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either a WIMP or is COMPROMISED.
Drawing lessons from the American war in Vietnam, the US mission in Iraq defined victory as the winning of Iraqi and American hearts and minds. To that end, the media was enlisted as a force multiplier in the exercise of soft power, unlike in Southeast Asia, where it was often viewed as a fifth column.
In Vietnam, it was clear to ordinary Americans that a militarily inferior enemy embarrassed the world’s most powerful army in good part because it had the support of its people. In Iraq, therefore, “perception management” became a strategic priority.
This involved carefully crafted press conferences and press releases as well as the selective leaking of information, which together structured assumptions about the basic facts on the ground. The embedding of journalists within military units helped control the perspective from which Americans viewed the conflict, with the experiences of US soldiers foregrounded and those of Iraqis relegated to the background. Sometimes information operations exaggerated the threat of enemies or even invented one altogether.
A significant consequence of battlespace thinking was that it afforded US military commanders the rationale to treat purveyors of information as combatants, even individuals and institutions protected by the Geneva Conventions, such as journalists reporting American atrocities, hospitals releasing civilian casualty figures and Iraqi mosque leaders calling on able-bodied men to defend their communities.