stealth ICBMs

Originally posted by NavalFC
reply to post by srsairbags

 

Stealth ICBMs are forbidden by treaty.

Which treaty, and what is specifically forbidden?

Identifying a re-entry vehicle by its heat signature assumes that the vehicle has a sufficient heat signature to lock on to.

The heat of re-entry is a product of the friction generated by the vehicle's speed as it passes through the atmosphere.



Therefore, reduce the speed of re-entry and you reduce the friction, reduce the friction and you reduce (or eliminate) the heat produced.


The only reason spacecraft (and that includes the warheads of ICBM's) re-enter the atmosphere at such insanely high velocities is because they fail to have the means to slow themselves to something more reasonable.

Simple physics shows that it takes as much energy (ie., fuel) to get an object into orbit as it does to get that same object out of orbit: conservation of energy. Problem is, most of our current methods of getting things into orbit require so much fuel (energy) that there is simply not enough space to carry the fuel (energy) to Deccelerate the craft out of orbit once it gets there.


QUESTION THE PARADIGM!

Now consider how Scaled Composites' SpaceShip One tackled the question of decceleration for re-entry. Instead of relying on expensive and fragile carbon heat shields (like the Space Shuttle), SS1 first limited the re-entry speed to a few hundred MPH. Second, it deployed its intgral "air-brake"-wing to further slow its descent, employing air resistance, rather than just pure friction, to assist in its braking maneuver.

Granted, SpaceShip One did not, and was not desiged to, actually orbit the planet; but the method does prove the point. If you want to avoid the heat of re-entry, avoid the speed of re-entry.



Orbital mechanics requires a certain velocity to maintain a stable orbit, but,if you can bring your velocity down low enough Before you de-orbit, you can drop in on your target with a significantly reduced heat signature, and maintain the element of suprise.

reply to post by srsairbags

The “bazooka” part is accurate, but not the “hiding” part.

If the spacecraft are torchships, their thrust power is several terawatts. This means the exhaust is so intense that it could be detected from Alpha Centauri.

By a passive sensor.

The Space Shuttle’s much weaker main engines could be detected past the orbit of Pluto. The Space Shuttle’s manoeuvering thrusters could be seen as far as the asteroid belt. And even a puny ship using ion drive to thrust at a measly 1/1000 of a g could be spotted at one astronomical unit.

This is with current off-the-shelf technology. Presumably future technology would be better.

There Ain't No Stealth In Space.

-Edrick

reply to post by Edrick


Debating this is beyond the scope of this thread (and forum, really). However, I assure you the "experts" at Atomic Rocket are grossly over-estimating image processing technology. The physics governing thermal imaging couples excludes the possibility of components existing that could detect the kind of delta-t at such a range and low resolution. It doesn't matter how far technology evolves - thermal imaging as we know it is incapable of it - the only way to get those sensitivities is with a very narrow focus and long exposures. Generally impractical for searching.

To put it simply - the Nimitz could be in orbit around the moon and we'd be none the wiser without knowing to look for it, or if it passes within the aperture of a focused observation of the moon or some other object.

We would probably pick up the 60hz buzz from its power system before we picked up its thermal.

Although it is something of a moot point - MIT has succeeded in doing something useful and created a perfect thermal insulator. That leaves you with attempting to detect exhaust plumes/trails. The more efficient VASMIR engines give this method a run for its money.

It's about like saying there's no stealth in the air. Yeah - if they know you are coming and where to look for you, an old WWII system can track today's best 'stealth' aircraft (in reality, it'd be jammed six ways to sunday - but that's not the point). There were plenty of "experts" back in the day that went on and on about how making 'stealth' aircraft was impossible. Ho hum.

However, an ICBM is different than a space craft.... there's not much one can do to make something exiting and re-entering the atmosphere 'stealth.' You could place warheads and re-entry vehicles in space as secretly as possible and conceal their radar signatures as best as possible - then rain down a nasty surprise some time later (months, years, decades...) .... but they are bound to be picked up on re-entry... not that there's much time to utilize the enlightenment.

Hi Aim,

reply to post by Aim64C


As you may not remember from so many of my spam like posts about ABM technology the means , certainly, and the methods, somewhat more complex to assess, to adequately defend against ICBM's have existed since the 60's in both the US and the former USSR. Nike-X, Spartan&Sprint adequately describes the capabilities of these early weapon systems.

Cheers,

Stellar

reply to post by StellarX


Most of those systems consisted of anti-missile-missiles with nuclear warheads - guidance systems were not accurate enough to score a kinetic kill on a reentry vehicle. Many of these systems were never tested against threats real or simulated - and while I am certain they would be effective at reducing the number of on-target reentry vehicles, exactly how effective is anyone's guess.

On that note - the NIKE missiles were generally intended to destroy formations of bombers (also with nuclear warheads). Interception of ICBMs was not their primary design purpose, merely an extension of mission once it became clear bombers were no longer the primary system for nuclear warhead delivery.

It has only been recently that we have developed guidance systems capable of delivering a kinetic kill on a reentry vehicle. Even so - these systems are limited in both capability and availability - a 'surprise' from a concealed satellite would be difficult to defend against on such short notice. Most defense systems presume early detection of an ICBM launch with geosynch infra-red satellites that allows early and accurate radar tracking and prediction of trajectory. Reducing the warning to "object on re-entry" and attempting to successfully engage in that time frame is pushing it.

With military spending down and a general complacency with regards to CONUS security from organized military threats, I do not see these systems being kept on a state of alert that would allow them to successfully engage such a threat scenario.

Hi Aim,

Originally posted by Aim64C
reply to post by StellarX

 

Most of those systems consisted of anti-missile-missiles with nuclear warheads - guidance systems were not accurate enough to score a kinetic kill on a reentry vehicle. Many of these systems were never tested against threats real or simulated - and while I am certain they would be effective at reducing the number of on-target reentry vehicles, exactly how effective is any one's guess.

Perhaps not in the United States ( but i have information to the contrary) but certainly in the USSR:

1961 began with another string of failures (5 further launches were planned in the first test series). A variety of warheads were wasted in attempting to destroy the incoming missiles. Once, manually, and twice, automatically, the missile made a more-or-less successful intercept. But this was followed by three failures, indicating a great amount of time and effort were needed to develop the intercept method.

On 4 March 1961 the V-1000 achieved a world first - the destruction of the re-entry vehicle of an R-12 IRBM. This was followed by the destruction of an R-5 re-entry vehicle. In all, there were 11 launches with military warheads, plus launches of developmental warheads. The S2TA variant used an infrared-homing self-guiding high-explosive warhead and was designed by Storozhenko at the GOI State Optical Institute in Lengingrad. It was capable not only of determining the moment for warhead detonation, but also was capable of guiding the anti-ballistic missile independently using an on-board computer. The R2TA version used a radio-guided explosive warhead, with two types of proximity fuses used to determine the correct moment for warhead detonation. These were the G2TA, a radio ranging system, developed by Bondarenko and an optical system, developed by Emdin at GOI. Flight tests of the V-1000 with a nuclear warhead designed at Chelyabinsk-70 were also carried out.

As the anti-ballistic missile system reached maturity, a range of anti-ballistic missile countermeasures deployed by the incoming missiles challenged it. These included Verba (inflated decoy warheads); Kaktus (an anti-radar system that generated false targets on the anti-ballistic missile system radars); and Krot (an active jammer). Operation K (including live nuclear-armed target and interceptor missile exercises K1 through K5) tested the effects of nuclear explosions at altitudes of 80 to 300 km on the ability of the anti-ballistic missile system to function. System A demonstrated its ability to continue operation despite the nuclear detonations, although the tests were primarily conducted to obtain scientific data for the design of the next generation of anti-ballistic missiles. At the end of 1961 KB-1 and SKB-30 were transferred to OKB-301 and dedicated to full-time anti-ballistic missile work. In 1966 the developers of System A received the Lenin Prize for their work.
On that note - the NIKE missiles were generally intended to destroy formations of bombers (also with nuclear warheads). Interception of ICBMs was not their primary design purpose, merely an extension of mission once it became clear bombers were no longer the primary system for nuclear warhead delivery.

www.astronautix.com...

It has only been recently that we have developed guidance systems capable of delivering a kinetic kill on a reentry vehicle. Even so - these systems are limited in both capability and availability -

As the source above indicates that capability has existed for decades in even the USA and if the US chose to pursue such capabilities it would gained the ability in the same ways others did.

a 'surprise' from a concealed satellite would be difficult to defend against on such short notice. Most defense systems presume early detection of an ICBM launch with geosynch infra-red satellites that allows early and accurate radar tracking and prediction of trajectory. Reducing the warning to "object on re-entry" and attempting to successfully engage in that time frame is pushing it.

While FOBS ( or the notion of it) certainly introduced complex new problems it all comes down to how much your willing to invest in terms of wide ranging short range defenses and how much interest you have in enabling the continuation of said nation. In my reading defense against nuclear weaponry is both practical and also not very costly in comparison to a world wide conventional armed force that costs a nation in excess of 3/4 of a trillion dollars without it's nuclear arm.

With military spending down and a general complacency with regards to CONUS security from organized military threats, I do not see these systems being kept on a state of alert that would allow them to successfully engage such a threat scenario.

Military spending down? Sources? As for the notion that such defense must be kept on a high state of alert the ridiculous bolt from the blue scenario that normally serves to enable a defense of MAD is politically impossible as nations do not go to war with each other 'just because' the opportunity presents itself on any given day. The mere existence of such defenses in my view greatly reduces the threat because it does not allow the type of accurate strategic planning that nuclear war inevitably entails. The real reason i believe we never had a hot war, after the USSR gained the ability to actually 'win' such a thing the 80's, is due to the inherent 'unknowns' that a attack on even the virtually defenseless USA main land entailed.

Cheers,

Stellar