COBRA

Something about today's date tickled my memory, and then I recalled what the date signified.

78 years since the start of Operation COBRA, an offensive that unhinged the German defenses in the Normandy hedgerows. Once the attack gained momentum, the German forces were almost completely swept out of northern France. Logistical difficulties finally stopped the Allied advance at the border of the Netherlands, Germany, and further south, in front of the Metz fortress complex.

The summer of 1944 was a disaster for the German armed forces. Not only were France and Belgium lost to Germany, in the east, the Soviets conducted a series of grand offensives that brought them to the suburbs of Warsaw and which saw German forces ejected from Romania, Bulgaria, and much of Yugoslavia and Hungary.

The German forces ultimately stabilized their lines, but by the end of summer, Hitler's regime had little more than seven months left. Armored warfare of the 1940s had reached its ultimate expression. The result meant that, overwhelmingly, the remaining combat in the war would be fought on the soil of Axis countries and not in the lands they had once conquered.

Cheers

a reply to: F2d5thCavv2 The more I learn about the last grear war the more I realize the wrong side won, General Patton said as much. Look where we are as a society now.

originally posted by: kimish
a reply to: F2d5thCavv2 The more I learn about the last grear war the more I realize the wrong side won, General Patton said as much. Look where we are as a society now.

Not quite. Patton despised the Nazi's and Japanese.

He also despised the Russians and wanted to take them out.

a reply to: kimish

Well chances are you would be speaking German if the Nazi scum axis powers had prevailed and you would not be able to communicate freely in the manner you are now doing, so there is that, same to similar predicament should the USSR have kept on going and prevailed in Europe.

a reply to: andy06shake
Have you read anything that wasn't printed/distributed by allied forces? Have you spoken with people that lived there or had immediate family living there during that time? If I may be honest, with the state of the world right now, I'd be happy speaking German. Are you happy with the way things are going in the world today?

a reply to: kimish

Have you read anything that wasn't printed/distributed by allied forces? Have you spoken with people that lived there or had immediate family living there during that time? Have you spoken with people that lived there or had immediate family living there during that time?

I have indeed and heard plenty of stories from my grand parents when they were alive who fought and lived through the second world war.

My grandfather served on HMS Searcher and my great grand mothers house in Rutherglen got bombed out during the air raids on Whites Chemical works.

If I may be honest, with the state of the world right now, I'd be happy speaking German. Are you happy with the way things are going in the world today?

Think of the implications of what you are suggesting should the axis powers have prevailed?

Imagine the holocaust on steroids and consider the fact that if Germany had prevailed free speech would have went out the window and we most lightly would not be having this discussion.

You should be careful what you wish for.

a reply to: F2d5thCavv2

The Normandy campaign displayed several "points of interest" (my wording).

On the German side, attrition usual associated with the Russian defenders wore down the defenders. Also, the issues that prevented German forces from driving allied forces back into the sea are present. Allied air power prevented or made the movement of armour and other forces difficult and delayed. Apart from their armoured units, the German Army was increasingly de-motorised by 1944.

Moreover, there is the matter of the dysfunctional and divided command structure that handicapped the Germans before D-day. Nor could the Germans match the seemingly endless industrial/logistical outputs.

For the allies, Montgomery's ego and lack of people skills hindered his relationships with his peers in rank and advancing Combined Operations in planning and practice. As a result, there wasn't any coordination between American and British/Canadian efforts to breakout from Normandy.

Lastly, a couple of points are worth making. First, tactically and with the hedgerows, the Germans mounted a sound defence of the area. But German tactical nous and success couldn't overcome the strategic handicaps.

The subsequent destruction inflicted upon German forces in Falaise Pocket contributed to Eisenhower's decision to Montgomery's plan for Operation Market Garden. (The German Army's admin and personnel's exceptional but futile ability to reconstitute units was unknown at the time.)

a reply to: xpert11

The campaign in the West offers various topics of interest.

One thing worth noting is "where the panzers were". Over years of study I've determined that the deployment of German mechanized units is a solid indicator of what parts of the front they perceived as critical. In the case of Normandy, much of the German mechanized force was deployed against 21st Army Group. Thus, when the U.S. forces broke out, the bulk of German armor was badly deployed to stop the breakout. The attempt of the Germans to counterattack didn't help them and set the stage for Falaise.

The U.S. attempt to leverage strategic air power returned very mixed results. German forces took a pounding, but so did U.S. units, to include the death of the Ground Forces Commander (an administrative position), Lieutenant-General Lesley J. McNair.

The U.S. field commanders were dismayed to realize that even up-gunned Sherman tanks (with longer barrels) were outmatched by German medium and heavy tanks. American ordnance efforts delivered too little and too late in terms of a tank (what became the M-26 "Pershing") that could go toe to toe with German armor. The U.K. did better in that regard by mounting the 17-Pounder gun in roughly every fourth of their Shermans.

Cheers

a reply to: F2d5thCavv2

You raise excellent points. The first two matters reflect Robert M. Citino's analysis from his book that covers the German Army in 1944-45. The other titles covered the German Army from 1942-43. Citino tackles the related subject matter from a strategic, political and sometimes moral perceptive.

From the German standpoint, the American, British and Canadian forces' attempts to break out from Normandy were a sustained effort, not separate military operations. On the Russian Front, the Germans were accustomed to moving across the front to meet the latest threat from the Soviets until they met their destruction. So what might appear to the reader as a losing proposition was the norm for the German Army.

American and British cultural differences influenced their respective armies' performance. The American traits concerning individualism are tied to adapting to battlefield conditions. For instance, modifying Sherman tanks to bulldoze their way through hedgerows occurred with U.S. forces in France.

The war-weary British witnessed their American counterpart's hiccups at the Battle of Kasserine Pass. Nor had lessons concerning the requirement for infantry and armour cooperation sunk in with senior British commanders by the time of Operation Goodwood, Montgomery's failed attempt to employ his forces breakout from the Normandy beachhead.

But in preparation for D-day, U.S. Army units took massive strides in equipment and training in 1943-44, so lessons surrounding combined arms were either learned or overcame problems as they arose.

Taking a broader view, the quality and performance of the British Army's senior commanders were often poor. Notable, Field Marshall Slim, the commander of the Fourteenth Army, broke the mould with his understanding of manoeuvre warfare and employing an indirect strategy in retaking Burma from the Japanese.

In comparison, Montgomery excelled as a planner, trainer, and executing preset battle plans (For instance, the Battle of El Alamein), but he struggled on more mobile battlefields.

So, on balance, and in Western Europe, the likes of Omar Bradley provided the U.S. Army with well-rounded commanders at the Army [group] level. Patton was the best-armoured commander available to the Allies after D-Day for all his flaws. (Slim's forces used armoured spearheads to significant effect in Burma, but that wasn't until 1945 and falls beyond the scope of this topic).