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Earlier this month, Western officials estimated between 20,000 and 30,000 Russian troops had been killed or injured in Bakhmut since last summer.
www.bbc.com...
originally posted by: WhatItIs
Earlier this month, Western officials estimated between 20,000 and 30,000 Russian troops had been killed or injured in Bakhmut since last summer.
www.bbc.com...
I’m not trying to justify anything the “west” is doing.
But those that are Putin fanboys. How do you justify Russian Losses in Bakhmut to achieve what?
After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russians were free to express what they really felt about their military and most regarded military service as something to be avoided. Because of this the trained reserves were seen as an effort to get people with previous military training to join a peacetime force, continue training a bit, get paid for that and be eligible for rapid mobilization in the event of a war. Most Russians assumed this would be a war to defend Russia being invaded, not Russian troops invading a neighbor. The mobilizations to replace early Ukraine war losses were seen as typical of Russian army incompetence and this was another reason why Russians avoided the reserves. The mobilizations found that there were fewer than 10,000 actual trained reservists and most of them regarded the Ukraine invasion as something they had not become a reservist for.
As was historically the case, the Russian army adapted to the mess in Ukraine and developed tactics that made the most of the many Russian shortcomings. This enabled Russian units to be of some use in combat. These improvised units took heavy casualties but the survivors became more capable and effective. This was another Russian military tradition and one that enabled Russia to emerge victorious during World War II. What was not revealed until the Soviet Union dissolved was the true cost of that victory; 13 percent of the pre-war population. That’s over 27 million dead. The Soviets reported lower losses because the true losses were considered bad for morale. When the true extent of the losses was revealed most Russians were not surprised at the higher losses and believed it was more realistic. Most Russian (and Ukrainian) families had a history of heavy civilian and military losses during World War II.
This explains the Russian expectation of high casualties in Ukraine. This is the first major war Russia fought since World War II. Naturally, the poor preparation and high casualty rates were expected. What has changed is that, unlike World War II, Russians have more opportunities to avoid going to Ukraine at all. Post-Soviet Russia no longer had the feared KGB and nationwide network of informers. Also absent was a homicidal maniac like World War II leader Josef Stalin. Putin tried to emulate all these World War II era tools but was unable to do so. One reason the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 was that Russians were fed up the many of the Soviet era military “traditions.” After 1991, school history textbooks were revised to tell the truth about Russian history. While this was not shocking to most foreigners, especially Westerners, it was a surprise to older Russians but the young students accepted the new textbooks because it described a Russia similar to the one quietly discussed among the adults, especially the older ones, in their families.
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originally posted by: andy06shake
a reply to: WhatItIs
That's what Russia does in most military confrontations.
They fling men into the meat grinder as nothing more than cannon fodder until they wear down or overwhelm the enemy by sheer numbers alone.
As to how it will be justified, it's predominantly the Wagner Group that's apparently responsible for capturing eastern Bakhmut a load of which constitute criminals and other miscreants deemed to be pretty much expendable and no great loss far as i can establish.
originally posted by: andy06shake
a reply to: putnam6
I don't see it ending anytime soon neither putnam6.
The fact is Ukraine is not anywhere near ready to capitulate, roll over, and surrender.
And Russian Federation forces are not willing, or even able, to up-stix, retreat, and go back home to whence they came.
Here is another main point and some food for thought.
Both Ukraine and Russia share the same too similar problems where an aging population is concerned.
And none of them can afford to lose an entire generation or thereabouts down to war and slaughter.
What a predicament!
originally posted by: andy06shake
a reply to: Observer19
Pretty much exactly how it went down far as im aware.
In this day of age through, Ukraine nor Russia realistically have the population numbers to absorb the losses should they continue the war and slaughter one another at the rate they are going.
Russia may well defeat Ukraine in the long run down to sheer numbers alone, but it will be somewhat of a pyrrhic victory.
And not something her population can absorb without serious repercussions back home.
Also all they win in a scenario and nation reminiscent of Ireland during the times of the troubles, only 9 times the size, good luck policing that place with whatever and whoever is left standing.
Plus look at the number of people who have chosen to flee Russia down to the fact that they do not wish to fight.
It's not looking good for future Russian or Ukrainian generations to come.
Not so sure about that it's not strategic at all ,like i said it's symbolic mostly because a lot of the DPR/LPR army and Wagner lost a lot of soldiers around this area the last 8 years, they don't want it to be for nothing.
The importance for Putin of taking Bakhmut is not just strategic, more symbolic. He desperately needs some sort of "victory" purely to try to justify his War at home.
Both sides are loosing a lot soldiers,not just Russia .
Equally, it seems that Ukraine does not see it as having any strategic value, but as an opportunity to cause maximum attrition of the invading forces.