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U.S. homeland defense strategists have quietly implemented a novel way to protect sensitive facilities from GPS-guided weapons, such as cruise missiles.
Electronics experts have noted large errors in GPS navigation units used within about 0.25 mi. of a nuclear facility. Monitoring different models of commercial GPS receivers, while repeatedly driving past the plant, they found GPS-indicated speeds were consistently about twice that of their car. And GPS readouts of the terrain elevation near the plant were zero--several thousand feet low.
Such gross errors could be induced by transmitting low-power signal "corrections" in close proximity to a sensitive facility. These could effectively "spoof" the navigation of a cruise missile or other guided weapon that relied on GPS signals for targeting.
Airline pilots landing at an airport near one of these facilities have reported seeing "GPS anomalies" during their final approaches, but were not given an explanation.
When asked whether GPS spoofing was in widespread use to protect weapons-related facilities and other sensitive infrastructure, a National Nuclear Security Administration official said: "Those are areas we just don't talk about." A similar query of the Homeland Security Dept. was unanswered.