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A solar storm that jammed radar and radio communications at the height of the Cold War could have led to a disastrous military conflict if not for the U.S. Air Force's budding efforts to monitor the sun's activity, a new study finds.
On May 23, 1967, the Air Force prepared aircraft for war, thinking the nation's surveillance radars in polar regions were being jammed by the Soviet Union. Just in time, military space weather forecasters conveyed information about the solar storm's potential to disrupt radar and radio communications. The planes remained on the ground and the U.S. avoided a potential nuclear weapon exchange with the Soviet Union, according to the new research.
As the solar flare event unfolded on May 23, radars at all three Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) sites in the far Northern Hemisphere were disrupted. These radars, designed to detect incoming Soviet missiles, appeared to be jammed. Any attack on these stations -- including jamming their radar capabilities -- was considered an act of war.
Retired Colonel Arnold L. Snyder, a solar forecaster at NORAD's Solar Forecast Center, was on duty that day. The tropospheric weather forecaster told him the NORAD Command Post had asked about any solar activity that might be occurring.
"I specifically recall responding with excitement, 'Yes, half the sun has blown away,' and then related the event details in a calmer, more quantitative way," Snyder said.
Along with the information from the Solar Forecast Center, NORAD learned the three BMEWS sites were in sunlight and could receive radio emissions coming from the sun. These facts suggested the radars were being 'jammed' by the sun, not the Soviet Union, Snyder said. As solar radio emissions waned, the 'jamming' also waned, further suggesting the sun was to blame, he said.
originally posted by: verschickter
Nice find
Just shows the insanity of the cold war days.
Loss Of Offsite Power
It is recognized that the availability of ac power to commercial nuclear power plants is essential for safe operations and accident recovery. A loss of offsite power (LOOP) event, therefore, is considered an important contributor to total risk at nuclear power plants. In 1988, the NRC published NUREG-1032 to report on an evaluation of the risk from actual LOOP events that had occurred at nuclear power plants within the United States up through 1985. NUREG/CR-5496 documents a similar study whose primary objective was to update the LOOP model parameters, frequency, and recovery time, using plant event data from 1980 - 1996. An additional objective was to re-examine the engineering insights concerning LOOP events.
originally posted by: Bedlam
originally posted by: verschickter
Nice find
Just shows the insanity of the cold war days.
There was worse on both sides. Some of which seem to have been used by movie script writers, at least indirectly. We came REAL close several times. There's a bit more scrutiny before response at the moment. Maybe too much. But that's probably a good thing.
originally posted by: verschickter
a reply to: Bedlam
Electronic students in Germany even learn how vulnerable the american power grid is, the way it is set up.
We have achieved insane cut-off and reconnect times with new types of heavy load switches but with a carrington event, the isolators are in trouble.
Don´t forget the telephone line, that´s nearly impossible to shield against. Funny, last time it was also the communication network.
I don't know exactly what efforts have been made to safeguard infrastructure
, for myself, will have heat/warm water /cooking without electricity. If the spare pv-panels survive I also have enough power for lighting. Food and unspoiled groundwater will be my biggest problems. And vultures.