Reflections on Australian military operations from East Timor to the Middle East

Among the topics covered in the latest instalment of The Voices of War Podcast. I came across the podcast on my Twitter. Twitter is often a dumpster fire, but the odd gen rises from the ashes.

Building the cultural knowledge of Timor Leste
When strategy and tactics don’t align—reflection on Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq
Were Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq strategic successes or failures?

Podcast with John Blaxland


Professor John Blaxland intermixes his experiences serving in the Australian Army and scholarship to provide excellent insights. But he doesn't speak down to his audience. Overall, his insights into Australian political and military leaders ignoring strategy and the outcome of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is sobering.

Blaxland eluding to the Vietnam War coincides with aspects of my thinking. However, my thoughts focus on the Australian government's motivations for creating and deploying the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF). In the 60s, the wounds from MacArthur's domineering role over Australian sovereignty and society are fresh. So the introduction of national service is designed to ensure that Australia retains operational control over the 1ATF.

Moreover, and at first glance, the motivations for the Australian Defence Force participation in U.S. led wars in the Middle East appears shallow. But, former Defence Minister Robert deserves credit for going into print . Prime Minsters or cabinet ministers won't face additional scrutiny concerning the deployment of military forces overseas unless there are people with the desire and relevant knowledge in the media and parliament.

IMO, for his human flaws, Winston Churchill grasped strategy and the need to explain his arguments to the public and parliament. Yet, I can't name a cabinet minister in the New Zealand government or media figure who displays interest in national security issues. Mostly, today's politicians are obsessed with focus groups and scripted sound bites.

Lastly, the diversity of threats or challenges that Australia and New Zealand face contrasts with the Cold War environment. The spectra of failed South Pacific states to conventional warfare illustrates the desperate vacuum that is flexible and reflective thinking. To what degree that aspect goes against human nature deserves more attention. Also, I live in New Zealand, but I one of those people who have enough trouble with English. Never mind, learning a second language.

a reply to: xpert11
Where do you see the most immediate threat to Australia?
I would have thought Indonesia. And the Indonesians might resent the expansion of Chinese influence. So if American support slackened, a Chinese-Australian entente at the expense of Indonesia might be quite handy. Do you think the politicians are thinking along those lines?

originally posted by: DISRAELI
a reply to: xpert11
Where do you see the most immediate threat to Australia?

In the traditional conventional threat mould, China poses the biggest threat to Australia's security. Australia's only way to outright fail in the national and regional security realms is to adopt a stand-alone fortress policy. Across trade, military and other spheres, a collective approach to national security issues allow for partnerships, policy debates and cultural differences.

Regards of the cause, citizens of atoll nations face pressure from rising sea levels or erosion. Before these countries disappear under the waves, threats to political stability emerge. Seawater entering fresh waterways poses dangers to people's survival. Politically, the sticking point for Australia and New Zealand is our obligation to resettle the people displaced by those events.

For politicians and their electorates, immigration is a thorny issue. Yet, the absence of a framework that maintains a degree of control over the number of arrivals from atoll nations opens up additional headaches. Australia and New Zealand gross negligence might trigger an avalanche of boat people fleeing their homelands.

I would have thought Indonesia. And the Indonesians might resent the expansion of Chinese influence. So if American support slackened, a Chinese-Australian entente at the expense of Indonesia might be quite handy. Do you think the politicians are thinking along those lines?

No is the direct answer to that question. But the outlying issue deserves a deeper analysis. The Indonesian – Malaysian Confrontation is worth considering for a moment. The U.K and not the U.S. assumed the led role in shaping post-colonial South East Asia, for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson concluded that the U.S. didn't have a stake in the situation.

As East Timor pivoted towards independence, the Clinton admin drew a similar conclusion to his 1960s predecessors. But the Australian government was ill-prepared in comparison to thirty years before for regional military and diplomatic interventions.

West Papua independence is the apparent place/contingency where an Australian led military intervention doesn't align with Indonesia's interests. For contingency planners, China isn't out of the equation. One can of worms is managing China's military and economic contributions to future peacekeeping or stabilisation operations.