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In the last twenty years there has been a surge of scholarly interest
in rumors and conspiracy theories. Only a few have conducted systematic
studies of conspiracy believers or the social factors contributing to
belief, but there is no shortage of thoughtful and provocative theorizing.
Much of this expanding literature suggests that conspiracy theories provide
clarity of vision and clear targets for addressing the confusions,
frustrations, and insecurities of living in contemporary societies which
are characterized by rapid social change; a multiplicity of voices and
interests; multi-level, multi-polar balances of power where those at higher
levels maintain control through secrecy and controlling information;
declining individual autonomy; increasing risk awareness associated
with technological advances and “post-scarcity” conditions; high levels
of social and geographic mobility; declining trust in national governments;
and post-9/11 fears of terrorist/outsider threats.1 While these
theories are stimulating and insightful, we believe there is a need to
bring more systematic evidence to bear on two basic questions: Who
believes conspiracy theories, and what sources of information are associated
with believing conspiracy theories?
This study uses a national survey to examine the social and media
correlates of belief in three conspiracy theories about the terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center buildings and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001 (hereinafter 9/11). We will frame our analysis within two academic
literatures—research on the media’s role in shaping social and political
beliefs and the literature on the social and political causes and functions
of conspiracy theories.
A survey of 1,010 randomly selected adults asked about media use and
belief in three conspiracy theories about the attacks of September 11,
2001. “Paranoid style” and “cultural sociology” theories are outlined,
and empirical support is found for both. Patterns vary somewhat by conspiracy
theory, but members of less powerful groups (racial minorities,
lower social class, women, younger ages) are more likely to believe at least
one of the conspiracies, as are those with low levels of media involvement
and consumers of less legitimate media (blogs and grocery store tabloids).
Consumers of legitimate media (daily newspapers and network TV news)
are less likely to believe at least one of the conspiracies, although these
relationships are not significant after controlling for social structural
variables. Beliefs in all three conspiracies are aligned with mainstream
political party divisions, evidence that conspiracy thinking is now a normal
part of mainstream political conflict in the United States.
The social scientific literature on conspiracy theories can be divided
into two camps. The first, more psychological approach argues that
there is a conspiratorial personality or paranoid style of thought, and
views conspiracy theories as closely related to scapegoating and “us versus
them” worldviews. This approach has roots in Hofstadter’s seminal
essays of the 1950s.8 In this view conspiracy theorists combine close,
sometimes obsessive, attention to details and documentation with great
leaps of imagination through which they explain virtually all social developments and historical events in terms of concerted and conscious actions by powerful, highly organized, and secretive groups. Pipes recently
added that conspiracists’ leaps of imagination follow from irrational cognitive
tendencies: a strong belief that nothing is ever as it appears, a dis-missive attitude towards evidence contradicting a given conspiracy theory, easy acceptance of flimsy or forged supporting evidence, a worldview that all human action is motivated by a will to power and that all events are orchestrated and carried off as planned, and a tendency to attribute conspiracy to those who benefit from an event.