posted on Apr, 16 2008 @ 11:04 PM
To jump back in boots and all, in answer to the question about what replacement we should be purchasing (I'm ditching the understanding that the Pig
is not being replaced, that only its capability is for two reasons: 1, the media keep using the words replace and replacement and 2, the SH clearly
cannot replace the Pig's capabilities) I say this:
What replacement?
No-one has yet given me a solid reason for not continuing with Pig until the introduction into service of the JSF-35.
And cost is not a solid reason. If we're going to spend A$6,600,000,000 on the (stop-gap) SH then someone had better show me how continuing with Pig
will cost A$6,600,000,001.00.
The SH cannot fly as far, cannot fly as fast and cannot carry as much as the Pig.
If it cannot match the capabilities, how can it replace them?
And that, Royal Australian Air Force types, is your basic problem.
Your secondary problem is this: there appears (to certain interested "outside" parties) to be a clear fight within the RAAF between "Bomber
Command" and "Fighter Command" as to who should rule and who will get the toys. Which means this is a political bunfight in a place that should
have no politics (which I understand is Shangri-la, pie-in-the-sky dreaming). The boys in "Fighter Command" have decided that they are the most
important and should be making the decisions and getting the toys and the boys in "Bomber Command" should shut up and accept the decisions of the
betters. That decision being that the RAAF has no problem in unilaterally ditching an operational capability as long as it gets seriously new shiny
toys to build up another capability.
And here is my two cents on the subject:
Since 1945, when is the last time the RAAF has been involved in a2a combat?
In Korea 77Sqn deployed with Mustangs, converted to Meteors (thanks, Menzies, fool), proved what was known (that straight-winged, Gen1 WW2 jets
couldn't tangle with swept-winged Gen2s) and concentrated on ground attack.
In Malaya the Lincolns dropped a hell of a lot of ordnance on the jungle, probably scared the crap out of the monkeys, well, those that survived,
anyway.
In VN the Caribous and Hueys airlifted a lot of men and material and the Canberras flew a lot of bombing missions.
In Gulf War II, the sequel, the Hornets were sent to do escort/a2a duty and wound up flying strike missions instead.
a2a gap? Is that like the famous missile "gap" from the sixties?
Or is it more like the credibility gap that sat exactly in between Andrew Peackock and the Lodge?