear to be harmless, authorities said Tuesday.
The FBI said it was investigating "a series of letters sent to banks around the country."
In Dallas, a hazardous materials response team was sent to the office of the FDIC on Bryan Street in downtown Dallas. The Office of Thrift Supervision on John Carpenter Freeway in Irving also received a letter with a mysterious powder inside.
"These threat letters contain a powder substance," the FBI said in a statement. "At this point, field tests on the powder have been negative. Additional testing will be completed. Even sending a hoax letter is a serious crime."
Not a single case of human anthrax has been reported in the United States this year, but the nation is now officially in a state of anthrax emergency.
The emergency was declared earlier this month by the Department of Health and Human Services, and will last until 2015. Whether it will protect public health is debatable, but it will certainly protect makers of faulty anthrax vaccines.
Emergency exemption from legal liability is granted to vaccine manufacturers by the Public Readiness and Preparedness Act, passed in 2005 to protect against paralyzing lawsuits during outbreaks of anthrax, avian influenza or other potentially pandemic diseases.
The act is supposed to be invoked when the Secretary of Homeland Security has determined "that there is a domestic emergency, or a significant potential for a domestic emergency, involving a heightened risk of attack with a specified biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent or agents."
But as Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff explains in a letter to the DHHS, none of these conditions are met: there's neither emergency nor heightened risk of attack nor "credible information indicating an imminent threat of an attack." But that doesn't matter.
"These findings are not necessary to make a determination," Chertoff wrote. It's enough that anthrax was declared a threat four years ago, and that "were the government to determine in the future that there is a heightened risk of an anthrax attack ... that determination would almost certainly result in a domestic emergency."
In other words, there could be an emergency someday — so we might as well declare an emergency now.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. banks were the primary targets in what might be an extreme backlash to the nation’s economic crisis. Investigators believe Atlanta’s mailing — which contained an apparently harmless substance — was connected to other mailings around the country, FBI spokesman Stephen Emmett said Tuesday evening. “All of these incidents are considered related, based on what we’re looking at,” Emmett said.
Thursday, October 23, 2008
The Department of Homeland Security dedicated a massive biodefense laboratory in Frederick yesterday, moving toward the facility's opening despite questions raised about the risks of deadly pathogens to be studied there.
When the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center at Fort Detrick is fully operational in March, about 150 scientists in the lab will be tasked with protecting the country from a bioterrorist attack through prevention or containment. Another goal is to allow investigators to fingerprint biological agents such as viruses and bacteria, quickly tracing their source and catching the offender.
Not a single case of human anthrax has been reported in the United States this year, but the nation is now officially in a state of anthrax emergency.
The emergency was declared earlier this month by the Department of Health and Human Services, and will last until 2015. Whether it will protect public health is debatable, but it will certainly protect makers of faulty anthrax vaccines.
US federal law officials have released a catalogue of evidence they say points to Bruce Ivins, a senior anthrax researcher for the US army, as the perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax attacks. It depends crucially on genetic matches between the posted anthrax and bacteria in a lab where Ivins worked, but no scientific details were released.
In a press briefing just after the release, Jeffrey Taylor, US attorney for the District of Columbia, admitted the evidence was circumstantial, but says had Ivins gone to trial, "we would have proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Ivins worked on anthrax for the Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Maryland. Because of his death on 29 July, which was ruled a suicide, the case will not now come to trial.
The scientific analysis of the anthrax spores sent to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle eventually will tell investigators who developed the technique that made the spores so lethal. Different techniques for drying anthrax spores and enhancing the airborne qualities that transform them into an aerosol were developed by the bioweapons programs in the USA and the former Soviet Union. Scientists say they are clearly identifiable. U.N. weapons inspectors say that Iraqi techniques are likewise identifiable. Still, it's a long leap from identifying the recipe for refining anthrax powder to identifying the culprits who mailed the anthrax to Daschle.
The DNA sequence of the anthrax sent through the US mail in 2001 has been revealed and confirms suspicions that the bacteria originally came from a US military laboratory.
The data released uses codenames for the reference strains against which the attack strain was compared. But New Scientist can reveal that the two reference strains that appear identical to the attack strain most likely originated at the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick (USAMRIID), Maryland.
The new work also shows that substantial genetic differences can emerge in two samples of an anthrax culture separated for only three years. This means the attacker's anthrax was not separated from its ancestors at USAMRIID for many generations.