posted on Sep, 16 2003 @ 06:31 PM
This is scary, and again epitomizes the essential meaning of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction).
Kosvinsky is regarded by U.S. targeteers as the crown jewel of the Russian wartime nuclear command system, because it can communicate through the
granite mountain to far-flung Russian strategic forces using very-low-frequency (VLF) radio signals that can burn through a nuclear war environment.
The facility is the critical link to Russia's "dead hand" communications network, designed to ensure semi-automatic retaliation to a decapitating
strike.
This doomsday apparatus, which became operational in 1984 during the height of the Reagan-era nuclear tensions, is an amazing feat of creative
engineering. It features hard radio nodes near Moscow that can use remote control to launch communications rockets, which in turn can launch virtually
the entire Russian missile force without human intervention. But the Moscow-area radio nodes have grown vulnerable over the past 20 years. Kosvinsky
restores Russia's confidence in its ability to carry out a retaliatory strike.
www.cdi.org...
Twin dangers emerge from this posture -- nuclear inadvertence on one hand, and failure to retaliate for a real attack on the other. These risks have
long worried Russian planners, and the situation becomes even more worrisome as the U.S. deploys Trident D-5 missiles, whose high accuracy and short
flight time threaten to deprive Russia of a quick launch option. Because of these dangers Russia devised a back-up method of launch known as the
"dead hand." If top leaders do not get a clear picture of an apparent missile attack, or if for any reason they fail to give timely authorization to
retaliate, the General Staff can activate a special system designed to ensure quasi-automatic retaliation in the event of their decapitation. This
dead-hand system, consisting of special underground radio stations, control posts, and communications rockets, became operational around 1985.
Although its safety is hard to evaluate, the Soviets at least designed this system to fire missiles only after it registers certain objective
conditions of enemy attack -- notably, the detection of nuclear explosions and a complete outage of communications with the General Staff. By
contrast, the two methods of launching on warning mentioned earlier depend on data from warning sensors alone.
www.uspid.dsi.unimi.it...